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PROGRESS AND SPIRITUAL VALUES [1]

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I

THE catchwords of our age, evolution and progress, sound very attractive so long as we do not pause to inquire into their significance. They are the delight of the sophist and the despair of the thinker. When we speak of progress we have in mind the human species. It is not easy to define what exactly the goal of human progress is. Even the leaders of the federation of progressive societies will find it difficult to give an adequate answer to the question of the end towards which we are actually progressing. They will find it more difficult to frame an ideal of human evolution which will be equally acceptable to, say, the monks of Mount Athos, Christian socialists, philosophical anarchists, secular humanists, Fascist nationalists, and classless Communists. Human nature is so widely differentiated in mind and outlook that there is not any single comprehensive purpose which will give direction to the partial and conflicting tendencies. Absence of any creative gradation of purposes has turned human society into a confused battlefield of groups holding passionate convictions that are irreconcilably opposed to one another. These groups, self-centred and exclusive, with clashing standards of value and diverse goals of action, are attempting to subdue and exploit the whole human commonwealth for the sake of their tribal aims. While modern science and the extraordinary progress of communications have made the world into a closely knit whole, and produced a unity in external and superficial things,

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the mental, moral, and emotional hostilities are effectively preventing the development of a world consciousness and community. Human beings seem to belong to many different mental species. We have to-day a world of increasing material contact and spiritual disunion.

These post-war developments have rudely shaken men's faith in the idea of progress. From the theory of the human perfectibility inherited from the eighteenth century, from the Hegelian interpretation of history as the progressive manifestation of absolute spirit, from the more recent doctrine of evolution, above all from the immense scientific and technological progress, we were led to believe in a constant, continuous, and almost automatic progress. Man's future is an endless road in which we are ahead of some and behind others. There is one god and progress is his prophet. The view that each decade is a gain over the previous, that each century is an improvement on its predecessor, does not inspire much confidence to-day, thanks to the war and its aftermath. No shock, no horror, no unprovoked aggression, no hideous assassination surprises us to-day. The world has grown incredibly harder and more brutal since 1914.

In his elaborate treatise on *The Decline of the West*, Spengler offers historical evidence for his thesis that cultures live through a period of development, flourishing, and decay. The culture of Babylon was so perfect and yet it vanished. Ancient Greece did great things in science and philosophy, in art and literature, but came to an abrupt end. Though one may not agree with Spengler's view, it helped to upset men's unreasoning faith in the providential nature of progress. There are some who believe that man and his world had been created perfect and all that had happened since was a steady falling away. Others argue that man and his manners have come out of savagedom and he is steadily moving towards the golden age which lies not behind but in front of him. The idea of inevitability, whether of progress or of decline, of a dialectical movement in historical sequence, is an illusion. Human history is not subject to natural laws.

The human element with its free initiative and adventure makes it difficult to accept the view that history is the fulfilment of a plan or a purpose. Turgot looked upon history as a pathless jungle and laid it down as a general historical principle that there were no historical principles. Professor H. A. L. Fisher endorses this view in the Preface to his recent *A History of Europe*. He writes: "One intellectual excitement has however been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me . . . (there is) only one safe rule for the historian;

that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen." This very capriciousness of history is the sign of the power of the human mind to produce good or evil. Men are autonomous beings and not automata. If the human individual were not to some extent a free cause independent of divine control and natural necessity there would be no history. If the divine were all, we should have the Kingdom of God on earth; if natural necessity were all, history would become a meaningless, mechanical routine. It is human freedom that gives meaning to history, which makes it irregular and inconsistent as well as attractive and interesting. Materialist views of history attempt to account for human progress by outward circumstances, by climatic changes, or social inventions. External conditions, however, are only the material. They provoke the reaction but do not produce it. The driving power of all change is the mind of man, his intelligent purposive striving to adapt himself more adequately to the changing world. Man is not a soulless item in a natural process borne on the tide of events of which he is the slave, willing or unwilling. He is the originator of the incalculable. If progress is not linear or uninterrupted, it is because we use our freedom in the wrong way. On account of our blindness and stupidity we fail to respond to opportunity and thus delay the triumph of ideals. History is more than a mere external phenomenon. It deals with events that take place on the plane of mind. Its reality implies the dynamism of man. There is no fatality of history, no obstacle which man cannot break down, no inescapable historic law.

Though there is no automatism in history, its course is not a matter of mere accident or chance. It may not disclose a plot or a rhythm; it yet has a reason and a sense. It is not a mere chaos. The ebb and flow in the waves of humanity, the great periods of enlightenment as well as the dark ages can be understood by a study of the underlying spirit of man. Unfortunately we know more about the affairs of kings and the intrigues of statesmen, about the collisions and upheavals which the world has endured on account of the unhappy egoism of powerful people, and less about the changes which have occurred in the thoughts and feelings of men. The way in which men ceased to care about the gladiatorial contests, how they came to feel after countless centuries that slavery was abominable, how to-day refined natures are revolting against wars and massacres is more revealing than dynastic feuds and quarrels.

Civilization does not proceed in a straight line upward or downward, but rather in a series of reaches. It follows an undulatory course. The great cultures of the past attained a pitch of perfection in many respects superior to anything of which we are capable. Due to the inertia and ill-will of man, dark ages occur off and on.

Progress is not inevitable. It requires to be achieved by man who grows by aspiration and effort. Ideas rule the world. Man must have a clear consciousness of the goal he is aiming at. He can advance to his goal by knowledge and achievement. He must adopt a world view which will bring him under the control of the great ideals of spirit. Human society is yet in its infancy with vast spaces of time to fulfil the destiny that awaits it.

II

(1) But what is the good of human effort and striving if in the end nothing really matters, if it is true that the ultimate extinction of life on earth is absolutely certain? On earth, there is no joy which is not tainted with sorrow. There is not one who is happy among mortals. Of all the fruits of our labour and toil, there is nothing which shall endure, nothing that shall abide and pass not away. All things are but ashes and smoke. Man is defenceless against death. The despondent author of the Book of Ecclesiastes says: "Because to every purpose there is time and judgment, therefore, the misery of man is great upon him. For he knoweth not that which shall be: for who can tell him when it shall be?"[1] That life is brief, that there is much in it of which we can have no sure knowledge, that there is no reason to suppose that in the end anything really matters ("Vanity of vanities, all is vanity"), are views which were dismissed as sentimental tosh so long as its spokesman was only the preacher. But now scientists are supporting the preacher's version of life and tell us of dissolving systems leading to universal extinction. The second law of thermodynamics or the law of entropy suggests the conclusion that the world had a beginning in time and is running down to a state of equal distribution of energy.[2] The world cannot escape the doom of all things mortal. It is folly to imagine that the human species will inhabit the world for ever. It will perish without leaving a trace behind. Just as we have individual death, we will have cosmic death. If the world is growing old and advancing towards its death, this aging of the world cannot be equated with progress. Dean Inge

[1] viii. 6–7. There is a passage in the Burial Service of the Church of England which reads thus: "Man that is born of a woman hath but a short time to live, and is full of misery. He cometh up and is cut down, like a flower; he fleeth as it were a shadow, and never continueth in one stay."

[2] Sir James Jeans writes: "The general principle known as the second law of thermodynamics predicts that there can be but one end to the universe—a 'heat death' in which the total energy of the universe is uniformly distributed and all the substance of the universe is at the same temperature. This temperature will be so low as to make life impossible. The end of the journey cannot be other than universal death."—*The Mysterious Universe*, p. 13.

writes: "An irreversible process towards higher value on the one side, and an irreversible process towards final extinction on the other, can hardly be manifestations of the same law."[1] Unamuno, the Spanish thinker who died recently, was haunted by the question: "What is the use of truth if a man dies?" The fortunes of the human race, so far as science can tell us, are too local, transitory, and unimportant an accident in the general scheme of things to satisfy human aspirations.

(2) It is true that science does not take the ultimate dissolution of the universe as quite settled. It is suggested that the process of dissolution is being balanced by recreation, and so the physical universe will go on endlessly. Space-time is essentially incomplete, not merely at this stage, but at all stages. A genuine duration must always be passing and can never be complete. In principle it is incapable of being completed. There can never come a time when the cosmic process will attain perfection. It can approximate to it perhaps but can never reach it. Man's historical experience cannot be anything else than one of steady failure. This failure is inseparable from material relations. Nothing perfect can be realized in time. The end of man consists in an uninterrupted striving after an impossible ideal. His aspirations can never be satisfied though it is necessary for him to cherish them since they animate his other activities and desires which are capable of fulfilment. There is no heaven other than the joy of ascent. Even this consolation is denied to us on a stricter interpretation. The Greeks, for example, regarded the process as a cyclic motion. Their gods were remote from the temporal process of history. The Greeks had no conception of a historical process which carries the universe to a "far off divine event." Aristotle tells us that human affairs are like the sea, which on its surface is distributed into a thousand motions, while at bottom it is comparatively changeless and still. The Florentine confirms this view when he paints the wheel of fortune on which a static mankind for ever revolves with the same sum total of virtue though differently distributed. Some of our progressives affirm that no age is or can be perfect, that goodness would not be goodness if there were no evil and that one age is not better or worse than another, but is only different. There is no hope of progress on this view. Even on the hypothesis of an endless process man is condemned to the fate of Tantalus. To strive after the unattainable, to waste the best of one's energy in the pursuit of a faith beyond the strength of man, cannot be the meaning of life.

(3) The Persians and the Jews were aware of history and historical destiny. For them history has a point of departure, a goal, a centre, and a purpose. For the Persians the conflict between

[1] *The New Twilight of the Gods* (1932), p. 16.

Ormuz and Ahriman is resolved by a catastrophic end of history which begins something else. The Jews believed in a final solution of history. The advent of the Messiah would solve the earthly destiny of Israel. The idea of the Kingdom of God was the centre of Jesus's teaching. As a child of his age, he was dominated by the contemporary expectation of a Messiah who would miraculously inaugurate a golden age. Though the Jews and the Christians valued the time process because it led up to a perfected state of the divine community, it is difficult to be definite about its nature and conditions. Some forms of Jewish and Christian eschatology declare the reign of Messiah on earth to be of very limited duration. Others do not believe in a steady progress but argue that things on earth would grow worse and worse until God intervenes catastrophically to inaugurate a reign of justice and happiness. In recent times, however, the idea that history leads by a gradual progressive development to a satisfying state on earth has become more prominent. This view raises two difficulties: (i) If the last generation is meant for perfection, what happens to the earlier generations? Are the individuals belonging to earlier epochs devoid of intrinsic value and significance? Are they mere means and instruments to the ultimate goal? How can future perfection expiate the sufferings of past generations? If this view were correct, then it is not a god of love that dwells at the heart of creation, but a "vampire pitiless and unjust" to the great bulk of mankind. In this difficulty, the religious expectation of the resurrection of all mankind is suggested, though this is a desperate remedy for a desperate situation. (ii) Perfection as a historical event is not a satisfactory goal. It is a psychological law that every sensation is blunted by being prolonged. If an agreeable stimulus lasts for long, it turns out painful. Weariness is the quality of all that lasts.

III

The difficulties mentioned in the previous section are due to a confusion between progress and perfection which belong to two different planes. Progress refers to a future world-aeon and perfection to the ultimate depths of one's being. Progress deals with a solution in the stream of time at some undated moment in the future history of mankind. It thinks of an ultimate perfection within the time order, within the limits of the historical process. Perfection is a victory over time, a triumphant passage from the historical to the superhistorical. Death is the symbol of time and resurrection is the symbol of the consciousness which has triumphed over death. We break up time into past, present, and future and argue that the future or the past has greater reality than the present. Eternity

suffers no such division. It is a quality, not a career, a possession not a pursuit. It is not a yonder state or a future consummation, but one here and now, a state we realize when we turn away from unreality and darkness to true light and life. The destiny of man is a realization higher than any that can be achieved in his purely historical experience. Man's inner division is reintegrated only in a higher and absolute reality. Perfection is not a goal at which the soul of man arrives, not a finality beyond himself. Release in this life (*jīvanmukti*) of the Hindu, perfection here and now of the Buddhist (*samditthakam nibbānam*) is the apprehension of reality which is not to be confused with the historical succession which is only the actual. "By reality and perfection," says Spinoza, "I mean the same thing." What causes the mind of man to entertain the idea of the eternal is the presence of the eternal in him. It is this that makes man put forth his effort to be purer and nobler than he is. When he rises to the higher life and apprehends the real, he transcends the pleasures and delights of life as well as its suffering and sorrows.

The intention of the Christian revelation is to endow history with this super-historical goal. At the moment of the revelation the bond of time is broken and the super-historical consummation realized. The closed circle of history is invaded by the energies of a higher plane, and this transformation is the climax and meaning of the history of our world in time. Christian theology, however, believes that the revelation of God in history is a non-recurring, indivisible, incomparable, and unique event. Hindu and Buddhist thought does not look upon it as exceptional. The experience is sufficiently frequent to be called normal. The unique event is an illustration of a recurring fact, of the fundamental truth that the eternal and the temporal coexist in reciprocal participation. Each individual contains the potentialities of spirit in him and can embody the divine Logos within himself. Eternal life is the birthright of every individual. As Sámkara, the great Hindu thinker, says,[1] everyone, by the very fact of his humanity, is capable of attaining the highest perfection. The call to perfection is addressed to each one of us: "Be ye perfect even as your father in heaven is perfect." If in the consciousness of Jesus man and God have found each other, each one of us can grow into this consciousness: "Have this mind in you which was also in Christ Jesus."[2] The Johannine letter describes the goal of Christian progress when it says that "we shall be like him."[3] Men of spiritual realization become "like" unto God according to the *Bhagavadgītā*.[4]

[1] Purusamātrasambandhibhih.
[2] Philippians ii. 5.
[3] 1 John iii. 2.
[4] Mamasādharmyamāgatāh, xiv. 2.

All systems of modern thought agree in regarding the world not as an unchanging succession of the same phenomena but as an evolutionary ascent, a progressive development from matter to man. The fundamental principle of this undoubted fact which has given us successively matter, plants, animals, and men is that this ascent cannot be interrupted at the stage of the imperfect being called man. The logical issue of this progression is that we should have further heights of consciousness and power which are not yet within our reach. There is a more developed consciousness possible, where we are able to release the imprisoned spirit by breaking down the obstacles which our body and life present. In other words, man can become the superman when his whole nature is organized and controlled by spirit. The spiritual heroes give us a measure of the stature of fullness or perfected individuality that is intended for us. To a world given over to succession they declare the magnetism of the unchanging, the call and cost of spiritual life. Look at Spinoza's noble words: "Love for the eternal and infinite feeds the mind with pure delight and is wholly free from every taint of sorrow; herein must lie the supreme goal of our desire, to be sought with all our strength."

The purpose of the universe, the ground of creation, so far as we can understand it is the attainment of perfection. Every aspect, every level, every individual contains within it a tendency to its perfection. Though it may not actually be achieved, its achievement would constitute its perfection. So far as the world is concerned, its justification would be the attainment of perfection at which it now darkly hints. When the human individuals freely respond to the call of spirit, when its rule prevails in the minds and hearts and wills of all men, when the spiritual perfection which we see realized in a few individuals is consummated in universal humanity, the Kingdom is established. It is the beginning and end of creation, its first cause and final goal.

Speaking in terms of time which is all that is open to us, we can say that such a complete manifestation of eternal values on the plane of history can only be, if at all, in the last moment of concrete time which contains all the others in the sense that it completes, synthesizes, and explains them. This completion of the universe is realized at the end when the process as such has ceased to exist. What was a naked possibility at the beginning becomes an accomplished fact in the end. The possibility which is the operative ideal and the driving power of the universe is the heavenly plan and the terrestrial destiny of mankind. The historical has its reflection in the eternal. It has an absolute significance as it is based on ultimate reality. When we say that the historical has its beginning and its fulfilment in the inmost depths of experience, we admit that it has

its origin in reality with which our spiritual life at its deepest comes into communion. The historical does not, however, exhaust the absolute. It translates into the plane of space-time one of the infinite possibilities in the absolute.

(1) So far as the end of the world is concerned, we need not be so dogmatic as to assert that it is either irrational or intolerable. Hindu and Buddhist religions accept the impermanence of things. The Hebrew poet who wrote "In the beginning," Plato who dramatized the world as having a beginning, a middle, and an end, and the early Christian writer who spoke of a time when "the heavens shall pass away with a great noise and the elements shall be dissolved into a fervent heat" conceived the world to be a finite entity. Time has meaning in relation to a process or purpose which is fulfilled or frustrated. When the universe becomes a bearer of values, it may well have its terminus. When the purpose of the cosmic process is achieved it only remains for it to be wound up, as mere continuance in time will not make values more valuable. Value is independent of time. When Blake tells us that we can hold infinity in the palm of the hand and eternity in an hour, he is pointing to the distinction between time and eternity. Time passes and along with it all things that belong to it. In the midst of things that are passing, there are a few that do not pass, which are exempt from death. These values abide while things only endure. The law of degradation makes no difference to the spirit which is the home of timeless values. Time is real only as the vehicle of values. Ultimate reality is distinct from a completed series of events and is of a higher character. When the Indian sage remarks that, when, his capital city is ablaze, nothing that is really his is lost,[1] he is affirming the reality of absolute values which remain unaffected by the chances and changes of the world.

(2) Eternal life is different from everlasting life. It is not an infinitely extended persistence through time. What is insoluble within the historical framework may be solved without it. History must be rescued from the externality of time, from its exile on the surface of that spirit to whose depths it belongs and restored to the perspective of the eternal.

(3) There is no such thing in history as progress from good to better and best on a single plane of development in virtue of which some future generation may perfect itself at the expense of those that have gone before. The absoluteness of spiritual life makes it possible for every generation to be in contact with it. It is erroneous to assume that only the last products of history are admitted to perfection. Every generation has its goal and justification, and every individual his meaning and value. No one is merely the

[1] Mithilāyām pradīptāyām na me dahyati kiñcana.—*Bhāgavata*, xii, 176, 56.

instrument of another. Through his spiritual impulses, every one approximates to the divine life.

IV

The significance of history is to be judged by its relation to absolute values, to the purpose which is independent of the historical process. Since the purpose is detached from time, is not situated within history, is not connected with any period of past, present, or future, it is well calculated to elucidate the historical process. It is not for us to say what exactly the end of the universe is. Its full comprehension is beyond human grasp. Though the details may be dark to us, we may say with confidence that the goal includes the development of free spiritual personalities with a universal outlook. This world is the sphere where the kingdom of spirit must begin and increase. It is realized by the spiritual redemption of the human race. It is not the same as the production of the greatest possible amount of pleasurable feeling or the creation of an earthly Utopia to be brought about by the co-operation of men of good will. Progress is not to be measured by the spread of an urban mechanical civilization whose evils are lessened by humanitarian movements. If humanity does not set before itself a transcendent aim, it will relapse into some barren rehearsal of the past or wallow in pleasure. A civilization requires to be judged by its capacity to increase the spiritual resources of humanity. We must ask whether it contributes to freedom, humility, and gentleness of soul or not, whether it recognizes the unique, imperishable value of the individual, and strives to maintain the sanctity of life at all hazards or not, whether it bases the social order on fineness of feeling or force. That there is *on the whole* progress is an assumption which must ultimately rest for its justification on the evidence of the facts themselves.

Freedom is the essential condition of man's higher life, intellectual and artistic, ethical and spiritual. Whether men make history or history makes men is an old controversy.[1] If we take away one man's vision, one man's heroic creation, one man's hold on the mind of his contemporaries, to that extent we will alter the course of history. The free individuals are the shapers of society. Every stage of our progress from the primeval slime began as a revolutionary thought in the mind of a single person, who was persecuted, if not stoned and killed for his audacity in daring to think differently. The great scientific inventions, artistic creations, philosophical discoveries, and religious insights are the work of exceptional individuals. A handful of free individuals guided the Christianiza-

[1] Cf. Kālo vā kāranam rājño rājā vā kālakāranam, iti te samśayo mābhūd rājā kālasya kāranam.

tion of Europe. Another handful to-day are staging a relapse into barbarism and disgracing the age in which we live.

From inward conflicts and outward chaos, from the instability of human nature and the bewilderment of the human soul it is clear that we have lost our hold on freedom. The fire of spiritual ideals is burning low. There is little zeal available for what is right and just, little indignation against the spread of inhuman ideals. Individual freedom is sacrificed in the name of mass movements. Mind, soul, conscience are absorbed into mass mind, mass soul, and mass conscience. We think with the crowd, feel with it, and act with it to the point of killing and getting killed. Society has become a machine and man a cog in it with no rights and claims to personal dignity. Nationalism is acting far more effectively as the opium of the people than religion. The regimentation of the mind, the annihilation of the individual spirit, the crushing of the soul is inimical to spiritual life. The process of history shows us many departures from the path of freedom to that of compulsion. The Grand Inquisitor wished to relieve men of the burden of freedom. Freedom is difficult and tragic. It is heroic responsibility and martyrdom. Automatism is easy, less heroic, less tragic. But there is no drama without personal freedom. When man sells his birthright for comfort and security, he is spiritually flagging, and growing insensitive to his high destiny.

The two chief characteristics of our age which are hostile to the life of spirit are economic materialism and romantic sentimentalism.

(1) Science has put us under an incalculable debt in its own domain. It has changed the face of the world. It has liberated man from drudgery and many occupations dangerous to human life and health have been abolished. If it has produced an industrial society and increased our dependence on machines, it is not in itself an evil. From that dim and distant date when a human creature struck out the first flint instrument, through all the ages until now, when man belts the globe with the radio and plans to annihilate whole cities with gas-bombs from the sky, the course of human life has been a career of material conquest and mechanical achievement. The pen, the brush, the spade, the lever, the pulley, the locomotive, and the internal-combustion engine form a continuous ascent. The machine is an expression of the victory of mind over matter. The machine is not an end in itself. It is a tool devised by man to give practical effect to his ideals. If our ideals are wrong, the fault is in ourselves, not in the machines. If our ideals are right, machines could be used to remove injustice, improve the lot of mankind, and help the spirit to grow into maturity. Those who declare that the danger of our situation is the excess of mechanism, the mechanizing of mind and the increase of machines in the outer world point to the excessive *tempo* of modern civilization, the anxiety connected

with the competition of living, the precariousness of life, the drabness and monotony of the lives of many workers who are required to repeat the same movement hour after hour mechanically, the exciting nature of our amusements and love for blinding speed and deafening noise. All these effects have little to do with machines as such. There is nothing in a motor car which requires us to drive it so fast as to kill innocent pedestrians. There is nothing in an aeroplane which compels us to drop bombs on fellow-men. If the modern tyrannies use the resources of modern science for making their despotisms more searching and ferocious than any autocracies of the past and succeed in turning out men as standardized units in the mass like the products of factories, it is because we are not keen about freedom. We do not seem to realize that it is not progress to try to shape ourselves in the image of ants and behave like worms. The technique of modern science and machinery could be used for the welfare of mankind as a whole, for giving them opportunities of spiritual development which were till now the privilege of a select few.

Unfortunately a false ideal of progress developed along with large-scale production. The machines produced in large quantities, and so more consumers had to be persuaded to buy the goods. Prosperity was said to depend on raising the standard of life which meant making two desires grow where only one grew before. While systems of religion and ethics plead for control of desires, the gospel of economic materialism demands increase of desires. To stimulate consumption, we must provoke longings and provide people with reasons for buying goods produced by machines. As a consequence, the only art which has advanced in recent times is the art of advertisement. Millions are wasting their whole labour in producing things that nobody ought to want, like stimulants and narcotics. The psychological equivalents which they help to assuage are depression and violence, exhaustion and excitement. The ambition of nations is to turn out goods cheaper and quicker than others and provide themselves with markets and colonies. By an inexorable logic, the quest for economic salvation and the idolatrous worship of the State lead to international anarchy and chaos. The world has become a madhouse of greed and conflicting interests.

We have long been familiar with calculating machines, and it will be more interesting if we get thinking machines. It will then be possible for us to know what the machines think of us, which will be more accurate than what we think of ourselves. Man's difference from the machine lies also in the power he has to conceive himself as other than he is. The thinking machines will show up our crudity of mind and insignificance. They will point out that prosperity and power, comfort and security are our ideals which tend to divide

and not unite mankind. They will laugh at our anxiety to get rich quick, at our readiness to succumb to schemes of sudden wealth, at the popularity of races and speculation, and at the ease with which material comfort has come to be a substitute for spiritual life.[1] Even our advanced thinkers set forth scientific Utopias which will result in turning the world into a well-run hotel or café. It is not realized sufficiently that outer organization is different from inner values. Outward success may coexist with inward failure, in individuals as well as in groups. A man may prosper in his business and reach a high position in his career and yet fail to overcome defects of character and attain serenity of mind. Another may fail outwardly and succeed inwardly. His success in his inward career may possibly be due to his outward failure. Success and prosperity may easily create a temper of mind in which the claims of spirit are forgotten. We are familiar with the parable of the Rich Fool, who, because his granaries were overflowing, chose to give himself over to the pursuit of pleasure. Science and its inventions are concerned with the outer organization, not the inward living. They can remove the hindrances to the good life but cannot create it. They can diminish illness but cannot tell a man what he shall do with his health. They can remove poverty and cure unemployment, but cannot tell a man what he shall do with his wealth and leisure. Oscar Wilde has a great short story, "Christ came from a white plain to a purple city and as he passed through the first street, he heard voices overhead, and saw a young man lying drunk on a window-sill, 'Why do you waste your soul in drunkenness?' He said: ' Lord, I was a leper and you healed me, what else can I do?' A little further through the town he saw a young man following a harlot, and said: 'Why do you dissolve your soul in debauchery?' and the young man answered: 'Lord, I was blind and you healed me, what else can I do?' At last in the middle of the city he saw an old man crouching weeping upon the ground, and when he asked why he wept, the old man answered: 'Lord, I was dead, and you raised me unto life, what else can I do but weep?' " Oscar Wilde is here pointing to the distinction between life and the appurtenances of life, between the means of living and the ends of life. Health, wealth, leisure, and life itself, which science can further, are the opportunities for higher life. Spengler draws a distinction between culture which is of the spirit and civilization which is of the flesh. Though

[1] An American Life Insurance Company recently advertised as follows: "Buddha, who was a born prince, gave up his name, succession, and heritage to attain security. But . . . we do not have to give up the world; we have only to see a life insurance agent who can sell us security for the future, the most direct step to serenity of mind," quoted in Babbitt: *The Dhammapada* (1936), pp. 114–15.

the two are not separable, a highly developed culture may subsist with a primitive civilization, as in ancient Greece, India, and China, and a highly developed civilization may subsist with a primitive culture as in the Roman Empire. While science gives us the capacity to control the conditions of life, it does not help us to use these conditions for fine living. We have to go beyond science to get the ideal values. If natural science is set higher than spiritual wisdom, if machines are allowed to make tools of men, the resulting state of the world can be best imagined by reflecting on Zola's hideous picture in his novel *La Débâcle*, of an express train roaring through the night with its crowds of passengers while the driver has fallen dead in the engine.

(2) Those who feel that it is difficult to organize life on the basis of science and utilitarian morality turn to the dark gods of instinct and feeling. Reality is for them not above but below the human and the rational level. "The man who thinks is a depraved animal," says Rousseau. "My great religion," said D. H. Lawrence, "is a belief in the blood, the flesh as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds. But what the blood feels, and believes, and says, is always true." Only the other day Goering said, "Intellectual activity has been the curse of our people." We are asked to substitute impulse, life force, blood, nature, for the ideals of reason and spirit. When we think with the blood puerilism, superstition, violence, idolatry and the open worship of the noble pagan and the predatory barbarian are the results. The romantic revivals which despise the critical principle and surrender to their own kind of unreason naturally come into conflict. Each one's allegiance depends on one's temperament. One man's goal is another's mirage. Between these private dream worlds, even communication becomes impossible. Cults of unintelligibility and codes of self-expression grow profusely. Romanticism is an evasion, a reaction.

Freedom is here confused with the absence of limitations, with the removal of the chains, with the throwing off of controls. Carlyle calls this kind of liberty the unstrapping of the devil. He represents the crowd as shouting at each successive liberation from control, "Glory, glory, another strap is gone." This kind of liberty cannot give us peace of mind or unity of life. Rousseau remarked that "his heart and head did not seem to belong to the same individual." We are not free simply because we happen to be born; we achieve freedom by effort and struggle. Freedom is attained only through the imposition of forms on the raw material of life. It is the spirit that shapes the given elements of our nature to a pattern and makes life fruitful.

A few words may be said about the expression of these conflicting tendencies in literature and morals, in philosophy and religion. "It

is as much a trade to make a book, as it is to make a clock," says La Bruyère. It is a matter of rules and technique. Delicacy, distinction, elevation of soul are not thought of. The great is reduced to the commonplace. On the other hand, we have the tendency to confound the real with the welter of the actual. Instead of eliciting the deeper meaning of facts, we are keen to show their lack of meaning. We are content with a jazzy impressionism, with crude accounts of the rawness of life. "Poetry," Diderot observes, "calls for something enormous, barbaric, and savage." Literature becomes the indulgence of idiosyncrasies. What is eccentric or unusual is said to convey the glamour of the spiritual. Robert Wolseley wrote as long ago as 1685, "Every ass that's romantic believes he's inspired." When Longinus tells us that great literature is the echo of a great soul, he makes out that it is inseparable from good living. Good living is neither temperamental overflow nor mechanical routine. Men's minds are shaped to-day not by the ancient classics, but by the works of Marx and Lenin and Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. In morals we have the Philistine and the Bohemian. The former lives outwardly, mouths the current prejudices, is impervious to ideals, and innocent of beauty. He exercises no free intelligence and vulgarizes everything he touches. He often speaks of morals and is perturbed about forms of conduct, but his moral being is as crude and undeveloped as the rest of his nature. He is an untrained, pushful, spiritually uprooted orphan, cocksure in his manner though not in his morals. There is not much meaning left in a morality that is always turning over text-books and quoting laws. The Bohemian, who is at the opposite pole, speaks of him as having the morals of a publican and the manners of a Pharisee and himself pleads for a relaxation of all forms of self-control. The evils of our age are due, according to the Philistines, to the unrestraint and temperamental liberty which are so fashionable and, according to the Bohemians, to the tyranny of taboos and traditional inhibitions. The Philistine and the Bohemian are not the only alternatives. There is the man of spirit who has faith in the transcendent and in the light of it achieves the delicate adjustment between the craving for freedom and the need of control. Everything, says Goethe, that liberates the spirit without a corresponding growth in self-mastery is pernicious. Long patient effort has ever been a part of the price to be paid for spiritual insight.

The rationalists reduce the divine reality to a pure transparency and are most at ease in moving within the circle of divine essence into which they seem to claim absolute insight. They emphasize right beliefs in God as essential to salvation. The romanticists advocate ecstatic worship and proclaim painless plans for getting into "tune with the infinite." Insistence on the art of meditation

implies the admission of the inadequacy of mere beliefs. Meditation is different from intellectual conceit and imaginative reverie. It is the strenuous effort of man's whole nature. Reverie is a dissipation of attention, a mere relaxation of one's grip on the world of spirit. Cultivation is the opposite of crudeness. It is personal exertion. Meditation is a strenuous effort of will assisted by keen intellectual discrimination.

Philosophy has lost its power because the over-intellectuals have reduced it to linguistic analysis and logical disputation. Protests against hard and crude rationalisms are uttered by romanticists who require us to become vital and dynamic. There is a tendency to confuse instinctive life with the spiritual. When we pass from outer to inner life, we enter the region of imponderables, that both eludes rules and scientific measurement, a region that is summed up in the word "soul." In the life of instinct and that of spirit, we have spontaneity and immediacy. In the former they are the result of absence of checks; in the latter of self-control. Spiritual life is not something into which we slip passively but is the result of the activity of man's whole nature. It is the task of philosophy to declare to us the truths of spirit, the eternal values which are above the stream of change.

V

If we scan the history of mankind over the centuries we see that with frequent failures, set-backs, and discouragements, it has advanced remarkably. There has been a steady growth in the accumulated knowledge and experience, the use of tools, customs, and traditions which make decent life in society possible. The reign of law and pity for the less fortunate and the weak have assuredly and gradually strengthened. We have knowledge, we have good will, and yet we are not able to shape our lives and institutions in a way that would free the world from the fear of wars. Resources, material and mental, exist in abundance, but are either unused or used with deliberate waste and destructiveness. We know that unlimited armaments mean ultimately competition in armaments and a race towards war. Like a drunkard who cannot give up drink in spite of his best will, like an addict who wants to give up his drug but cannot, civilization seems unable to save itself. Thinking men have much fear for the future and the unthinking suffer from nerves. We are in urgent need of a remedy that will soothe our shattered nerves and unify our distracted lives. Spread of enlightenment and growth of pacifist sentiment are not enough. Our rationalist prophets define the problems, deliver the doctrine, and declare that if man would but start to think, he would proceed to his salvation.

It is not quite so simple. These short cuts remind us of the dancing-master in Molière, who asserted that "all the mistakes of men, the fatal reverses that fill the world's annals, the shortcomings of statesmen, and the blunders of great captains arise from not knowing how to dance." Humanitarian sentiment is not effective enough to change men's minds. The question of peace or war is not simply a matter of political arrangement. Peace is a state of mind. So long as individuals are filled with restless desire and do not have peace in their hearts, it is madness to expect peace in the world. While resolved to renounce nothing, this generation wishes to enjoy the fruits of renunciation. A new simplicity, a new asceticism is what we need. If men conquer their own inordinate desires, this inner victory will show forth in their outer relations. In the third century B.C., Asoka succeeded to a realm more extensive than modern British India. He achieved in early life a reputation as a military hero. The spectacle of the misery caused by war filled him with remorse and he became a man of peace and an enthusiastic disciple of Buddha. The results of his conversion may be told in his own words as they appeared in the edicts which he caused to be carved on rocks and pillars throughout his vast empire. In one of them he tells us of his profound sorrow at the thousands who had been slain in his war on the Kálingas and at the misery inflicted on the non-combatants. "If a hundredth or a thousandth part of these were now to suffer the same fate, it would be matter of deep sorrow to his majesty. Though one should do him an injury, his majesty now holds that it must be pátiently borne, so far as it can possibly be borne."[1] Here was a mighty emperor who not only repented of his lust for dominion but had his repentance cut in rocks for the instruction of future ages. If science and machinery get into other hands than those of warring Caesars and despotic Tamerlanes, if enough men and women arise in each community who are free from the fanaticisms of religion and of politics, who will oppose strenuously every kind of mental and moral tyranny, who will develop in place of an angular national spirit a rounded world view, who can tell what might not be done?

[1] Rock Edict XIII. See Vincent A. Smith: *The Edicts of Asoka* (1909), p. 19.

GREAT THINKERS

(XI) BISHOP BERKELEY

Professor T. E. JESSOP

Berkeley belonged to the days when it was possible to write philosophy without being learned, when it was sufficient to have fundamental convictions and to be able to write about them clearly. His contribution to the stock of philosophical possibilities was substantially complete when he was twenty-five, at which age no man can or should be learned. Not until he became a bishop did he pile up the burden of scholarship, and the work in which he expressed it, the *Siris*, has remained a stumbling-block to his expositors. In his day philosophy was not learning but culture and wisdom. He could only have contemplated with dismay the plight of philosophy in England in our own day—the confinement of it to the universities, the substitution of scholarship for conviction, and the consequential admission on the part of many of those who teach it of its insignificance for practice. For him philosophy was not an academic discipline but a phase of an integrated life, or at any rate a part of the effort towards integration. All knowing, he said repeatedly, is a practical affair. For saying this he has been called a pragmatist, whereas he was only pragmatic. And because knowing is practical, it is simple. For the same reason its most significant findings are largely coincident with the beliefs of the plain man about the obvious world of sense and its supernatural foundation. He regarded himself as the philosopher of common sense. Practicality, simplicity, and constancy and serenity of religious conviction are the three qualities of Berkeley's mind that moulded and informed his philosophy. He stepped into the philosophical arena because the mathematics and physics of his time were becoming what in his view all thinking becomes when it breaks loose from its practical moorings, namely, oversubtle; and because they and the philosophy of his time outraged both his common sense and his religious beliefs. His philosophy, he said in the *Alciphron* (III, 16), is "a medicine for the soul of man."

His philosophy does not stand or fall with his motives, but it cannot be fairly understood without reference to them. It is no service to him not to insist that he philosophized primarily as a clergyman intent on vindicating the creed of which he was not simply an official trustee but also an ardent and transparently

sincere devotee. The ratification of belief, and of conduct through belief, was the dominating purpose of his writings. He went to philosophy as he went to America, to convert his fellows to what he regarded as the saving truths of religion. This religious purpose, besides its candid expression both at the climax and at many points on the way towards the climax of his several philosophical works, is emphatically advertised in his sub-titles and prefaces. It was not new truth but new proof of old truth that he set himself to discover. If, then, his conclusions were fixed beforehand, was he not rather a theologian than a philosopher? Since the objection would apply equally to St. Thomas, I see no force in it. The difference between the theologian and the religious-minded philosopher is not that the former has and the latter has not his main conclusions predetermined by an alleged revelation, but that the former treats whereas the latter does not treat this same revelation as evidence as well as source. By this test, Berkeley, equally with St. Thomas, is to be judged a philosopher. He integrates his foregone conclusions with empirical facts and rational principles and, at any rate in intention, with nothing else. To know that his conclusions were foregone is a valuable help to the proportioned understanding of his thought, but irrelevant to the question whether his thought, regarded not biographically but as an ordered body of propositions, is theology or philosophy. Besides, the main question about a man's thought is just whether it is true or not, and this can only be settled, not psychologically, but by considering the quality and extent of the evidence for it, its consistency, and the range of its explanatory power.

Berkeley, then, raised his religious apologetics to the rank of a philosophy. But this is not all. He could have done so very easily by refurbishing the Scholastic metaphysics that many of his contemporaries were content with, or by joining the recent but somewhat reactionary school of Platonizers. Instead, he took up the newest philosophy of his day and not only used its weapons but also endorsed much of its spirit. He was as rebellious as Locke and the Cartesians against the subtlety, pedantry, apriorism and authoritarianism of the Scholastic tradition. "I was distrustful at eight years old" (*Commonplace Book*, entry 275) is a confession which anyone who has tried to keep pace with his agile mind will not dream of questioning. In his verses on America he extolled the time

> When men shall not impose for truth of sense
> The pedantry of courts and schools.

The new "way of ideas" fascinated him. His respect for Locke stamps him as a child of the new age, of the eighteenth and not of the seventeenth century. This is evident also in his literary style.

Not with affectation but with natural genius he adopted that simplicity and elegance of presentation which the new century into which his late 'teens ushered him demanded and achieved in every kind of writing. He was the first to show that even philosophy could be expressed in the new style at its best; and even in the brilliant company of Swift and Addison and Steele he stands distinguished on the strength of his writing alone. Had he but dwelt on the themes they dwelt on and written always for their public, his name, like theirs, would probably have been known to everybody. Gosse and Saintsbury all but give him the highest honours; Mr. Herbert Read also, who speaks of his style as "almost the purest and serenest in English literature." In our own annals no one has shown so great a triumph of style over subject-matter. The *Principles* is but slightly dulled by its treatise-form; the *Three Dialogues* start the comparison with Plato; and the *Alciphron,* with its living texture of posers, repartees, characterization, and satire, completes it. Only a great *writer* could make a book out of nothing but 595 questions and "get away" with it—his *Querist,* which ran through six editions in two years.

Berkeley began and continued to philosophize primarily to defend four fundamental religious convictions, namely, that a God certainly exists, that He is pure spirit, that He associates Himself providentially with mankind, and that the human soul is immortal. The provocation to defend them came from the Newtonian conception of matter, Locke's theory of material substance, and the distinction, of which Locke was not the author but the most recent patron, between primary and secondary qualities. The first two provoked him because he found that from them he could conclude to materialism and that others had in fact done so whole-heartedly, and the third because he divined in it a latent scepticism. That both Locke and Newton were devout was irrelevant. Berkeley was concerned not with their private beliefs but with what he thought to be the logical and practical consequences of their published doctrines, and he attacked these consequences because they were so dangerously congenial to the moral materialism of the time that he feared they would fall on it like sparks on tinder. He would deprive "free-thinking" of any philosophical excuse.

Instead of speaking of the Newtonian conception of matter we ought perhaps to speak of the Newtonian vindication of the conception of matter introduced by Galileo, but the abbreviation is convenient. The greatness of Galileo lies less in his being the champion of the Copernican astronomy than in his being the founder of physics, the first to overturn the ageworn Aristotelian dogma that a science of terrestrial matter is impossible. He denied the distinction between terrestrial and celestial stuff. He demonstrated experimentally and

mathematically the identical regularities of both. After his work and Kepler's, Newton worked out his universal mechanics and fixed the conception of matter, so familiar to us but still fairly novel in Berkeley's day, as a homogeneous self-contained system operating in all its parts and elements in accordance with invariable laws which, when formulated, enable us to exhibit every physical happening as a necessitated one. This mechanistic scheme had been anticipated speculatively by Descartes and Hobbes. It thus came to Berkeley through both his scientific and his philosophical predecessors. What he saw in it was its most obvious religious bearing. Making of Nature a closed order, a blind machine operating entirely out of its own resources, it seemed to leave no place for God. It gave a warrant for atheism. Even a religious bias could carry it no further than deism, for it excluded not only the actuality but also the very possibility of that divine intervention in cosmic and terrestrial affairs which Christian theology maintained on the twofold ground that it is called for by man's needs and involved in God's essential sovereignty and benevolence.[1] Since both inferences, the atheistic and the deistic, had in fact been drawn and defended by a few known writers and a great many nameless talkers (when we write about "free-thinking" we tend to forget the coffee-houses), Berkeley recoiled from the grounds. His recoil generalized itself into a refusal to allow any view of matter that gave it an existence and potency independent of God. Positively and philosophically, he set himself the task of finding a theory of the corporeal world agreeable to the sovereignty and providence of God and at the same time compatible with the facts of perceptual experience; compatible also with man's responsible freedom and his immortality, which the new theory of matter was already being used to deny.

The peculiar turn given by Locke to the conception of matter was less overtly but just as dangerously susceptible of an anti-theistic interpretation. He analysed matter into qualities and substance. The former are aspects mirrored in such of our percepts as he considered to be veridical ("primary qualities"), the latter is an entity postulated as the support and possessor of the former, postulated under the demand of what we should now call the category of thinghood. But although both appear in knowledge with equal though unlike certainty—the one with the authority of perception, the other with the authority of reason—material qualities appear as

[1] Berkeley here had in mind providence rather than miracles. His avoidance of any stress on the evidential value of the latter is another sign of his modernity. One of the main aims of his thought was to preserve the vast regularities discovered by the new science. But by making them depend directly on the will and purpose of God and interpreting them exclusively as the condition of human living he preserved also his religious point.

concrete content, whereas material substance stands only as a pure form, as simply that which it has been invented to be, namely, a something of which qualities are the qualities. For Locke, then, the very essence of matter, the producer of all perceptible phenomena and the bearer of such as are truly objective, is unknowable except as a rationally indispensable *x*. This agnostic conclusion alone was enough to antagonize Berkeley, who, until he settled down, for the first time in his life, at Cloyne, saw most things with the cognitive simplicity and confidence of youth. But when Locke went further, dividing spirit too into known qualities and unknowable substance, Berkeley revolted against the increasing nescience. And when Locke went still further, suggesting the theoretical possibility that material substance and spiritual substance are, for aught we know, the same—it is fatally easy to identify two *x*'s—Berkeley detected a grave danger to his own religious postulates. He saw that the suggested single indeterminate substance could be interpreted in two ways with equal legitimacy so far as Locke had gone, either with a spiritualist or with a materialist bias; and, knowing the temper of his day, he suspected that the latter was the more likely to be followed. He therefore undertook to disprove this alternative and establish the other. An unknowable entity, a postulated mystery, takes us away from the controls of responsible thinking: in so far as it is indeterminate it is incompatible with nothing, and in so far as it goes beyond the analogies of experience nothing can be either proved or disproved of it. Like the Unconscious of our psycho-analysts, it will accept almost anything we care to attribute to it.

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is in Locke in one respect (against the Cartesians) a vindication of sense-perception, in another a condemnation of it. Berkeley fastened on the latter. Scepticism of sense was for him, I think, the worst scepticism of all, as being the least excusable. On the higher planes of thought there are obscure margins where the strangeness and inherent difficulty of the points at issue make uncertainty and controversy natural—no one was more aware of this than Berkeley—but at the lower level the certainty is so plain that we do and must live by it. Besides, quite independently of his motives, Berkeley found a Nature destitute of secondary qualities altogether incredible. He could not bring himself to believe that when he saw a colour he was really looking at a motion. What he felt, then, in the presence of Locke's criticism of sensory knowledge was that if we can get little or no certainty about the vulgar objects of sense there is little chance of our gaining certainty about such higher matters as the existence and nature of God and the freedom and immortality of the finite soul. True, Locke had urged, as Butler and Hume were

to do shortly, that his conclusions proved only that our powers of knowing were given to us for practice, for which they are entirely adequate, not for speculation, for which they are inadequate, and that in consequence we are not logically entitled to deny the transcendent truths of religion. Berkeley's retort is one of his many paradoxes. The man who insisted that knowing is a practical function, who disliked finely spun concepts, who has been praised as a radical empiricist, stood for our title and ability to speculate. This, and not always because of his *esse-percipi* doctrine, is why he has warmed the heart of post-Kantian idealists. When we write our histories it is better to say, not that Locke posited empty substances, that Berkeley had the sense to get rid of some of them and Hume to get rid of them all, but that whereas Locke tried to cut down speculation to a minimum and Hume tried to destroy it altogether, Berkeley spoke out for it and gave it wings. He was one of the very few British ontologists of the eighteenth century, and the only one of any consequence. It was self-evident to him that the foundations of even practical belief and life are transcendental, to be received, therefore, either by faith or by speculative knowledge, or partly by one and partly by the other. He stood for the last of these three possibilities. From the beginning to the end of his career as a writer he shrank from the justification of religion and morals by the bankruptcy of either sense or reason. Even in the humble conclusion of the *Siris*, written in the chastened mood of age, he is still a gnostic, unable to take a single step towards Pascal; age finds knowledge harder, that is all. This gnosticism, of an entirely non-esoteric kind—to commend the ultimates, he said (*Alc.* VII, 15), it is not necessary to depart from the accepted rules of reasoning—is one of the marks that distinguish him from Malebranche, with whom his contemporaries confused him. Malebranche, after an arduously sustained philosophical effort, in the end fell back on a mystical intuition of God and a merely pious acceptance of a material world which he had shown to be theoretically dubitable and superfluous.

In these ways Berkeley's religious apologetic came to shape itself into strictly philosophical problems. The general problem was that of matter, which he analysed into the questions of the content, status and causation of the world of sense. His remaining problems arose out of the discussion of these. His general answer was that the senses reveal a real world, that they reveal it faithfully, and that this sensory world is spiritually created, spiritually maintained, and spiritually made known. Because one of its chief aims was to exclude matter, Berkeley called his doctrine immaterialism. "Immaterialistic theism" would describe both its negative and its positive aspects. Matter as an absolute existent or order and God are

incompatible, for there cannot be two absolutes; and matter as an *x* is either sinister or simply silly.

Having given a name to his metaphysical position, how shall we characterize his epistemological position? There is a monstrous tradition that Berkeley was a sensationalist. I know only one text that can be quoted in support of it, but it is one of the entries in the *Commonplace Book* that he did not allow to pass into the works he published.[1] The tradition is monstrous because it makes his published works unintelligible and even foolish. Start by imposing this label and you can criticize his assumption of the causal principle as unwarranted, his introduction of "notions" as an inconsistent afterthought (although it is already in the *Commonplace Book*, cp. nos. 179, 527, 581, 724), and his affirmation of spiritual substance, whether divine or only human, as a scandalous lapse. You may even sink to the level of repeating the charge that the man who said "*esse* is *percipi*" left no place in existence for *percipere* and thereby made his position absurd. In print Berkeley never said that all knowledge comes from sense but only that without sense there would be nothing to start the thinking function into activity, the latter, once active, being another source. He never said that all our knowledge of even sensory objects is sensory—our knowledge of their causation is not—but only that the sensory evidence for these must be taken seriously if radical scepticism is to be avoided. And though he did say that *esse* is *percipi*, it was in a context in which he was considering only the existence of sensory objects, not existence in general or as such.[2] The apparently disproportionate space which he devoted to the problem of the world of perception is presumably responsible for the misunderstanding. But the misunderstanding is scarcely pardonable. The *Principles*, rightly taken as the most authoritative statement of his doctrine, was published as a fragment, as "Part I" (this is on the title-page), as that part in which the nature of only the perceptual world was to be the main subject; and his *Three Dialogues* appeared as a livelier rewriting of that one part. But even in that fragment he makes it abundantly clear—in the first edition and not only in the second[3]—that he accepts "reflection" as well as sensation as a way of getting

[1] No. 792 (Johnston) "I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.' "

[2] Berkeley is quite clear about the two senses of *esse*. See *Principles*, § 142, *ad init.*

[3] Arguments about the changes in the second edition are unreliable in so far as they are based on Fraser's text, which, despite his claims, is at many points an amalgam of the two editions. For this reason I have prepared a new recension of the *Principles*, giving in full the text of the first edition, and noting all deviations in the second. It is now in the press.

data, and reason as the faculty by which data have to be interpreted; and I do not know of any presuppositions or statements of his that make his acceptance of reflection and reason inconsistent with his acceptance of sensation. He was as little a sensationalist as Locke was, and as little an empiricist, if empiricism means the restriction of "experience" to "sense-experience" and the admission of reason as nothing more than the analysis and synthesis of sense in terms of sense alone. Like Locke, he just took the principles of reason for granted: there was no need to defend what had not then been impugned. He was, indeed, more rationalistic than Locke, in the sense that he had a bigger confidence in the power of reason to carry us beyond the limits of individual experience.

The line of argument by which Berkeley disposes of matter is subtle only because it is disconcertingly simple. He means by matter not only Locke's material substance and the quantitative body of the Newtonian physics, but also and always—for this is a more general concept including the others—any object of sense or analogue of an object of sense regarded as existing absolutely, that is, independently of mind. Any such conception, being grounded on sense, must be examined by examining the testimony of sense. He first cleared the way, in his *New Theory of Vision*, by showing that sensible objects are not given as external, not even in vision. Externality is only inferred. But his primary and persistent position was one which in his day needed no apology, for it was the primary and persistent position of the Cartesians and of Locke, namely, that the immediate objects of sense are ideas, that is, entities that cannot be regarded as floating about apart from a mind. Here he was no innovator. The philosophic issue of the day was the question what could be inferred from these sensible ideas, and the prevalent answer was that some of them mirror, and all of them are caused by, things that exist, possess their mirrored properties, and go their way, quite independently of any awareness by mind. It was this inference that Berkeley bent all his efforts to counter.

Firstly, he gave a shrewd refutation of the reason for distinguishing ideas into those that do (ideas of primary qualities) and those that do not (ideas of secondary qualities) copy things or properties existentially separate from them. That the former, unlike the latter, do not vary with the position and other conditions of the percipient is simply an error of fact. Moreover, it is utterly impossible to realize in consciousness any primary quality without a secondary one intimately suffusing it: extension, motion, rest, number, do in fact have and cannot be presented without a concrete filling. Wherever there is space, for example, there is colour, and conversely. They are correlatives, and correlatives cannot be separated in thought. Consequently—for Berkeley believed in the metaphysical

truth of thought—they cannot be separated in reality. This is one of the bearings of his polemic against vicious abstraction.

Secondly, he laid the axe at the root, at the underlying supposition that an idea can represent, in the sense of copy, something that is not an idea or not potentially an idea. For since, on the one hand, *ex hypothesi* the mind cannot directly confront anything but ideas, it has no means of knowing whether these are or are not like anything beyond their own form of being, the condition of comparison (the direct presence of both) being absent; on the other hand, any such likeness is impossible, for how can an idea be like what is not an idea, the essentially perceptible like the essentially imperceptible? To say with Locke that the square I see is not the square that is really there but only a copy of it, though a faithful one, is to affirm what cannot be proved, and to imply what is incredible, namely, that there are shapes that *cannot* be perceived. Berkeley could no more believe this than he could believe that when we see a colour we are really seeing motions; and I imagine that in both these cases his incredulity was spontaneous, not derived from the metaphysical advantage he was to draw from it. The incredulity is so natural. He just failed to find a reason for taking properties that are immediately perceived and duplicating them in a supposititious realm inaccessible to perception; still less could he conceive why the gratuitous inaccessible duplicates should be called the real properties. He therefore flatly denied the twofold existence of sensory objects. And in so doing, he disposed not only of matter but also of scepticism regarding the worth of sense-knowledge, for an idea is only subject to doubt when it is supposed to stand for something else. What it *is* it itself reveals. What it represents is, however, nothing. Some ideas are not good copies and others bad ones, for none of them are copies at all. They are simply themselves. Therefore the very shape I see is the real shape; and the very colour I see, and the very sound I hear, and the very heat I feel, are real, not masks of invisible motions. The only escape from scepticism is insistence on the immediacy of perception.

An interesting feature of this hard-headed argument against representationism is that it can stand apart from the Cartesian presupposition, the "way of ideas," from which it started. It could be approved and repeated—indeed, it has been—by some of the extreme realists whom the twentieth century has brought forth. So far Berkeley was right in claiming that he had vindicated the naïve assessment of perceptual knowledge. The corporeal world is what I apprehend it to be when I use and trust my senses, and what I apprehend is the corporeal world itself, matter in the only meaningful sense of the word. But Berkeley assimilated all this to the presupposition that the directly apprehended world consists of

ideas, of objects inseparable from awareness. As he himself put it, he sided with both the unreflective man and the philosopher, combining the insights of both—the horse-sense of the former that seeing is believing, that what I perceive is precisely what is there to be perceived, and the "discovery" of the latter that what I perceive is an idea. It is the union of the two that yields his famous formula *esse* is *percipi*. He urged that this formula was an eirenicon, a word of reconciliation between the man in the street and the philosopher. In his day, instead, the man in the street (for example, Dr. Johnson!) ridiculed its philosophic premiss, and the philosopher ridiculed its naïve premiss. This is ever the fate of the mediator. In our own day, the philosopher tends to accept the naïve premiss, while the plain man, sophisticated out of his plainness, just scratches his head. For Berkeley, however, the formula is axiomatic. That the existence of stones and trees consists in their being perceived is certainly not obvious. But if we reduce them to all that they exhibit themselves to be, to sensory qualities, the formula becomes "the *esse* of *perceptibilia* is their *percipi*," which is less paradoxical. And if we then find ourselves quite unable to read any meaning whatever into the conception of a sensory quality such as shape that *cannot* be seen or touched (Locke's "real" shape), we almost see the formula as Berkeley himself saw it.

So far matter has been disposed of as an unnecessary and unintelligible duplicate of the sensed world. It may still be affirmed as the substance of that world. Berkeley's rejection of material substance is straightforward. The term "substance" must be understood either literally or metaphorically. Taken literally, it means something extended ("standing under"). Now if material substance is extended, it is perceptible. But it is by Locke defined as essentially imperceptible; and since he postulated it to provide something in which extension can inhere, it cannot itself be extended. In its literal sense, therefore, Locke's material substance is self-contradictory. Is it, then, a metaphor? But "a metaphoris abstinendum philosopho" (*De Motu*, 3). The maxim is, of course, a sound one, but hard to follow, and Berkeley knew quite well that Locke introduced the postulate of material substance in order to provide a principle of attachment or unity for the fleeting objects of sense-perception. He agreed that such a principle is needed, that these objects do not wander about self-existently. But he could find no decently definable term, no tolerable concept, to express any attachment or unity on the side of the objects or beyond them, and therefore concluded that their only anchor and bond is their associated presentation to consciousness. This connection is factual; anything else is theory; the minimal requirement of theory is that it shall be intelligible; and Locke's postulate is unintelligible. In

the only sense that remains for the word "substance" in relation to the corporeal world, mind is the substance of sensory qualities. This is the first clear instance of the deliberate metamorphosis of substance into subject. Perceived qualities "inhere" in consciousness not by way of mode, not as qualifying it, but as objects over against it. They qualify nothing.

The last plea for matter is that even if we can give it no other content or function, we need it as the cause of sensory qualities. Berkeley agrees that these must have a cause, and that this cause is neither the qualities themselves not the finite consciousness to which they happen to occur. They are not produced by one another because the testimony of consciousness gives no evidence whatever of it, and things whose whole nature is to be manifest cannot have occult powers. They are not produced by things like themselves but imperceptible because there are no such things. And they are not produced by us because they are the very qualities which the testimony of consciousness distinguishes as not produced by us. By the same testimony of consciousness, however, we do produce other ideas, and since, where reason gives of itself no guide, the analogies of experience are to be followed whenever there are any, we have to conclude that the ideas of sense are produced by a mental agency other than ours; by a single mind because they exhibit regularities in a single order of being, by a beneficent mind because their regularities are adapted to human needs, and by an infinite mind because nothing less accounts for their vastness. This is Berkeley's new proof of God, based on the doctrine of *esse* is *percipi*.

Here, in my belief, his interest in speculation, up to the time of his retirement to Cloyne, stopped. For himself and his readers, he held, such a conclusion required nothing more than the acceptance of its practical religious consequences. The internal development and extension of the theory he reserved for systematic works—Parts II and III of the *Principles*—which he never wrote, giving only glimpses in occasional writings such as the *De Motu* and the *Analyst*. His *Alciphron*, the product of the only real leisure he had in the twenty years between his first Dublin period and his going to Cloyne, is the nearest we get to a continuation, but it is richer in criticism than in construction. In the early period it was sufficient for him that he had sketched the main outlines of a philosophy, the *principles*, not the detailed organization, of human knowledge. And the principles he had so far formulated and defended arise only out of the problem of the status and origination of the order of objects given to us in sense. He has shown that even from this lowly level, and by a procedure consisting so largely of negations, of pruning by Ockham's razor, reasoning can raise us to a transcendent real, even to God. This is a *tour de force* without a parallel in the history

of philosophy, the result of an original and inflexible simplicity of mind content to establish the minimal certainties of thought because they are the maximal certainties of life. Perhaps he simplified too much. If we attach any significance to the work begun by Kant and Hegel and to the achievements of nineteenth and twentieth-century science—for not forestalling these Berkeley can scarcely be blamed—we shall certainly find his system too attenuated. But simplicity is the ideal and criterion of science, and Berkeley's insistence on it in philosophy is a healthy admonition, and a welcome counterweight within idealism to the heavy involutions of the German tradition. A French writer has well said: "S'il est vrai que l'auteur des choses agisse toujours par les voies les plus simples, Berkeley doit être bien près d'avoir surpris le plan créateur."[1]

Of his outline the above is itself a much abbreviated outline, omitting his criticism and restatement of the doctrine of abstraction, his theory of vision and visual language and of space, time, and number; omitting also any discussion of the questions whether he has logically avoided solipsism, whether his resort to (or concession of) archetypes is inconsistent with his denial of representationism, whether his account of thinghood is adequate, and other questions. Every statement of the outline bristles with challenges, which I have ignored for the sake of continuity of exposition. One paper cannot embrace all these. That they raise, indirectly when not directly, the basic problems of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics is the chief reason why Berkeley is so often a text for philosophers and a text-book for their students. He suits the former because he leaves them room to use their wits in the eliciting and testing of special consequences; he is helpful to the latter because he keeps the big issues always to the fore.

Of his undeveloped doctrine of mind, to which the unwritten Part II of his *Principles* was to be devoted,[2] a word may be added with a view to removing a common misunderstanding. The implied criticism of Hume is often repeated that Berkeley, after rejecting the conception of material substance, had no right to retain the conception of spiritual substance. The criticism is confused. In the first place, Berkeley's arguments against the first do not apply at all obviously to the second. They turn on the incoherence of supposing anything "under" extension, on the impossibility of conceiving how the material could produce ideas, and on the superfluity of postulating a material principle of union among ideas. It was not because he could not find it given in sense-experience that he rejected it, but because he judged it to be meaningless and useless,

[1] G. Lyon, *L'idéalisme en Angleterre au 18e siècle* (1888), p. 337.

[2] See *Commonplace Book*, nos. 511 and 819, and *Principles*, § 144.

creating problems and solving none, having "no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority."[1] It is possible that he was wrong in this judgment, but he was not inconsistent; if he was wrong, the criticism that proves it is external, not immanent. In the second place, it is very doubtful whether the conception of spiritual substance he retained was analogous to the conception of material substance he rejected. His spiritual substance, it seems to me, was neither an *x* nor a postulate but a fact of experience: he meant by it the self-apprehending oneness of his own experiencing, the continuity of awareness that declares itself in remembering, and in following out a problem, and the power, introspectively evidenced, of producing new ideas. His taking the unity seriously, metaphysically, was a consequence of his belief in the veracity of consciousness; and the possibility that the unity is only derived or phenomenal, belonging wholly to the body, was not overlooked but logically excluded by his idealistic interpretation of the corporeal world. Hume is not Berkeley made consistent. The only material premiss they have in common is that the immediate objects of sense-perception are ideas, and Hume made these ideas the source and criterion of everything, whereas Berkeley made them the source and criterion of nothing but what alone they are relevant to, that is, knowledge of the corporeal world. From the outset, Berkeley recognized the peculiarities of mind or minding, again and again warning us not to construe it after the analogy of the corporeal, the sensory, the minded. It is the essentially active, ideas being the passive, and therefore even as object it is not an idea. This doctrine cannot be torn out of the *first* edition of the *Principles* without making nonsense of the whole book. What he added in the second edition was the *name* "notions" (which in the first edition had been used as a synonym for "ideas"), to fix for the terminologically minded a distinction which he had made clearly enough before. But few, I fear, will believe this as long as Fraser's imperfect collation of the two editions is the only text available.

To say anything about the *Siris* is to risk adding to the misunderstandings of that curious work. I certainly dare not claim that any thoroughly objective interpretation of it is possible. My own reading of it is heretical. I am not quite happy about the stock saying that it is the work of his old age. A philosopher of all men is scarcely old at fifty-nine. If the book is senile, its author's senility was premature. I doubt too whether the book, even when the tar-water is emptied out of it, is fairly treated when it is regarded as an essay in philosophy. Philosophy is at least argumentation, and of this there is scarcely anything in the *Siris*, which is much more a sequence than a consequence of affirmations and negations. When

[1] *Three Dialogues*, Fraser (1901), vol. i, p. 462.

Whitehead[1] treated Berkeley in close connection with the Romantic Revival, he could have added by way of particular evidence that De Quincey and Blake and Coleridge were fond of Berkeley. But it was the Berkeley of this late book. After Berkeley's death, it seems, no one read the *Siris* except such romantic writers until it was resurrected—the first reprint since 1747—in Fraser's great edition of the *Works* (1871), since when it has been either praised as a deepening of his idealism or censured as a recantation of his early "sensationalism." The latter appears to me to be much further from the truth than the former. If there was indeed a *volte face*, it was not what it is usually represented to be. He still rejects abstract ideas in the only sense in which he ever rejected them (secs. 323, 335); there is still no absolute space or motion (270 f.); force is still only a mathematical hypothesis (234, 246, 250), and attraction still only a phenomenon and therefore not an explanatory factor but a fact to be explained (243, 245); natural phenomena are still simply what we perceive them to be (292); body is still inactive (248), physics dealing only with observed uniformities (250), corporeal "causes" being still entirely secondary, *συναίτιοι*, "necessary to assist, not the governor, but the governed" (160). And, of course, all bodies are still relative to mind (251). In all this Berkeley is but summarizing, in the aphorisms which the absence of argument makes possible and with the genius of perfect mastery of his thoughts, the main positions of his earlier works. Even the much-quoted saying, "Strictly the sense knows nothing" (253, cp. 304 f.), rings in its context with no unfamiliarity except one of emphasis. The only way to know a sensible object is to sense it, and it is still just what we sense it to be; but while all of us have senses, not all of us have (or at any rate use) understanding, which is requisite for the knowledge of their causes (cp. 264, 330): and Berkeley always held that *this* knowledge is an affair of reasoning. In the earlier days polemical exigencies moved him to defend sense; now other external provocations prompted him to exalt with an emphasis which his former problem did not demand the other factor in knowledge. The new emphasis does, however, betoken a deep change of attitude, the full explanation of which is an unsolved biographical problem, but only biographical, not philosophical. Accompanying it was an affection and respect, quite new in its extravagance, for the writings of the ancients. Through a farrago of quotations from and references to them he seeks to add authority to his own distinctive doctrines. Of this most uncharacteristic trait we fortunately have the hint of an explanation from Berkeley himself. The general temper of an age is influenced by the prevalent philosophy, his own age by the "corpuscularian and mechanical philosophy," which had given to

[1] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 106.

interests as well as to thinking a strongly materialistic bias; but "had the philosophy of Socrates and Pythagoras prevailed in this age . . . we should not have seen interest take so general and fast hold on the minds of men, nor public spirit reputed to be γενναῖον εὐήθειαν, a generous folly, among those who are reckoned to be the most knowing as well as the most getting part of mankind" (331). What led Berkeley from the moderns to the ancients was their stable sense of practical values. So that Berkeley's final lapse into scholarship was, after all, but a consequence of those practical prepossessions which had moved him to write the *Principles* and his other works, to sail to America, and to advertise to the world the virtues of tar-water.

OXFORD AND PHILOSOPHY

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I HAVE often wished that someone would write a History of Oxford Honour Schools. But I want that work written for reasons which the title does not immediately suggest.

To begin with, there is a certain attitude towards life associated with Oxford, of which we all recognize the outward forms. One of these is a sort of irony which, aggravated in the acuter cases by a slight drop of the larynx in speaking as in the voice-production of a bad contralto singer, used to be called the Oxford manner. But perhaps the Oxford manner died with the late Lord Curzon. Max Beerbohm showed a prettier side of the Oxford ethos when he said, "We are sent to a Public School to have the nonsense knocked out of us, and then we come up to Oxford to have it all gently put back again." It is maliciously illustrated in the story of the Oxford rowing man and the Cambridge rowing man, each of whom paid the other a visit in order to inspect the rival river. The Oxford man, having explained how much broader and livelier are the waters of the Isis than those of the Cam, led his friend into Christ Church Meadow through Rose Lane, and then turned left-handed, taking the longer route to the barges, in order to show him that Oxford had something comparable to the Backs as well as a better river to row on. "Oh!" said the Cambridge oarsman, when they reached the bank of the Cherwell, "it's not so very much broader!" Shortly afterwards the Oxford man returned the visit, and found himself with his friend on Clare Bridge. Leaning nonchalantly over the parapet, he remarked, "And is this the Tab?"

I will not try to describe this Oxford attitude more closely. Those who have it find the very attempt to define it a degree too ingenuous and unclever. That is characteristic of it. And yet in a hesitant age, which is beginning to feel for its roots in the past because it does not much like the look of its future, it might be good for Oxford too to take stock of itself; to examine historically the cast of mind which lies behind its outward manner and address; to ask what has produced this ethos, and what it has produced; even prehaps what is likely to become of it in the future.

That is one reason why I want a History of Oxford Honour Schools. Another is that though, when we are criticized, it may be dignified in us to refrain from active apology, yet I believe it is our business to help the world in general to a knowledge of what it is

criticizing. I want not propaganda but impartial publicity; not self-advertisement but a frank effort to discover and give an account of the faith that is in us—or has at least been in us for the last few generations.

Those are two points which my historian will bear in mind.

Lord Curzon swallowed every academic honour. Max did not: he ploughed in Greats. So we might think that of "the sweet food of academic institution," as Lamb calls it, which nourished two such diverse talents, and which works a change even in the idlest passman, the actual curriculum is not the *pièce de résistance.* But I think we should be wrong. At any rate, my author will work on the hypothesis that Literae Humaniores have been the vital impulse —or, it may be, the lethal virus—which has permeated Oxford education as most of us habitually picture it to ourselves. Perhaps no one will be shocked by that. But—as the title of this article suggests—he will try to contend further that within Literae Humaniores philosophical studies have constituted a centre of influence which has radiated outwards through the teaching of the Classics to other humane subjects, and thence even to Pass Moderations and the non-scientific Groups; which has by leakage through channels official and unofficial even come to touch faintly the daily life of young men whose contact with the curriculum is superficial, and who would be astonished at the suggestion of any such sophistication.

That may seem less likely. It is of course true that this radiation diminishes constantly, fusing differently, as it lessens, with each fresh positive element which it meets, until at its circumference you can hardly recognize the blend. Modern Greats has altered in quality, but also strengthened, the philosophic efflux. Mathematics and natural science have naturally been little affected, and when my historian comes to deal with them, their probable future relations with philosophy in Oxford may fill one of his later chapters, but he will not much concern himself with their disconnection in the past. Yet I fancy that one can usually tell an Oxford scientist from one bred elsewhere.

A History of Oxford Honour Schools should, I suppose, open with a discussion, trivial and quadrivial, of the medieval curriculum. But in the Middle Ages, and even in the eighteenth century, Oxford showed no very obvious germ of that distinctive character which it acquired in the nineteenth. Dr. Johnson's directly combative methods of conversation were not in the Oxford manner. It is with the year 1800 that the work itself will begin, and I will indicate a few of the facts which will constitute a part of its material.

In 1802 Oxford's first Honours Examination took place in accordance with the Examination Statute of 1800. The two candidates

who presented themselves were tested by the newly appointed Public Examiners in Divinity, Ethics, Rhetoric, Logic, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and the chief Latin and Greek classics. In 1807 a school of Mathematics and Physics separated off from Literae Humaniores, but proficiency in the Rudiments of Religion and in Lit. Hum. remained a necessary condition of the B.A. degree. Successful candidates were placed in three classes, and the further examination for the Master's degree was abolished. In 1825 the examiners were divided between the two schools on the ground that they were overworked and that it was becoming difficult to find men competent to examine both in Lit. Hum. and mathematics.

1830 is an important date. The statute of this year defines the scope of Lit. Hum. to include Greek and Latin Language and History, Rhetoric and Poetics, and the Moral and Political Sciences, "quatenus a scriptoribus veteribus derivandae sint, quas tamen aliquando, prout expedire videbitur, ex neotericorum scriptis illustrari permittimus. Dialecticam (meaning, I suppose, Logic) . . . adnumeramus." Leave is given to the examiners to conduct their business either in Latin or English; to set the same question to several candidates in the written part of the examination; to read the papers "etiam extra locum examinationis"; to send candidates into another room to do their writing, and even to interrupt the viva voce proceedings in order to allow candidates to write.

One may infer that the written element in the examination was now greatly increased—there survives in Bodley a protest, circulated before the passing of the statute, against a proposed abolition of oral examination in mathematics—but one cannot conclude that writing was a complete innovation. 1831 is the date of the first printed examination paper in Bodley, and it may be that previously questions in MS. were handed to the candidates, a different one for each; not a very great burden in the early days when the examiners usually outnumbered their victims.

Thus in 1831 begins a more or less philosophical written examination, the detail of which can be traced in Bodley with fair continuity through the period during which Oxford acquired the peculiar but elusive ethos which I touched upon at the beginning of this article.

The 1831 Logic and Rhetoric paper contains twenty-three questions. It is not stated how many of these the candidate is expected to attempt, but I imagine he was intended to do most of them; for spaces are left on the question-paper itself for his replies. To us who know how hard a modern Honours candidate finds it to produce more than three decent answers in three hours, this will seem a trifle elementary, but there was probably still at that time opportunity for everyone to expatiate more largely in viva, and I have heard that there is still an American University which contends for

the practice of setting one hundred questions to be answered by a plain yes or no. The character of the paper as a whole reveals—naturally—the current narrow and formal tradition of logic. Passages from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Cicero *De Officiis*, Horace *Epistles*, etc., are to be put into strict logical form, and so on. One question, however, rather mysteriously moots the supplementation of syllogism by "the higher logic." I do not feel sure what is meant. Of three questions on language one shows some imagination: "Why is language figurative when poor—why when rich?" One could judge that with some knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, *Categories*, and *Prior*, but not *Posterior*, *Analytics*, and also, I suppose, of Aldrich's Compendium, one might do pretty well. A smattering of the *Poetics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* would help. Also quite naturally, a background of good stiff, dogmatic, Protestant theology is evident. Question 6 is specially delightful: "The Romanists maintain the authority of the Church as paramount to that of the Scriptures. By what line of argument do they maintain this, and is it tenable?" Thus zealously do the examiners carry out the spirit of the statute, making doubly sure that the candidate, already examined in Divinity, shall not gain his degree unversed in the rudiments of religion. In a Pass paper of the same year candidates are bidden "Examine with respect to its logical nature as a definition the description of the Church in the Nineteenth Article," and told to deduce a definition of "a neighbour" from the parable of the Good Samaritan.

The Moral Philosophy paper, on the other hand, is a single question for an essay. It is worth quoting as a fresh illustration of the dogmatic atmosphere spread by the religious beliefs of the time, and forced upon candidates in the Logic and Rhetoric paper by the exiguous space allotted for their answers. "The difference, and the only difference" between 'acts of duty' and 'acts of prudence,' says Paley, "is this, that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come." The examiners know better, but they are as cocksure as Paley in guiding the candidate. The question continues: "Examine the grounds and consequences of this principle, and show by a discussion of all the authorities with which you are acquainted, that the obligations of morality are perfect *in themselves*" (Italics the examiners').

At this period the examination took place twice a year, and there still survives W. E. Gladstone's answer to the Moral Philosophy question set in the Michaelmas term of 1831. Evidently the merciful rule that all the papers must be destroyed by the examiners as soon as their list is completed was not yet in force. I only know Gladstone's effusion from an excerpt in Mallet's *History of the*

University of Oxford, Vol. III, p. 228. The question, which is not given, would appear to have been, in some shape or other, "Is conscience innate or factitious?" The Grand Young Man began: "It will be my endeavour, in the consideration of this question, to adhere as closely as possible, in point of division and arrangement, to the order suggested by the form in which it has been proposed. The principal heads may be thus briefly stated:

I. To discuss i. the absolute } compatibility of virtue and self-
ii. the relative } denial.

II. To contrast the conclusion thus obtained with the Stoical doctrine of ἀπάθεια.
Also with a particular reference to Aristotle.

III. By considering the nature and office of conscience, to inquire how far the question whether it is factitious or innate is affected by anything hitherto stated.

. . . . . .

The topics embraced will be so numerous, that a brief and I fear often an abrupt notive must suffice for each."

According to Mallet, Gladstone then wrote fourteen long pages with references to Aristotle, Locke, and Butler, and finally decided that conscience is innate. He perorates with a noble apology: "I am aware that this paper must from its length, and from the time it occupies to get anything like an outline of the subject, have many marks of haste, and probably much of repetition and omission besides more serious errors—and in particular that the latter part is abrupt and slovenly—but as much has been done as time and hesitation would allow me. There is not even time to reperuse." This is not quite the Oxford manner, but it was obviously Disraeli rather than Gladstone who ought to have been educated at Oxford. Gladstone, however, got his first. His diary throws further light on the examination. In contrast with the other papers, it seems that candidates were allowed as much space for their essay as they liked, and as much time as most of them could have wanted. "In morning," writes Gladstone, "getting up Roman History; but on going into the schools, found a moral essay on a very fine but very difficult subject. Wrote hard for five hours, but how effectively I have not the least conception."

In 1833 Logic has a paper to itself, and there is another question introducing good sound dogma by a side wind: "Why are the oracles of the Heathen, generally speaking, not to be considered as legitimate propositions?" It was five years now since John Newman had begun to preach at St. Mary's against the torpor of contemporary Anglicanism, the "cold, self-sufficient, self-wise tranquillity" of its Natural Theology. The Oxford Movement was already afoot—the

first three *Tracts for the Times* were published in this year—but fortunately, though for the wrong reason, it is wholly ignored by the Public Examiners. Fortunately, because the Oxford Movement on its theoretical side was obscurantist and illiberal; genuinely free-thinking could not at that time be learnt at Oxford officially or unofficially, and Greats papers with a Tractarian bias could only have been a change for the worse. For the wrong reason, because the motive for exclusion can have been nothing but the hostility of the old dogmatism for the new.

Then I find a lamentable hiatus of thirteen years in the Bodleian records. This is the more unfortunate, since it covers the years in which Jowett and Matthew Arnold had to face the examiners. The 1846 Logic paper is definitely less formal and more speculative. Perhaps the ingenious Whateley had something to do with this.

On the other hand, though the number of questions is reduced to sixteen, the total area of virgin paper set before the examinee amounts roughly to three foolscap pages. In the Logic paper of the following year, 1847, he is requested to define and distinguish Desire, Will—Understanding, Reason—Appetite, Affection, Motive, in just about 15 square inches! There is in this paper a reference to the name of Aldrich, and the companion paper on Rhetoric and Ethics mentions Butler. These are the first extant instances—bar the quotation from Paley—in which the examiners openly avail themselves of the statutory permission to illustrate the classical basis of their syllabus from the writings of the moderns. There is a question on induction, but no explicit reference to J. S. Mill, whose *Logic* was published in 1843. But this lag in the admission of new authorities was perhaps not unwholesome. The urgent need was obviously to widen the classical basis of the examination, and there *is* a quotation from the *Posterior Analytics* and a question on Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence. There is also a demand in the Michaelmas Logic paper of the same year for the illustration of some thesis from the Platonic dialogues. Despite the terse text-book type of answer which the papers still obviously invite, the emergence of Plato and of the *Posterior Analytics* beside the more desiccated portions of Aristotle, and the absence of theological insinuation, do suggest a rather ampler air of speculative freedom. Greats is beginning to entail some sort of effort to think without dogmatic presuppositions.[1] Yet evidently the great men who were

[1] It might be thought that the free, dialectical, character of philosophical studies was likely to vanish with the substitution of written for oral examination, but all the evidence goes to show that oral discussion and examination had been a pretty cut-and-dried affair. Rather the paradox is that the introduction of Plato into the curriculum gave the spirit of freedom, whereas the old oral examination had preserved only the letter.

young dons at the time, and were destined to refashion the mind of the University, broke away from academic tradition rather than built upon the foundations of their undergraduate studies. Jowett must have taken his schools about 1838, and his passion for Plato must have been as extra-curricular as Shelley's had been twenty years before. Nor can he have acquired his interest in Hegel from his tutors. Matthew Arnold's place is nearly central among the makers of that liberal, ironic, spirit of Oxford, which swings in self-expression from the silly-clever to the Olympian—an epithet early applied to Arnold by his contemporaries. But Arnold's mind was more literary and poetical than philosophic, and poetry is a freer growth, or at least more secret in its heredity, than the less purely imaginative human activities. Though they be close cousins, poetry is not born of philosophy as poets have sometimes—more often than philosophers—forgotten. Robert Bridges, like Matthew Arnold, took a second class in Greats. His *Testament of Beauty* designs to lift, or shift, speculation into poetry, but the thought is hackneyed, or it is, apart from flashes of felicitous phrasing, halting and confused: the pure poetry of its few descriptive passages comes always as a relief. Arnold was wiser in his choice of poetic themes.

After 1847 I find nothing until 1863. In this second unhappy gap falls the 1850 Commission, which, I suppose, really initiated modern Oxford. Separate schools of Natural Science, Law, and Modern History had already been inaugurated, and it soon became possible to combine any two Honour Schools for the purpose of obtaining a degree. So Lit. Hum. lost its monopoly, but, judging from the papers of 1863, the effect of this and other reforms in the University was to impart fresh life to philosophical teaching

There now appear three separate papers on the *Republic* of Plato, the *Ethics*, and the *Politics*, of Aristotle, with "gobbets" for comment. There is a Political Philosophy paper and a Moral Philosophy paper, in each of which, however, eight out of the twelve questions set are definitely confined to Greek Philosophy. And once again the only modern authority named is Bishop Butler. The Logic paper begins with a question on the relations of Logic, Psychology, and Metaphysics, and invites criticism of the syllogism. It is far more general in scope than anything which precedes the sixteen-year interval. In a paper of five questions on the history of philosophy four are devoted to Greek philosophy, but the fifth contains a quotation from Kant. He had been dead for sixty years, but German philosophy did not spread very rapidly across the North Sea. All these papers show that the examinee of this time no longer wrote on the question-paper itself. One would like to know the precise date at which the old practice was abandoned: probably it was in the early 'fifties.

The remarkable features of the 1863 examination strike me as being these. (1) The character of all the questions is undogmatic and genuinely speculative. Despite Pusey and the still unabolished Tests, philosophy is now being philosophically studied. (2) Greek philosophy is still of course enormously preponderant, but the questions on it now cover a really wide range. The appearance of a separate paper on Plato's *Republic* is particularly significant. Aristotle can be studied at the same time intensely and unintelligently. Plato at once excites all minds but the least speculative. With the institution of the *Republic* as a set book—perhaps due to Jowett in the 'fifties—begins, I fancy, the policy which has built up the best in humane education at Oxford, the policy of conserving tenaciously in the syllabus, without regard to the date of their composition, the greatest works of liberal-minded men. It is a philosophical policy.

During the next ten years the influence of J. S. Mill becomes obvious, and in 1865 there first appears the name of Bacon. Bacon had died nearly two and a half centuries before, but now that he had come into his own he was destined to survive in every Logic paper until the Great War. Butler preserves his popularity as a moral philosopher. A reference to analytic and synthetic judgments, an appeal for an explanation of the term "transcendental," and even in 1869 an actual quotation from Kant, herald the tardy arrival of German philosophy.

The period 1870–80 shows an immensely important expansion. The History of Philosophy paper becomes less purely classical. The 1871 paper mentions Descartes, Berkeley, Spinoza, and Kant. The Logic paper of the same year ventures to inquire into modality. In 1875—just fifteen years after the memorable meeting of the British Association at which Huxley told the Bishop of Oxford that he would rather be descended from an ape than from a divine who employed authority to stifle truth—biology is first noticed in a logic question as to the evidence for the hereditary transmission of mental qualities. There is also actually a special subject paper on the philosophy of Kant, due, I presume, to the efforts of Green and Caird. In 1876—only forty-six years after his death—Hegel first appears on the scene. The Logic paper has a question on the possibility of constructing an *a priori* system of logic, and invites comment on Hegel's identification of the real and the rational.

The next ten years suggest a steady progress of idealism. In 1882 there is a question on the hypothetical judgment, and in 1887 its possible identity with the categorical is canvassed. In 1891 occurs the first quite obvious reference to Bradley. Yet still in the Logic paper Aristotle, Bacon, and Mill form a nucleus which dwindles very slowly before the idealist war of attrition until we reach the

period of the Great War. The "gobbet" questions on the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Novum Organum* do not vanish until 1906.

The period of twenty years from 1894 is chiefly remarkable for a great diversity of special subject papers. Besides Kant I find Psychology, William James's Psychology, Aristotle's metaphysical system with *Metaphysics* EZH, Descartes, and Spinoza, and also Political Economy.

Since the War special subjects have declined, and the Logic paper has been stretched to bursting point to include new philosophical theories. But at this critical juncture I should like to pause for a moment in order to instruct my potential historian. For I think he should select the end of the nineteenth century in order to make a very serious effort to grip the significance of Oxford in a wider world of ideas and actions. No doubt he will have done his best to ascertain from written records the effects during the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century of an Oxford education conducted under the aegis of Literae Humaniores; but I fancy that what at any rate the more middle aged of us still think of as the Oxford ethos was largely built up during the last quarter of the century—so far as philosophy is concerned, by the English interpretation of a teutonic idealism, the roots of which go back as far as Socrates. He will not of course be tempted to minimize the Hellenic influence, in which the continuous study of Plato has been the most important factor. I am certain that without the Platonic Socrates there would have been no Oxford manner; though for the worst of it one need, I suppose, as little blame Socrates as one need hold Hegel responsible for the Great War, or the founder of Christianity for the Spanish Inquisition. But I am sure that without Socrates Oxford would never have seemed both a source of sophistication and critical irony and the home of lost causes. On the other hand, my historian will not forget the strongly British cast which for good or for evil was impressed, particularly by Bradley, upon the domesticated German philosophy. We have with the Greeks a common difference from the Germans in our liking of an amateurish pose.

Then I think it would be well to collect some evidence from tutors and examiners of that period as to the conduct and the efficacy of the examinational process itself. My historian will ask *inter alia* the general question how far the ability to carry in his mind over a period of more than two years a mass of material in various stages of undigestedness is a mark of the really able man. He will inquire of men of all nations who went out into the world after taking their degree in Greats during this twenty-five or thirty years, what went on in their minds while they were working for schools, and what has been the after-effect upon their general outlook. He will, of course, find himself at once amid a most befogging cloud of

witness, and he will have, too, to compare the evidence of those who entrusted their minds to other Honour Schools. He will have to study the careers of great men in all walks of life. Everywhere he will find it hard to select without caprice. But I think he ought to try.

When he has completed this task, he will have, finally, to say something of the post-War period. I do not find it easy to help him here. It is now possible for two candidates to obtain first classes in Lit. Hum. having read no philosophy in common, although the alternatives to the *Republic* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are rarely offered. In Modern Greats two candidates specializing in philosophy need not have opened one book in common save the more important works of Kant. Once the same men examined in Divinity, Classics, Philosophy, Mathematics, and Natural Science. Now philosophical examiners have often to rely largely on their colleagues' judgment on subjects in which they themselves have not specialized. Doubtless the same difficulty arises nowadays, through inevitable expansion, in all Honour Schools, but in philosophy the threatened break in continuity makes an especially acute problem. Faith in the old main stream of speculation, even as an examinational instrument, is growing weaker. Philosophy has, indeed, its healthy revolutions like all else that is alive, but until we discover the old in what is new, it is hard to see what is going to become of philosophy as an education for the ordinary more or less able student. It is often said that the purpose of reading philosophy is not to inform a man but to make him think, and it is added that an examiner can generally gauge a candidate's ability pretty accurately by his style and consistency, however unfamiliar the theory which he is expounding. There is much truth in both these contentions, but the lesson of thinking is very ill learnt without considerable study of what has been thought in the past, and thought through long periods of steady and consistent speculative striving by men whose greatness is as well established as any human reputation can be. The danger of criticism *in vacuo* was sufficiently familiar to Plato, and our study of nineteenth-century examination papers soon began to reveal a consistent effort to give youth something solid to try its teeth on, which should at the same time be not unstimulating to its palate.

Not many years ago all this would have sounded priggish and platitudinous; just the sort of thing which Oxford knew but did not talk about. Now I am less sure. One would like to know what print the most up-to-date philosophical tutor sets upon his pupils' minds. My experience as an examiner is not comforting in this respect. New countries are now often offered us as the promised land of philosophy, but I am far from sure that some of them have not

by some quite acute minds in the past been already prospected and found uncultivable. It may be that some fresh concentration of philosophic thought is soon to dawn, but at present it looks rather as if the only link between our philosophical examinations and those of the past will soon be the spirit of that injunction to examiners which occurs in the 1825 statute, and is perhaps even older: "Lenitati ubique consultum volumus, modo ne ea sit, quae Juniorum socordiae patrocinari videatur." In short, "Be as kind as you can without letting through the really idle man."

Still, even that relic of the past would be something. I have no wish to dispirit my imaginary historian by excessive pessimism, and by the time he comes to write his final chapter he will have had every chance to sharpen his insight in dealing with the pre-War period. He will have had to decide whether there is more of Oxford in the irrepressible tartness and the stimulating agnosticism of Jowett, the prototype of all good Greats tutors; or in the strenuous, even saintly, liberalism of his gentler pupil, T. H. Green, who nevertheless voiced undergraduate opinion in favour of the biologists against the bishops at the meeting of the British Association in 1860. He will have had to set the smoothly rounded mentality of Bernard Bosanquet beside the sterner temper, logically just but humanly a trifle fierce, of F. H. Bradley, who called his dog "Pusey" in order that he might vent vicariously upon it his feelings towards that remarkable reactionary—an anecdote less sinister for the fact that Bradley adored dogs. He will have had to judge whether in Ruskin and in our Pre-Raphaelites—save perhaps William Morris —there was a certain absence of humour and self-criticism hardly assimilable, possibly even hostile, to essential Oxford. Blend the artistic and the academic, and too often you get the "arty." And what will he have seen in Oscar Wilde? A flash of Oxford's self, and a defect, too, of Oxford's native quality? Where will he have decided that A. E. Housman acquired his manner, poetic, critical and conversational? In Cambridge? No; rather, I think, in Oxford, where he ploughed in Greats, and wrote to the Chairman of Examiners asking from which class his name had been accidentally omitted. In considering the statesmen of this time, will he have found more characteristic of Oxford the crushing superiority of Lord Curzon or the robust insolence of the first Lord Birkenhead, loyallest of Oxford men?

Let my historian first answer these questions and the like. Then, if he has held a true course without shipwreck through the past, we can confidently leave him struggling to connect the 1936 Logic papers of Ancient and Modern Greats with our own uncertain tempered times.

THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN CULTURE

Professor W. T. STACE

I think there is scarcely any academic subject regarding which there exists so much general misapprehension as philosophy. If I were to introduce myself to the readers of almost any newspaper as a professor of chemistry, or of classics, or of music, most of them would have a fairly good general idea of the nature of my subject. But if I were to introduce myself as a professor of philosophy, I suspect that many of them would vaguely associate my subject with theosophy, or palmistry, or occultism. Very few would have any notion of what philosophy really is. Even in a university, even among the learned themselves, it would be true to say, I think, that while the nature of such subjects as mathematics, classics, geology, is pretty well understood in a general way even by those who are not specialists in them, the nature of philosophy is not. If it is not by highly educated people mixed up with palmistry or occultism, it is at any rate apt to be regarded as hazy, high-flown talk, or as a kind of quibbling disputatiousness, or as the asking of vast, vague, and probably unanswerable questions about the universe.

So long as one does not trouble oneself about precisely accurate definitions, there is no great difficulty in describing, roughly at least, most other subjects; in saying at any rate what they are *about*. Biology is about living organisms. Astronomy is about the heavenly bodies. Physics is about light, heat, sound, and so on. The universe, man's total environment, has been cut up, more or less arbitrarily, into sections; and each science takes one section for its province. Botanists take the plants, zoologists the animals, astronomers the stars. Thus it comes about that, in spite of difficulties here and there about boundaries, these sciences are on the whole fairly easy to describe at least in a popular way.

But the difficulty in describing the nature of philosophy arises precisely from the fact that there is no one section of the universe which is more especially its province than any other. It does not, as most of the other sciences do, peg out a claim to some comparatively small area, and leave all the rest untouched. It is true, in a sense, that there is nothing anywhere in the universe with which philosophy is not concerned, and that the whole universe is its

subject. And yet it has its own special content. And this is a kind of paradox. On the one hand, philosophy is clearly distinguished, by its own special content, from all other subjects. On the other hand, it overlaps them all. Clearly, then, philosophy is in some way peculiar as regards its relation to other branches of knowledge. What is this relation? What is the place of philosophy in the general scheme of human knowledge? I think it is obvious that this question will have to be answered before one can say what is the place of philosophy in education or in culture generally. And therefore I make no apology for beginning by considering the relation of philosophy to other branches of knowledge.

One theory on this subject is that the special function of philosophy is to co-ordinate the other branches of knowledge, to knit together the sciences into a single whole; to treat them in much the same way as a central government treats the several departments which come under it—except, of course, that philosophy has no special authority. This, I think, or something like it, was Herbert Spencer's conception of the business of philosophy.

I do not think this is at all a satisfactory view. It is out of date now, and no living philosopher would be likely to accept it. So I do not propose to discuss it at length. I will give only *one* reason for rejecting it—one among many which might be given—namely that it finds no place for many of the problems which have always been regarded as essentially philosophical. Take, for example, the problem whether the material world is in any way dependent for its existence upon mind. That it is so dependent has often been asserted in the past by idealistic philosophers, and is now again being asserted by some astronomers and scientists who are also amateur philosophers. This problem, which is certainly one of the most central and important of all philosophical problems, has no connection at all with the question how the sciences ought to be co-ordinated. It would therefore be excluded from philosophy by the suggested definition. And this definition, therefore, cannot be satisfactory.

Another idea, more common at the present day, is this. It is said that philosophy has for its subject-matter all those problems which have not *yet* been appropriated by any of the special sciences. Human knowledge is like a tree, with a trunk and many branches. The trunk, the parent stem, is, or was, philosophy. The branches are the special sciences. All knowledge was originally included in philosophy. But as knowledge has grown, it has differentiated itself. When the knowledge of any particular section of the universe became sufficiently advanced to stand alone, it separated itself off from the parent stem, and became a separate subject. There are still a certain number of subjects and problems regarding which our

knowledge is so vague and rudimentary that they have not yet organized themselves into special sciences. This residue of problems not yet taken over by any science is what we call philosophy at the present day. I will call this view of the nature of philosophy the "trunk and branch view."

The evidence for this view is as follows. It is an historical fact that knowledge has grown much in the way described. Modern science has its roots historically in ancient Greece. The Greeks were the first people in the world to develop the scientific attitude. They were the first people to ask such questions as: What are the sun and the stars made of? What size are they? How far away are they from the earth? You may remember, as a picturesque piece of early astronomy, the assertion of Anaxagoras that the sun is a red-hot stone, larger than the Peloponnese—a statement which got Anaxagoras into serious trouble with the orthodox Greeks who regarded the sun as a god. The Greeks were also the first people who studied animals and plants in at all a scientific way. They were the first genuinely theoretical mathematicians. They were the first people to speculate as to whether the many different kinds of matter may not be ultimately reducible to a single kind of matter. They were the originators of the atomic theory, the theory that matter is ultimately composed of minute hard indivisible particles without colour, taste, or smell.

But the Greeks, or at any rate the early Greeks, did not distinguish between science and philosophy. The problems of the constitution of matter, the nature of the sun and stars, the properties of the triangle, were regarded by them as *philosophical* problems, and were not separated from such purely metaphysical problems as that concerning the nature of God. The scientist and the philosopher were in those days one and the same person. Aristotle, the philosopher, was the founder of the science of biology. Pure mathematics were mostly studied and advanced in the philosophical schools of such men as Pythagoras and Plato.

Thus philosophy in those days was practically synonymous with all human culture. Consequently, it was the parent stem out of which grew all branches of knowledge. It was only later, when the body of knowledge increased beyond the point at which one man could master it all, that specialization took place. The study of the stars broke off from the parent stem and became the special science of astronomy. And so with the other sciences.

It is commonly added that we can to some extent see the same sort of process going on even now. It is only in the last thirty or forty years that psychology has established itself as an independent science. It used, until then, to be included in philosophy. And following out this idea, I understand that Professor Alexander

thinks there are signs that aesthetics is shortly about to separate itself from philosophy and become an independent science.

Now of course no one can dispute the historical facts just referred to. But for my part I do not think that this trunk and branch theory of the nature of philosophy and of its relation to other subjects is any more satisfactory than the view which we previously rejected. It implies that philosophy has no real content of its own. Philosophy is merely that which is one day going to be science, but which is not yet scientific enough. It is rudimentary science. And philosophy therefore has no real content distinct from what is, or ought to be, science. But in my view philosophy has a content of its own, quite distinct from anything that is, or ever could be, science.

I do not doubt that many problems, which were never properly speaking philosophical problems at all, have in the past been wrongly jumbled up with philosophy, and that these have gradually been sorted out and assigned to their proper spheres. That is all that the supposed historical evidence really proves. And no doubt psychology is a case in point. But I believe that there is a certain *core* of philosophical problems, which are in their nature philosophical, and *not* scientific, and which will therefore never be handed over to the special sciences, and will always remain what they are—philosophy proper.

As examples I would give all problems regarding the nature of what we call *values*—moral values, artistic values, and so on. I think that these can never, however far knowledge advances, become the subject-matter of science, or be dealt with by the methods which science adopts in other fields. I cannot here enter into a full justification of this statement, because it depends essentially upon the view one takes of the function of science and the nature of scientific method. But I will say that, as I see it, the sole business of science is to describe facts and events, to tell us what happens, what has happened, what will happen. I do not think it is at all the business of science to estimate the *value* of what happens, to say what *ought* to happen, or to say that one event is *better* than another. All such questions of value fall, in my opinion, within the sphere of philosophy.

The biologist, for example, tells us that organic species have evolved. Man is descended from ape-like ancestors, and originally from creatures which can scarcely be distinguished from little lumps of moving slime. That, you see, is an account of actual facts and events, of what has actually *happened* on the planet. It is the business of the evolutionary biologist to discover and piece together these facts and events, and to give, if possible, a complete description of them. And when he has done that, his task is finished.

But now suppose I begin to ask, as regards evolution, such questions as the following: Is the change from protozoon to man a change for the *better*? Is it an *advance*? Is a man in any way a *higher* being than a protozoon, or a higher being than a dog? Or has the process of change, traced out by the biologist, been merely a process of change from one indifferent thing to another? Or—another possibility—is this whole conception of better and worse, of higher and lower, as applied to evolution, a misconception, an illusion? Are these merely *human* values, which have no application to affairs outside human society, no application at any rate to events on the cosmic scale? Is it altogether false, or meaningless, to apply conceptions of value to the non-human universe? Or what is the truth of this matter?

Such questions of value, I say, fall outside the sphere of biology. They belong to philosophy. And they will always belong to philosophy, and will never, at any time in the future, come to belong to biology, or to any other science, as the trunk and branch theory would have us believe. Or at least this must be so, if what I said just now about the nature and functions of science is true, namely that the sole function of science is to describe what *happens*, and that it is in no way concerned with the valuation of what happens.

Of course an individual biologist may very well have opinions on these questions. And his opinions may very well be interesting and important, although he will have, if his opinion is to be of any real value, to take into account many considerations besides his bare biological facts, considerations with which biology cannot supply him, but with which philosophy can. But however that may be, the important point is that, in having such opinions, he has really ceased to be a pure biologist, and has become a philosopher.

I have given the problem of values as an example of a problem which belongs, and must always belong, to philosophy, in order to show that the trunk and branch theory of philosophy, which implies that philosophy has no content of its own, cannot be true. But I do not mean to imply that the problem of values is the sole content of philosophy. I do not mean to say that the relation between philosophy and the sciences is that science deals with what happens, philosophy with the valuation of what happens. That would be far too simple a division of labour. And philosophy has many problems of its own, which are not scientific, and which yet are not in any sense problems of valuation. And I will try now to indicate what, in my opinion, the special nature of philosophy is, and what its relations to the sciences are.

The view which I advocate may best be described by saying that, in my opinion, philosophy is concerned with the search for *ultimate* principles, the attempt to push all knowledge back to its *ultimate*

grounds, to answer *ultimate* questions; and that it is distinguished both from the sciences and from all other branches of knowledge by this fact. I would, in short, define philosophy as the knowledge of ultimate principles.

Of course you will say, and quite rightly, that this is a very vague definition. For what is the meaning of the word "ultimate" here? I certainly think it ought to be defined. And I think perhaps it could be defined by a process of careful logical analysis. But I think I can better convey to you something of what I mean when I speak of ultimate principles and questions if I give you a few examples than if I attempt the difficult logical feat of defining "ultimate."

You will find, if you take almost any subject of human discourse —whether it is a scientific subject or any other—that it leads *back*, upon reflection, to problems and questionings of a very fundamental character, problems and questionings which are not usually considered at all by those who specialize in that subject. These problems constitute, I should say, the special content of philosophy.

Suppose you take what are generally considered the first principles of any branch of knowledge. If you work *forwards* from those principles, taking them as ultimate, you will find yourself moving among the particular details of that branch of knowledge. For example, if you take the axioms of geometry (any geometry) as your first principles, and work forwards from them, you will find yourself among the detailed theorems of that geometry. But if you reflect upon these so-called first principles of any subject, you will generally find that they are not really ultimate at all, that it is possible to go *backwards* from them, instead of forwards, and to ask upon what more ultimate principles they themselves rest. You may, for example, ask yourself what is the basis of the axioms of geometry. Are they *a priori* laws of the human mind? Or are they laws gathered by observation from experience like most of the ordinary laws of nature? Or are they arbitrary assumptions based upon nothing but convenience? Or what are they, and on what depends their right to *be* the first principles of geometry? When you proceed backwards in that way from what you had hitherto considered to be first principles, and when you search for the more ultimate principles on which these depend, then you are in the realm of philosophy.

What I have just been saying is not only true of mathematics. I say that it is true of *any* branch of human knowledge. And I will take as further examples the specific spheres of morality, art, and science.

In the sphere of morality, we commonly say that some actions are right, others wrong. Most people take it for granted that there is *some* distinction between right and wrong, and that they know pretty well what is meant by these words. And if they discuss moral

problems, it is usually some detailed question about the particular *application* of moral principles which they discuss. Was a man, in a given set of circumstances, right or wrong in what he did? Is suicide ever justifiable? Would a doctor ever be right to administer a deadly drug to a patient suffering from an incurable disease and undergoing ceaseless physical torture? These are the kind of questions which practical moralists generally discuss, and if we had good answers to them all it might be said that we were in possession of a complete body of moral knowledge.

But now suppose that instead of working forwards from moral principles to their detailed application in life, I try to work backwards. Suppose I raise questions about the foundation of these principles themselves. Suppose I ask: what is the foundation of moral principles? Is it true, for example, that right actions are merely those which tend to produce among human beings generally a balance of pleasure and happiness over pain and unhappiness? Or is morality founded upon biological considerations, so that right actions are simply those which tend towards the preservation of the species? Or have moral principles some profounder, less obvious, basis than these ideas would suggest? These, I think, would be questions of that very fundamental and ultimate kind which I should call philosophical.

Exactly similar questions arise from reflection upon the sphere of art. In the moral world we have the antithesis of the good and the evil. In the artistic world we have the antithesis of the beautiful and the ugly, or perhaps, of the artistic and inartistic. These conceptions are commonly taken for granted, just as are the conceptions of right and wrong. What are usually discussed are questions of their detailed *application.* Is this picture genuinely artistic or not? Or is it more artistic than that picture? Is this poem successful or not? Is a certain musical composer justified in introducing into his work discords and other innovations which would have shocked his predecessors? The attempts to answer questions of this kind constitute the branch of knowledge which we call art criticism.

But now suppose that, instead of moving forwards from the principles of art to their detailed application, we move backwards towards their more ultimate foundations. Suppose we raise questions about the nature and validity of the conceptions of the artistic and the inartistic themselves. Suppose we ask: What is the nature of the artistic as such? What is that quality which may be shared in common by a picture, a statue, or a poem, and which makes each of them what we call artistic? What *is* art? What are its ultimate criteria and foundations? These again would be questions of that fundamental and ultimate kind which no art critic or artist as such ever asks, and which I should call philosophical.

Turning now to the sphere of science, there are, I think, all sorts of ultimate questions to which science leads back, but which the scientist as such does not usually consider at all.

There is, for example, the question of the nature and justification of mathematical axioms, to which I already referred. Again, science is, or has been in the past, very largely concerned with the *causes* of phenomena. What is the cause of the movements of the planets, of the evolution of species, of ocean tides, of eclipses, of the pointing of a comet's tail away from the sun? And so on.

These are all questions of the detailed application of the principle of causality. But suppose I ask about the principle of causality itself? What, in the first place, is its proper analysis and definition? And then, upon what grounds have I the right to assume that the same causes must always necessarily give rise to the same effects? In that case, it seems to me, I am asking very fundamental and ultimate questions, and I should call these questions philosophical.

Or, to take a very different example, Professor Bridgman, in his book on *The Logic of Modern Physics*, writes regarding science, "The nature of our thinking mechanism essentially colours any picture we can form of nature." There is nothing new in the suggestion that the world as we know it is to a greater or less extent determined by the structure of our own minds. That is an opinion which has frequently been held by many philosophers. The only novelty is perhaps that it should now be a physicist who makes the suggestion. But obviously this raises very fundamental and ultimate questions regarding the relation of our minds and our knowing processes to the world. The sciences profess to give us *knowledge* of the world. But we may raise the more ultimate question: what *is* knowledge? Is our knowledge of the world a sort of photograph, or mirror image, or picture, of the world as it actually is? This is what most people used to think. But if all our knowledge is coloured by the structure of our minds, it seems obvious that it is not a true picture of the world at all. And it becomes a profoundly difficult question what the relation of our knowledge to reality actually is. And that, I should say, is a very fundamental and ultimate question which belongs to philosophy, and which no specialized science as such ever considers.

Some of the central problems of philosophy, too, are reached by going backwards, not from science, art, morals, or mathematics, but from the everyday knowledge of common sense. But I think I have now given enough examples to illustrate my general contention, which is that philosophy has for its subject-matter the ultimate principles upon which all other branches of knowledge are based; and that all other branches of knowledge necessarily lead back to, and end in, philosophy, if one reflects upon their grounds. No

matter what subject you study, no matter through what gateway you enter the kingdom of knowledge, philosophy looms in the background. If this view is accepted, you will see that it explains the paradox which I mentioned at the beginning of this lecture. Philosophy has its own special content, these ultimate problems. And yet it is concerned with the whole universe and is entwined with every other subject, because whatever section of the universe your special science takes as its province, that section, and the knowledge of it, give rise to philosophical problems.

Now that we have decided what place philosophy holds in the general scheme of human knowledge, it ought not to be difficult to discover its proper place in education. But first of all, let me deal shortly with a preliminary criticism which is sometimes made. Philosophy, it is said, is an unpractical study. Science yields practical, tangible, results—the telephone, the steam engine, the electric motor. Philosophy yields none, and it has no influence on life. It is, so to speak, all talk.

Perhaps I need hardly point out that, as is obvious, University subjects fall roughly into two classes, those which are of immediate practical utility, such as chemistry and geology, and those which are not. These latter, which have no immediate cash value, include not only philosophy, but also all literature, the classical languages, and the fine arts, not to mention such a subject as religion. These so-called unpractical subjects contain most of what is finest and noblest in human life, because they are concerned not with the production of material wealth, but with the advancement of the wealth of the mind.

Nor is it true that philosophy has no influence on life. It would be easy to show that, even as a preparation for practical life, philosophy has its value, since it sharpens the wits, exercises the reasoning powers, destroys prejudices, and develops the habit of considering all questions with an open mind. I have seen it stated in print (by a so-called practical person, not a philosopher), that the world-war was ultimately traceable to the pernicious influence of the philosophy of Hegel. I do not myself agree with that opinion. It is, I think, an absurd caricature of the truth. But it shows that men do dimly perceive what an immense practical influence the philosophical conceptions of a people, or even of an individual, may exert. And it would be a fascinating study to follow out this line of thought; to show to what extent the wise and the foolish actions of mankind have ultimately depended upon what are, in the last analysis, philosophical opinions. But I must leave that field of discussion untouched. I must return to my proper subject, the place of philosophy in education.

By education here I do not mean the special training required to

make a man a competent doctor, engineer, or lawyer, however important that may be. By education I mean the process of raising human personality to the highest level which it is capable of attaining, the process of developing all that is finest and noblest in it, the process of turning out first-class human beings.

And if education is taken in this sense, it is not difficult to show that philosophy is an essential part of it, and that without some tincture of philosophy a man is an imperfect human being. For it follows from what I have already said that philosophy is an essential part of all human culture. If philosophy is, as I have tried to show, nothing more than an attempt to throw knowledge back upon its ultimate principles; to think out the most fundamental and ultimate problems which are raised by morals, by religion, by science, by art, and by common sense; is it not obvious that any perfect human culture cannot exclude it? Philosophy is nothing but the most fundamental kind of thinking which a man can do in any branch of study. It lies at the basis of every other subject. It is bound up with all human culture, and is therefore an integral part of any complete education.

It is a mistake to think of the different branches of knowledge and culture as if they existed in watertight compartments, completely independent and isolated from one another. They are, after all, products of one and the same human spirit, and a sufficiently keen insight will detect one and the same human life unfolding itself in them all. Every age has its own peculiar attitude towards the problems which man's environment presents, its own peculiar attitude towards the world. This attitude of any age is sometimes called the spirit of the age. The spirit of an age expresses itself in a diversity of different forms, in the forms of its art, its literature, its religion, its science, its politics, and finally its philosophy. These different forms will usually be found to have the same essential content. That is to say, the philosophy of an age will be found to express in philosophical form the same attitude towards the world which is expressed in other forms in its literature, its art, its science. It is one and the same life which, in a plant, puts itself forth in the different flowers and branches. And literature, art, science, religion, philosophy, are the flowers of the human spirit. Consequently I would say that the philosophy of an age crystallizes in its most abstract form the essential thought and culture of that age, and is therefore a key to the understanding of that age. Let us give a few examples of this.

It is almost a platitude to say that in Greece the philosophy of the Sophists merely crystallized in abstract terms the same tendencies of thought as were everywhere making themselves apparent in the political life of the time, in the dramas of Euripides, and elsewhere.

What, again, is the famous *Republic* of Plato but an expression in abstract philosophical form of that ideal of a balanced and harmonious personality which is well known to have contained the essence of the Greek attitude towards life?

Another example is to be found in the American philosophy known as pragmatism. The essence of this philosophy consists in its subordination of all the higher human activities, such as knowledge, art, and religion, to purely practical ends. It judges them all by their cash value. Thus it perfectly reflects the predominantly commercial spirit and civilization of the American people.

Turning to modern Europe, I would draw your attention to the fact that during the nineteenth century the essential content of philosophy was identical with the essential content of literature and poetry. In philosophy it took the form of idealism, in poetry of romanticism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there came in literature that great outburst of romantic poetry which is connected with such names as Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Keats. At the very same moment there dawned in Germany the great age of philosophical idealism, and this idealism rose to its greatest heights in the system of Hegel. Hegelian idealism expressed in general the same human attitude to the world as did the romantic poets. The system of Hegel was nothing but a vast elaboration of the idea that the finite world in space and time, the world of nature, is not ultimately real, is but a shadow, an appearance, beneath which lies a deeper, a divine, reality. But this idea is also the very indwelling life of poetic romanticism. The spirit of romanticism is epitomized in Wordsworth's famous lines in which he speaks of

> a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.

Wordsworth's reverence for nature is no sentimental vapouring about crocuses and cowslips, but is based upon this belief that nature is at once the veil and the revealer of a deeper divine reality. His vision of the world is the same as Hegel's vision. And this vision Wordsworth transmitted throughout the poetry of the nineteenth century. It inspires in varying degrees the work of all the romantic poets, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson, Browning, and even such an apparently positivistic and anti-religious poet as Swinburne. It finally dies out, I should say, in the early work of the Irish poet, W. B. Yeats, and has now been replaced by a very different attitude.

Parallel, in the nineteenth century, to the stream of romanticism which takes its departure from Wordsworth, there flows the stream

of philosophical idealism which has its source in Hegel. It passes over from Germany to England, inspiring the work of such men as Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. It passes over to America in the work of Royce and many others. And in them, I should say, it finally dies out as an original and creative force—notwithstanding that it still finds many admirers and imitators—to be replaced, once more, by a very different spirit.

What is this very different spirit which has now made its appearance both in literature and philosophy? Well, the present age is neither idealistic nor romanticist. There has been a violent rebellion against all that. Romanticism is now set down as sentimentalism. And the present age is above all anti-sentimental. The repudiation of romanticism arises ultimately from the fact that the vision of a deeper reality behind the appearance of the world has been lost. The finite things in time and space, the moving masses of matter, the life of animals and plants and men on the planet, these things, which for Wordsworth and Hegel were mere appearances, are now proclaimed as the only realities. There is nothing behind them, supporting them. They are real in their own right. This is the essential message which is proclaimed by the most characteristic philosophical school of the present day, the school of the realists. The universe of the realist can be obtained by taking the universe of the idealist, cutting away the inner spiritual essence which lies behind it, and leaving only the outward appearance, a sort of lifeless mask, which is now declared to be the only reality. There is no "something far more deeply interfused, whose dwelling is the light of setting suns." There are merely the setting suns and the clouds, and these are composed of oxygen, hydrogen, and what not.

And is it not exactly the same spirit which informs a great deal of current literature? It is no longer the business of literary art to reveal "the light which never was on land or sea." It is now an affair of surfaces and externals. Its message is that a man's life consists of an endless procession of externalities; of smoke and grime; of the streets and the mud in the streets; of offices and houses and money and clothes and hats; of sights and sounds; of pleasures and pains; succeeding each other in a kind of bewildering nightmare. These are the realities, the millions of disconnected experiences of a drab and uninspired life. There is, beneath and beyond them, no indwelling spirit to transform them from the sordid to the sublime. So says the literary realist. And this is what his brother the philosophical realist is saying too.

In this contention between the spirit of the last age and the spirit of the present day I am not now taking sides. The realist may be right for all I know. My point is not that the romantic spirit was better than the anti-romantic, or vice versa. I am only

concerned to point out that the philosophy of an age on the one hand, and the literature and art of the age on the other, usually express in different forms the essential attitude of that age towards the world, and therefore that their content is the same. And my thesis is, you see, simply that philosophy is an organic part of human culture, one of the natural modes of expression of the human spirit, not something utterly remote and cut off from other branches of knowledge and from the affairs of ordinary life, the idle plaything of a few pedants and recluses.

For not only does the essential thought of each age express itself in philosophy. It expresses itself there, I should say, in its purest form. For whereas in literature and in art you will find the tendencies of the age expressed diffusely, mixed up with all sorts of unessentials, in a chaotic jumble, in philosophy you will find it crystallized out, reduced to its fundamental principles. It is hardly too much to say that philosophy is the master key to human culture; and that in the last resort no full understanding of the great movements of the human spirit—that is to say, no full understanding of life itself—is possible without philosophy. And if that is so, can it be any longer doubted that the rôle of philosophy in education is vital?

But there occurs a doubt to one's mind. It is a common reproach against philosophy that it is nothing but an arena of disagreements. Compare philosophy, it is said, with any of the well-established sciences. Among scientists, of course, there are disagreements. But each of the sciences nevertheless presents us with a large and growing body of established truths. The sciences, moreover, do not remain stationary. They advance triumphantly from discovery to discovery.

Now if you turn your eyes from science to philosophy, what a pitiful spectacle meets your gaze! Philosophers cannot agree even upon the most elementary principles of their subject. They are divided into numerous hostile camps. Philosophy is nothing but a haphazard jumble of contradictory opinions. There must be something wrong with a subject which has always been, and still is, in such a pass. That is the sort of onslaught which the unhappy philosopher has to meet from his friends the scientists. What reply can he make?

I cannot, in the brief space now left to me, deal as fully with this subject as I should like to. I can, in fact, give only the bare headings of what I think would be the adequate reply.

One might, of course, point out that the disagreements of philosophers are often greatly exaggerated; that if one were to draw up a list of matters on which practically all philosophers agree, the list would probably be surprisingly long; that the development of

philosophy, as of other branches of knowledge, has not been chaotic, but orderly, a well-defined evolution; and that philosophers themselves naturally discuss the points on which they disagree, and are silent on those upon which they agree, thus giving an appearance of greater disagreement than actually exists. There would be some truth in all these contentions. But such a line of defence would, I think, be rather a case of special pleading. One has to admit roundly that there *is* far more disagreement among philosophers than there is among the men of science. What other reply can we make?

Firstly, it is somewhat oddly overlooked, by those who make this criticism of philosophy, that philosophy is not alone in this matter. It is true that there is a remarkably large measure of agreement in the purely physical sciences. But in the spheres of art, religion, morals, politics, economics, there is, I should say, as much disagreement as there is in philosophy. If philosophers are divided into idealists and realists, into rationalists and empiricists, are not political thinkers divided into conservatives and revolutionaries, communists and fascists, republicans and monarchists? Do they not dispute regarding every possible political principle in theory, and every possible political decision in practice? Are not American economists divided into brain-trusters and anti-brain-trusters? Is not the religious world divided into Christians, Muslims, Buddhists? In moral questions is there not constant and violent dispute as to whether a man in given circumstances ought to have done this or that?

Now what would you think of anyone who should argue that, because there is so much disagreement in the spheres of politics, art, religion, economics, morals, therefore politics, art, religion, economics, morals, are unimportant subjects the study of which ought not to be encouraged? Is it not obvious that, in spite of the disagreements, perhaps *because of* the disagreements, these are just the most important subjects in the world, the subjects which ought above all to be studied by a man who wishes to be a first-class human being? Why, then, should philosophy be selected for special reprimand because of its disagreements?

But that answer, perhaps, does not satisfy. It consists, you may say, only in the blackening of other subjects, not in the whitening of philosophy And it does not go to the root of the matter. Let us leave politics, economics, and so on, to fight their own battles. Let us speak of philosophy alone, and face the issue. Why *should* there be so many disagreements among philosophers, if their subject is really in a sound and healthy condition? I suggest that the answer is, in essence, as follows. There is a special reason why physical scientists are able to present a more or less united front. They are dealing always with *ponderables*, with crass matter, in other words

with things which can be measured and weighed. Moreover, they are dealing nearly always with the quantitative aspects of matter, and the questions regarding matter which they seek to answer are mostly questions which can be definitely settled by operations of measuring and weighing. These operations can be fairly easily and accurately performed. And the result is that scientific problems can for the most part be definitely solved.

But philosophy deals mostly with *imponderables*, which cannot be measured and weighed, and the questions which philosophers ask cannot be settled by yardsticks and balances. Take any of the great questions with which philosophers are concerned. Is the world ultimately a product of mind, or is it mindless mechanism? Is there a cosmic purpose, or is there not? Is the world finally rational, or is there an irreducible element of irrationality in it? What is the significance of the presence of evil in the universe? What is the essence of morality? Is there a single absolute moral law or is there not? What is the ultimate nature and foundation of art, and of the sense of the beautiful? Can any reasonable person expect slick answers to these questions as if they were sums in arithmetic? Can they be answered by means of operations with foot-rules and chemical retorts? Is it not obvious that there will always be room for differences of opinion on such matters? And can we expect more than that we should know what the best minds, who have given their lives to these problems, think, notwithstanding that, among them too, there may, and indeed must be, different views?

Philosophy is deeply rooted in human life. It reflects, as I have tried to show, the essential attitudes of ages and of civilizations to the world. And it is little short of idiotic to expect that these attitudes will not show wide cleavages and divergencies. But this does mean that men's attitudes to the world, and the philosophies which express them, are not among the deepest concerns of human culture.

Therefore I cannot hold out the hope that to-morrow, or in five years, or in fifty years, all philosophers will agree. Only a simpleton will entertain such a hope. And only a shallow understanding will condemn philosophy because of this.

In any case, all this about the disagreements of philosophers is, for me, merely a side-issue. My main contention is that philosophy is an integral part of human culture, and whether that culture is divided within itself or not, the study of it necessitates philosophy. Whether we like it or not, we cannot escape philosophy; because, on whatever road of knowledge we travel, philosophy lies in wait for us with its questions.

TAKING SIDES IN PHILOSOPHY

GILBERT RYLE, M.A.

THERE is a certain emotion of repugnance which I, and I hope a good many would-be philosophers, feel when asked the conventional question, "If you are a philosopher, to what school of thought do you belong? Are you an Idealist or a Realist, a Platonist or a Hobbist, a Monist or a Pluralist?"

We all habitually and conveniently employ these and dozens of other similar party-labels. And the standard histories of philosophy aid and abet us in treating the history of philosophy as a series of conflicts between opposing camps or election campaigns between rival factions. We even come to deem philosophers as worthy or unworthy of study according to the particular "isms" of which they are alleged to be, or confess themselves to be partisans. Sometimes quite well-meaning persons actually boast of being "orthodox Hegelians" or "orthodox Realists" as if the notion of orthodoxy in philosophy was a natural and appropriate one.

I fear, too, that in teaching the subject we are prone consciously or unconsciously to give our pupils the impression that they would be well advised not to inform themselves of the views or the arguments of philosophers belonging to this or that school.

Nevertheless, I dislike being asked how I cast my vote, and I want, if I can, to lay bare the sources of this dislike. But I should say at the very start that I am not arguing for eclecticism in philosophical thinking. To my mind eclecticism is only the most corrupt of all the "isms." It is our form of Coalitionism, a parasite on the party system.

The gist of my position is this.

There is no place for "isms" in philosophy.

The alleged party issues are never the important philosophic questions, and to be affiliated to a recognizable party is to be the slave of a non-philosophic prejudice in favour of a (usually non-philosophic) article of belief. To be a "so-and-so-ist" is to be philosophically frail. And while I am ready to confess or to be accused of such a frailty, I ought no more to boast of it than to boast of astigmatism or *mal de mer*. I am, that is, prepared to find myself classified and classified justly as a "so-and-so-ist," only I think that that is something to be apologetic for. My "ism" exists, doubtless, but it is not a banner so much as a susceptibility. So there ought to be nothing in philosophy corresponding to vote-

casting. The question "How do you vote between this 'ism' and that 'ism'?" ought to be dropped in favour of the question "Which way do your inclinations and biases pull you between this 'ism' and that?"

1. Part of my repugnance comes from this source. To be a member of such and such a school is to cleave to a certain tenet or set of tenets. And for the school to know itself, or be known by others, as a special school, the school, say, of Monists or Pragmatists, its tenets must be contestable. In fact, a set of tenets gets its label from being opposed. It is usually those who think it false who first call it "Realism," or "Rationalism" or "Berkeleyanism." In general "isms" are unnamed until they are contested. They are also, as a rule, unchampioned until they are contested.

To cleave to an "ism" is then to cleave to a disputable position. But what is it to cleave to a position? If it means to entertain no doubts of the truth of the theory, then this is an unforgivable irrationality, if the arguments against it have anything in them at all. And they will not be arguments if they haven't. It is sheer credulity to accept without question a theory which is in any part or degree logically fallacious or imperfect.

But sometimes a logically valid theory is disputed. Probably there still exist militant circle-squarers. So there would be nothing irrational in cleaving to an "ism" the arguments for which were logically unassailable, although assailants in fact exist. But what would this "cleaving" be? Just seeing that the arguments for the theory were valid and those against it were fallacious. On this showing, being a Realist, say, would just consist in seeing that Idealists reason very foolishly. And there would be no more reason for cherishing a school of Realism in philosophy than for fostering a school of non-circle-squarers in geometry. The party would contain everyone who could think straight in philosophical subjects. No philosophers would be outside it. So it would be no philosophic party at all.

Every "ism" that can get to the point of acquiring a name is *philosophically* questionable, and is actually questioned by genuine philosophers. And that means that no philosopher has any excuse for cleaving to it. Any philosopher should see and welcome the logically valid part of its argument; and any philosopher should see and welcome the logically valid parts of the theory of its contestants. And there is nothing left which should convince anyone of the truth of the remainder of those theories—unless a philosopher is to be allowed to believe doctrines because he likes them.

Of course each of us is predisposed to swallow uncritically certain sorts of doctrines which happen to be congenial to him; and it is hygienic to recognize and confess these predispositions. But a

fraternity of persons of kindred credulities could only constitute a school of "misosophy."

2. Another consideration which I find underlying my distate for party-labels in philosophy is this. The central issues between the self-announcing "isms" turn out, when the fog of the early engagements is over, to be extremely refined and even academic differences. (I also think that they often turn out not to be genuine philosophical issues either. But I choose not to discuss this point here.) For example, it has been argued and not, I think, contested that the radical issue that splits Monists or Absolute Idealists from opposing "schools" is the question whether relations are or are not internal to their terms. Now the question interests me, and is, I think, soluble. But if asked by a pupil what are the radical problems of philosophy, I could not with an easy mind tell him, "Oh, such questions as whether relational propositions are analytic or not." Or, to take another example, I should feel unhappy in saying that one of the major truths discovered by philosophers is the answer to the question that splits Platonists and anti-Platonists, namely, that general words are significant by being proper names of entities (or the negative, if it is preferred).

Yet the doctrines of principle (adherence to which, as we shall see, is what constitutes schools of thought) have to be fairly narrow and abstract propositions if the "schools" are to be supposed to be standing for anything in particular. So they have to treat their single-plank election platforms as if they were the radical truths of philosophy. The radical topics that philosophy is about have to be represented as of these patterns—whether truths of fact can be deduced from *a priori* premisses (the issue between Rationalism and Empiricism), whether "I ought" is compatible with "I had better not" (the issue between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism), whether the nature of what I know or think about entails that I know or think about it (the issue between one form of Idealism and Realism). And so on.

Now doubtless such questions as these are watershed questions. As we vote on them, so we shall have to vote on many derivative questions. But to say that these are the central questions that face philosophers provokes the comment that they seem very technical specialists' questions. Indeed, they seem to be riddles which we need a lot of special training in philosophy to appreciate.

The chief fruits of the subject seem to be rather small potatoes. Now I am not complaining because these topics are unfit for the pulpit or the market-place; nor yet because they are abstract and logically fine-drawn. These are merits in a topic of philosophical inquiry. No, I am complaining, I think, because questions like these are *resultant* riddles and not *inaugurating* riddles. They are special

posers which trip us up after we have travelled a good long way; they are not what set us travelling. To change the metaphor, there is the smell of sediment about them, as if they were what the tide has left behind it—after ebbing.

3. However these two grounds for girding at sectarian habits of thought and speech in philosophy are not yet at the root of the matter. The real root of my objection is, I think, the view that I take of the nature of philosophical inquiry. I am not going to expound it in full, but a part of the view is that it is a species of discovery. And it seems absurd for discoverers to split into Whigs and Tories. Could there be a pro-Tibet and an anti-Tibet party in the sphere of geography? Are there Captain Cook-ites and Nansenists?

But before developing this argument it will be useful to clear away some possible misinterpretations of the case for which I am arguing.

(*a*) I am as far as possible from deploring or ridiculing polemics in philosophical discussion. There could, in my view, be nothing more unwholesome than unanimity among philosophers. The unconvinced are the sharpest critics of an argument, and those who are also hostile are its warmest critics. And an argument which was not tested by sharp or warm critics would be at least half untested. I am only urging that the common motive for unconversion and hostility, namely, allegiance to an "ism," is philosophically unjustifiable and ought to be discountenanced by philosophers. Arguments should be attacked because they are invalid, not because they are "Monistic" or "Pluralistic," "Occamistic" or "Spinozistic."

Philosophy lives by dispute. For dispute is the testing of arguments. But debates under the eyes of Whips test nothing but solidarity.

(*b*) Nor, of course, am I defending the milk-and-water doctrine that all philosophers are really in the right and really seeing eye to eye with one another. All philosophers make mistakes, and even great philosophers commit howlers. And their mistakes often lie undetected for a long time, or, when detected, retain the credence of their disciples for woefully lengthy periods. It is often desirable that a philosopher should be refuted. What is improper is that he should be discredited for being a Left-Winger, say, or have his fallacies condoned because he is on the side of the angels in the party of the Right-Centre.

(*c*) There is one way of dividing philosophers into types which is perfectly legitimate, namely, the classification of them as Logicians, Moralists, Political Philosophers, Epistemologists, Metaphysicians (maybe), Jurisprudents, and so on. Certainly these compartments are not watertight, and a philosopher may justly be suspected of philosophic incompetence who ignores all philosophical questions save those in his one pet department. But a man may, like Butler, be predominantly excellent in the philosophy of conduct and motives,

or, like Berkeley, in the philosophy of perception. There is nothing sectarian or schismatic about such preoccupations.

(*d*) And for certain ends, such as those of biography or the history of cultures (though not those of philosophy itself), it is often useful and correct to classify philosophers according to certain general casts of mind or temperaments. There are, we are told, the tender-minded and the tough-minded among philosophers; or again, there are those who are constitutionally Platonic and those who are constitutionally Aristotelian; there are the mystical and the matter-of-fact; the "inflationists" and the "deflationists"; those of the prophetic and those of the engineering casts of mind. The fact that we can get a fair measure of agreement between students of diverse sorts, how the major philosophic figures ought to be classified under such heads as these is good evidence that the contrast of psychological types is not altogether fictitious. To some extent the thoughts of the philosophers whom we study are congenial or uncongenial to us according to which of the two psychological baskets they are drawn from.

If we admit that there is some big difference of psychological types of this sort, we can take either of two attitudes towards it. We can say that one of the qualities of mind is a necessary part of excellence at philosophy, while the other is an insuperable disability. Or we can say that both are or can be assets—only assets which human beings can seldom, if ever, possess together. Neither view would justify the existence of philosophical sects. For suppose, on the one hand, that the "prophetic" or tender-minded temperament is a *sine qua non* of philosophic excellence. Then it would follow that no one of the "tough-minded" or "engineering" temperament could be a philosopher. So the gulf would be one between philosophers and non-philosophers and not between one set of philosophers and another. (Astronomers do not boast a party of anti-Astrologists.) And, on the other hand, suppose that both temperaments are assets, so that some are excellent at philosophy because they are of the "prophetic" type, while others are excellent at it because they are of the "engineering" type. Then for the followers of those of one type to campaign against those of the other would be as stupid as it would be for a lover of poetry to declare war on the lovers of prose, or for a mountaineer to blackball from his club all maritime explorers.

Whether the "prophetic" temperament, say, is analogous to blinkers or to long-sightedness there can be no grounds for a philosopher of the "engineering" type to join a faction against the possessors of it. For either they are constitutionally impotent at philosophy, in which case they can be ignored as we ignore phrenologists and fortune-tellers; or else they have a special quali-

fication for discovering certain sorts of philosophic truth which is denied to those of the more matter-of-fact type, who on their side will have a compensating ability to discover philosophic truths of another sort. And in this case, they are related as the physician to the surgeon, by difference of function and not by conflict of "isms."

But in any case this crude sort of psychological division can only serve to explain causally why some sorts of people are prone not to appreciate either some sorts or any sorts of philosophical arguments and questions, and not to feel either some or any sorts of philosophic qualms. It contributes nothing to the testing of such arguments, to the formulation or solution of such questions, or to the excitation or appeasing of such qualms. Again, it may explain causally why certain sorts of philosophers are congenial or uncongenial to me. It cannot explain what are the philosophical excellences or demerits of their work. (Incidentally, on a point of history, it seems to me that some of the best philosophers have enjoyed both temperaments. Plato, for example, "engineers" in the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Parmenides*. Kant is "prophetic," perhaps, in his moral theory. Leibniz is both a formal logician and a "heaven-sketcher.")

Let us consider more closely than we have yet done what it is to be a member of a "school of philosophy" or a champion of an "ism" or a disciple of a philosophical teacher. For certainly there are people who have been with justice labelled, by others or by themselves, as Epicureans, Wolffians, Kantians, Spencerians, Bradleians, and the like. We speak familiarly and intelligibly of the schools of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Occam, and of the schools of Hegel, Brentano, and James. Are there not notoriously a Cambridge and a Vienna school? Was there not an Oxford tradition?

If there hadn't existed any such churches, claques, or cliques, there would have been no sectarian tradition for me to inveigh against. My whole case is that there is a schismatic tradition in philosophy, and that "schismatic philosopher" is a contradiction in terms.

What then is a "follower"? First, there is the deliberately abusive sense in which we sometimes use such descriptions, though it is not the use for which we are looking (namely, the use in which a man might say *with pride* that he "followed" Hegel, or Wittgenstein). We can abusively describe someone as a follower or disciple of Nietzsche, say, who accepts because they are congenial to him those doctrines of Nietzsche which he understands and rejects by ignoring them the views of everyone else. A man who only attends to the views of one philosopher and takes them as gospel because they are to his taste is, of course, neither a philosopher nor a student of philosophy. In this sense of the word to say "I am a disciple of so-

and-so" would mean "I prefer to shut my eyes to all doctrines and problems save those of so-and-so. I prefer also to shut my eyes to any defects there may be in so-and-so's theory. I swear *in verba magistri.*"

Next it might be suggested that what it means to say of someone that he is a follower of Epicurus, or a disciple of Kant, is that he believes all that Epicurus (or Kant) says, and nothing that any other philosopher says, save where he echoes Epicurus (or Kant). But this would be a silly definition of "follower" or "disciple." For no one can remember all the dicta of any but the least copious of philosophers. And no philosophers are completely consistent. And all the best philosophers rebut views which they had themselves once believed. Nor can one disbelieve all the dicta of all other philosophers. For we cannot read, much less remember and much less still understand, all the dicta of all philosophers. And of those that we read and understand we cannot disbelieve all. For some are the direct contradictories of some others. And some are obviously true.

Even if by "follower" we meant someone who is generally disposed to believe whatever he reads and remembers from Epicurus (or Kant), and is disposed in general to disbelieve what he reads and remembers from anyone else, we should have to say that such a man was a worshipper or a parrot, and no philosopher. For on such a definition a "follower" would be one who never thought for himself. And there is no room for credence in philosophy. However, it is obvious that when philosophers or would-be philosophers are described as "followers" or "disciples," it is not ordinarily meant that they are just unthinking "yes-men." What else does it mean?

A third possible and more flattering definition of "followers" would be this. To follow Aristotle, say, would be to see, after rational consideration, that Aristotle's conclusions are true because his arguments are valid, and also to see, after rational consideration, that no other philosophers argue validly for their conclusions.

But even in this sense no one but a fool could claim to be—and not even a fool could be—a follower of anybody. For neither Aristotle nor any other philosopher has failed to produce at least some defective and even fallacious arguments. Nor is Aristotle or any other philosopher the sole discoverer of valid arguments. And no human being could be so acquainted with all the arguments of all philosophers that he could dismiss all of them save some of those of, say, Aristotle as invalid.

A philosopher, or rather student of philosophy of this type, for whom "following so-and-so" consists in seeing the validity of so-and-so's arguments, would have rather to describe himself in terms like this. "I follow Aristotle in respect of arguments A, D, and F,

but not of his arguments B, C, and E; I also follow Berkeley in respect of his arguments W, Y, and Z, but not of his arguments P. . . V, and X; I also follow Russell on such-and-such points, and Kant on such-and-such others. . . ." And then he would not be, in the ordinary sense of the word, for which we are still in search, anybody's "disciple." But he would be (almost) a philosopher. For the only bias or *parti pris* in his outlook would be one in favour not of persons or congenial doctrines, but of valid arguments.

But even this is patently not the sense in which people actually claim with pride or thankfulness to be uncompromising Spinozists, sound Hegelians, unswerving Pragmatists, loyal Moderate Bradleians, or last-ditch Logical Positivists. To accept the philosophy of such-and-such a teacher (or group of teachers) is, it is rather vaguely felt, something more than merely to find his general temper of mind sympathetic, and something less than credulously to endorse every particular dictum or argument that he ever propounded. A philosophy, such as Hegelianism or Thomism, is something more definite than a mood, and less definite than a cento of propositions, or a sorites of special ratiocinations. It is in some way adoptable or discardible as a whole.

A philosophy, that is, is something which has a general trend; and it is or else it rests on some dominant structure of argument. So it can be in some important sense on the right track, for all that much of its detail may be faulty. Its terminology may be loose and confused; many of its special arguments may be fallacious or incomplete, and yet as a whole (or "system," as it is dubbed in its testimonials) the philosophy of so-and-so may have the root of the matter in it. Conversely (so this vague theory would hold) the philosophy of such-and-such may be altogether on the wrong track, and its wrongness be not a whit compensated by the precision of its terminology or the cogency of its special arguments. The rottenness of the trunk is not excused by the fineness of its foliage.

Further, the rightness as a whole of a given philosophy does not derive from, though it is probably the source of the congeniality of the temperament of its author to us who appreciate it. Its rightness is something rational, and not merely temperamental or emotional. The rightness of, say, Rationalism or Critical Realism or Empirio-Criticism, is something for which the ability to think coherently plus the willingness to think honestly are the necessary and sufficient conditions. Monists, therefore, are radically good at philosophizing, and Pluralists radically bad at it (or vice versa). The members of the opposing school, championing as they do a philosophy which has the wrong general trend, are the victims of a mistake in principle, no matter what acumen they may exercise in questions of detail.

Accordingly every school of thought which is conscious of itself

as such must and does maintain that the opposing school or schools of thought are in some way philosophically unprincipled. For they are blind to those principles which make its philosophy *a* philosophy and *the* philosophy.

Of course we are not often let into the secret of what these principles are. There is apt to be an almost Masonic reserve about them. Just as in politics Conservatives, Liberals, and Socialists would rather shed their blood to defend than court disaster by unpadlocking their Joanna Southcote's boxes of principles, so the militant advocates of the philosophical sects generally prefer to attack one another's derivative tenets than to win each other over by exhibiting those truths for the seeing of which rationality and honesty are supposed to be a sufficient condition.

And it must be confessed, in justification of this reserve, that when these principles are divulged, they are apt to bear a close resemblance either to undebatable platitudes, or to dogmatic unplausibilities, for neither of which could a man of sense and mettle fight with gusto.

But are there such principles? And if there are, are they the preserves of cliques? And most important of all, how are they established, that is, what makes it reasonable to accept them and perversity or blindness to reject them?

It can hardly be maintained that they are self-evident axioms —else why does no one publish the first page of our Euclid for us? Moreover, they would have either to be self-evident because analytic, in which case no thinking man could fail to assent, with a yawn, to them; or they would have to be self-evident although synthetic. And the possibility of there existing such truths at all within philosophy can hardly be taken for granted in the face of Hume and Kant.

No, these doctrines of principle, which constitute (it is supposed) both the bedrock and the cement of any reputable "ism," are established, and only established, by philosophical argument. (Or if no reasons can be given for them, they should be confessed by their adherents to be sheer dogmas, which philosophers are at liberty to accept or to reject at the dictates of their palates.)

So let us consider what it is to establish a doctrine by philosophical argument. What sort of an argument is a philosophical argument? Two answers can be dismissed without many words. Philosophical argument is not induction, and it is not demonstration *ordine geometrico*. It is not the latter. For we have no agreed or evident axioms to start with. In the sense of the word "presupposition," in which philosophy is concerned with presuppositions, the goal of its labours is to reveal them. They are not the premisses of its arguments. And certainly philosophical argument is not induction.

A philosopher is playing at science who culls statistics or experiments in laboratories. To suppose that a philosopher's propositions can be falsified or corroborated by a new empirical discovery is to annihilate the difference between philosophy and the special sciences.

Moreover, inductive arguments cannot yield better than probable conclusions, and (I say it dogmatically) no probable arguments are philosophical arguments. Certainly there is an important sense in which a philosopher's argument may be *plausible*, that is, not obviously invalid. Most philosophical arguments are too difficult for us to know that they are completely probative on first, or even fiftieth, examination. But we may see that they are plausible in a non-derogatory sense. Something (though we are not quite sure what) seems to be proved by certain steps (though we are not quite clear which), in the argument. But an argument which is plausible in this way is not a probable argument; it is an argument which probably (or not improbably) is probative. It has the *prima facies* of a probative argument.

No, a philosophical argument is neither a piece of induction nor a piece of Euclidean deduction. Its pattern may be labelled "dialectical" if we like, though I am not clear that this means anything different from "philosophical." It is or aims at being logically rigorous, for self-contradiction is the promised penalty of default in it.

Now the ability to see that a philosophical argument is rigorous or has the *prima facies* of being rigorous is not the perquisite of any person or team of persons, though of course some people are more capable of philosophical thinking than others.

So the arguments which establish, or are supposed to establish, the "principles" of a system of philosophy are inspectable by all. To accept (or reject) those principles on blind trust (or blind distrust) in the rigorousness of the arguments is partisanship of the irrational sort. If there are questions of principle in philosophy, there is one task primarily worthy of philosophers, namely, to examine the force of the arguments for and of the arguments against such principles without a *parti pris* for or against the truth of those principles. Any serious philosopher would be as grateful for rigorous arguments for as for rigorous arguments against the principles of "Idealism" (say), or "Thomism," or "Logical Positivism."

So if the opposition between rival "isms" is, as both must claim, an opposition on a question of principle, the contestants ought to find in each other the keenest and most helpful coadjutors in the examination of the cogency of the arguments about that principle. A "Thingummist" who is seriously concerned about the validity of the argument for "Thingummism" should find the strongest argu-

ments of the "anti-Thingummists" the very test for which he craves of whether his own argument is rigorous or only plausible. And then they would not be rivals, but coadjutors in dispute. But the attitude of actual schools towards their rival schools seems to be something different. Content with the case for their own principles, they seem, as a rule, to ignore the case for the prosecution, as if presupposition of those sacred principles was a necessary condition of any argument being valid, including, it is to be feared, the very arguments by which those principles were established.

Of course this sort of attitude is not consciously or deliberately adopted, much less justified. There could be only two ways of justifying it, if justification was sought. One would be to say that there are private revelations of principles to selected and privileged people, so that the hapless majority of philosophers are to be pitied for being, through no fault or deficiency of their own, graceless. The other would be to admit that principles can be adopted according to personal predilection. But the intellectual conscience of the better philosophers would forbid them to immunize themselves from criticism by claiming that their principles are above or beneath argument. The only heresy in philosophy is the belief that there are philosophical orthodoxies.

So far I have spoken as if it was pretty clear what sort of a thing a "principle" is. But in fact it is far from clear. The only account that I can give is this. A philosophical question is a question of principle when it is philosophically much more important than most other questions. And the relative importance of philosophical questions could be explained on these lines that when, given the answer to one question, it is at once clear what are the answers, or of what sort are the answers, to an expanding range of other questions, while the answers to any of the latter do not in the same way throw light on the former, then the former is a question of principle relative to the latter.

Or else, when in the case of a range of questions it is clear that none of them could be answered, or, perhaps, even be clearly formulated before some anterior question is answered, then this is a question of principle relative to them. The notion is simply that of one question being logically prior or cardinal to a range of other questions. It is tempting, but it would be too rash to say that there is one absolutely first question, or one set of absolutely first questions. Relations of logical precedence among questions are moderately easy to get fairly wide agreement about; but not so about absolute primacy.

A question of principle then is just an important or very important philosophical question. And that a question is important or very important is something for and against which there can be plausible

and sometimes probative arguments. Often it is not contested that a question is important, though every suggested solution is hotly contested.

But there is no difference in kind between arguments on more and arguments on less important philosophical questions. The sort of logical rigour demanded is the same.

Nor must we say that the less important philosophical questions are not philosophical questions. This would be self-contradictory. Certainly there is room in philosophy for ingenuity on minor points. We need our deft joiners as well as our engineers and our prophets. Though at the present moment I am inclined to think that we are suffering from a spate of over-ingenuity. Indeed, of the two prevalent infections to-day, over-respectability and over-ingenuity, I am not sure which is the more enervating complaint.

DISCOVERY IN PHILOSOPHY

It is my opinion that there is an affirmative answer to the cynically meant question, "Do philosophers ever discover anything?" The allegation that they do not is partly due to the fact that the champions of the "isms" never acknowledge defeat. And indeed they are not often defeated. For their battles are usually sham battles. My view is simply this. Every rigorous philosophical argument is a discovery. And in a looser sense of the word "discovery," even every plausible philosophical argument, is a discovery. A valid philosophical argument is itself the revealing of something, and something of the sort of which philosophy is the search. Every philosopher who produces one new philosophical argument has made a philosophical advance. But it is not just the *conclusion* of his argument which is his discovery; it is the total argument for that conclusion. (Many histories of philosophy are worthless just because they think that, for example, Hume's philosophy can be presented, like pemmican, by cataloguing his conclusions. But if all we needed to learn from Hume's thinking could be propounded in the dozen odd sentences in which we would state Hume's conclusions, we should properly blame him for burying them in his ocean of other words. Whereas for his *argument* the Treatise errs in the direction of ellipse.)

When a philosopher or his commentator is asked to summarize what he has discovered, a bad mistake underlies the very posing of the question. It assumes that just as the astronomer's discoveries can be published to the world in a sentence or two, namely, sentences stating the new facts that he has discovered, so the philosophers ought to be able to tell us new facts. But philosophy does not discover, or look for, new matters of fact. In a sense, which I shall not

try to elucidate, the philosopher throws new light, but he does not give new information. And the light that he throws is resident in the rigour of his arguments. Anthologies of the quotable dicta of the great philosophers pretend, sometimes, to be encyclopaedias of the "results" of philosophy up to date. But they illuminate no one who has not himself followed the same lines of reasoning as they had done.

But if this, or something like this, is true, how can there be in philosophy "isms" pitted against "isms"? If, for example, we take Monism and Pluralism to be two accredited and antagonistic "isms," then the Monist, if he is a philosopher at all, will be bound to say either that the case for Pluralism contains some plausible or probative philosophical arguments, so that the Pluralists will have discovered something which he had missed; or that Pluralism contains no philosophical arguments which are either plausible or probative, in which case it will not be a philosophical theory at all, and will not therefore be an antagonistic philosophical theory. Even if he alleges that the case for Monism is probative, while that for Pluralism is merely plausible and fallacious—and this would, I suppose, usually be the allegation of the one "school" against its rival—he should confess that there must have been defects in the presentation of the case for Monism, else how could the case for Pluralism have looked plausible? How can an argument *seem* to refute a patently unanswerable case? The case for Monism, if really unanswerable, ought to be made patently unanswerable. So the existence of Pluralists will at least have done philosophy the service of advertising the fact that the case for Monism is either answerable or not patently unanswerable. In either case the Monist, if he is a serious philosopher, would give the Pluralist the credit for having made a philosophical discovery on a question of principle. And then the feud between the "isms" is over, and we are left with a serious dispute on questions of philosophical importance. Instead of saying, "I can't argue with Pluralists, for they are philosophically unprincipled," the philosophically minded Monist will say, "I can't argue profitably with anyone but a Pluralist. He is the only person who is keen to examine the rigorousness of the arguments on our questions of principle." And the sect-labels would be dropped.

I have said that there is no philosophical information. Philosophers do not make known matters of fact which were unknown before. The sense in which they throw light is that they make clear what was unclear before, or make obvious things which were previously in a muddle. And the dawning of this desiderated obviousness occurs in the finding of a logically rigorous philosophical argument. Something that was obscure becomes obvious to me in the act of

seeing the force of a particular philosophical argument. Nor can I make a short cut to that clarification by perusing the conclusions, but skipping the reasoning of the argument.

Anyone who appreciates the argument *ipso facto* gets the clarification. Though, of course, it is often very hard to appreciate involved and abstract arguments, like that which constitutes the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

But if a philosopher does succeed in finding for himself and transmitting to his readers a new and valid philosophical argument, then he has made something obvious for mankind. The obscurity which he has overcome is, apart from collapses of cultures, dead from that time on. His arduously achieved discovery becomes a public truism, and, if it is of any importance, becomes crystallized in the diction and the thought of educated people, even though the great majority of them have never read a word of him. The historian who wants to find out what Aristotle or Locke "discovered" must see what public truisms existed after the philosopher's work was done which were not even the topic of a clearly recognized question before he began it. Now when such a clarification has been effected and a previously unseen truism has become a part of the ordinary intellectual equipment of educated men, the discoverer of the truism will seem, on retrospect, to have been talking platitudes. And just that is his great achievement, so to emancipate men from an obscurity that they can regard as a platitude what their predecessors could not even contemplate clearly enough to regard as a paradox.

Those very parts of the work of Berkeley, say, or Hume, to which we vouchsafe an unexcited "Of course," are the discoveries of Berkeley and Hume.

But there can be, and are in fact, no faction-fights about the public truisms which are the real legacy of effective philosophizing. We do not marshal ourselves into Liberals and Conservatives about the points which a philosopher has made obvious. On the contrary, we contest about points which he has left contestable, points, namely, where he failed to make something obvious. We fight for or against some of his doctrines which are not truisms just because he has failed to establish them by probative or patently probative arguments. We enlist ourselves as his "followers" on the points where he was unsuccessful in clarifying something. He is the leader of a party in those very paths where he is still blindfolded.

I conclude with a few concessions.

1. Although, as I think, the motive of allegiance to a school or a leader is a non-philosophic and often an anti-philosophic motive, it may have some good results. Partisanship does generate zeal, combativeness, and team-spirit. And, when these impulses are by

chance canalized into the channels of a non-spurious philosophical dispute, the hostilities and militancies may aerate the waters and even drive useful turbines.

2. Pedagogically there is some utility in the superstition that philosophers are divided into Whigs and Tories. For we can work on the match-winning propensities of the young, and trick them into philosophizing by encouraging them to try to "dish" the Rationalists, or "scupper" the Hedonists. But this is a dodge for generating examination-philosophy rather than philosophy.

3. The "ism" labels remain, of course, applicable and handy, as terms of abuse, commiseration, or apologia. It is a neat and quick way of indicating the blinkers of a would-be philosopher to say, "He does not consider such-and-such an argument or type of argument, but then, poor fellow, he is a die-hard Idealist (or a sound Realist, or a whole-hogging Pragmatist)." And we, too, shall be, with perfect justice, allocated to new or old-fangled "isms."

For, being human, we are in philosophizing as elsewhere, partial to views from irrational motives, such as vanity, personal devotions, local patriotisms, and race-prejudices.

I am only urging that the employment of "ism-labels" should be reserved for our intervals of gossip and confession. They should not occur in philosophical discussions.

4. A big service that has been done to philosophy by the philosophical sects has been in respect of the technical terminology of philosophy. Philosophers no more dispense with technical terms than do plumbers. But language traps are the source of errors and confusions in philosophy. So a fairly copious supply of alternative and disparate founts of jargon is a considerable safeguard. And the occasional essays in inter-translation which occur when, for instance, a convinced anti-Thingummist tries to expound or criticize the views of a Thingummist are admirably fog-dispelling about the jargons of both, and not infrequently even about the philosophical problems themselves.

5. An important part of philosophical thinking consists in the hypothetical trying-out of theories—seeing what would follow from the assumed theory, how far other theories would or would not be compatible with it, and so on.

Now much of the exploration can be done by a person who firmly believes the theory, although he has no good grounds for it. But whether he consciously adopts it as a not impossible theory, or is so irrationally imbued with it that it constitutes his inescapable "point of view," he can follow out its consequences with profit to the subject. Sometimes the added enthusiasm which comes from belief, however irrational, stimulates the exploration where it would have flagged in the absence of that credence. But none the less the disposition to

be convinced of ill-founded or unfounded doctrines, or unconvinced of well-founded ones, is a "misosophical" disposition.

6. It is often claimed that the major "lesson" that we ought to learn from a philosophical leader is not so much a doctrine or set of doctrines as a Method; and what unites a "school" is not unanimity about conclusions, but agreement in the practice of the Method. We are to follow the example, not echo the pronouncements of the founders. Now though it is not easy to say what we mean by a method of philosophizing, it seems to me clear that it does mean something. If there is more than one method of philosophy, or more than one strand in the method of philosophizing, the revealing of a new method or a new strand in the method is one of the biggest sorts of discovery that a philosopher can make.

However, that a proposed or exhibited method is a proper method or the proper method, or part of the proper method of philosophizing, is not a truth of private revelation, or a matter of personal taste. It is a philosophical proposition, and one on a question of "principle." So a school which claimed to be, and alone to be, on the right track in virtue of its monopoly of the true Method would only be a special case of what we considered before, the pretended monopoly of philosophical principles. The rival sects would again be separated only by rival pretensions, unless they join in exploring the case for and the case against those pretensions. And then they are not rivals.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

The purpose of *Wissenschaft und Weltanschaunng*,[1] by Aloys Wenzl, is to provide a rational explanation of the world which shall give us greater insight into its nature than either common sense or the natural sciences can give us. Philosophy, Professor Wenzl says in his introduction, springs from the desire for a *weltanschaunng*, for insight into the significance of life. But it also springs from a desire for *rational* explanation, and aims at objective validity. It proposes to give a truer, more complete, and more intelligible account of reality than appearances provide. This idea of a more intelligible explanation underlies the whole of Professor Wenzl's book. We want more than knowledge of empirical facts, we want knowledge of reasons (*verstehen aus dem Grund*), or, as he often puts it, insight (*einsichtig verstehen*). We want to see that though things seem to be contingent, they are really necessary. Different types of explanation will satisfy this need. There is mathematical deduction in which propositions follow from axioms. On the other hand, we get insight through awareness of psychical relations, and in particular the relation between end and means. Professor Wenzl foreshadows his conclusions by pointing out that no mathematical explanation can account for change. Complete understanding of the world is only possible in psychological terms.

I shall now give a brief outline of how Professor Wenzl reaches his main conclusions and what they are. It should, however, be understood that his discussion is very detailed. In considering a point, he suggests a number of alternative views and discusses each. The second section of this book is epistemological. There can be no metaphysics unless there is a real world. We are justified in assuming that there is, for our sense experiences guarantee the existence of real things. But they do not tell us about their "inner nature." Our knowledge of this depends on inference, and is expressed in the hypotheses formed by the natural sciences and metaphysics. Professor Wenzl believes that metaphysics uses the knowledge obtained by natural science but goes beyond it, and this belief determines the scheme of his book. In section three he surveys the conclusions of natural science, in so far as relevant to metaphysics. In the final sections he considers these conclusions in relation to each other, and the further hypotheses to which he believes that they lead.

We shall find, he says in his third section, that physics has contributed a great deal to our desire for rational explanation. It has explained complex appearances in terms of simple realities. Classical physics treats the world as a system constructed out of elementary entities and fundamental laws. The elementary entities are in space and time though we do not perceive them. They are strictly measurable, and the fundamental laws are mathematical. Modern physics has replaced this picture by another in which we get "ideal objects," "mathematical structures" forming a four-dimensional continuum in which space and time have been translated into quantitative but not perceptible properties and relations.

Biology and psychology lead us to the second kind of explanation, to the

[1] *Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung.* Felix Meiner. Leipzig, 1936. Pp. xi + 374.

insight we get in awareness of psychological relations. Professor Wenzl believes that empirical facts require us to accept the hypothesis of a purposive factor or *entelechy*, directing organic processes. He opens his biological survey with a detailed discussion of the controversy between mechanists and vitalists. The latter base their position on the occurrence of certain phenomena which we can sum up as purposive reactions to changes of situation. These phenomena, Professor Wenzl concludes, certainly require a teleological explanation of some sort, and he finds Driesch's hypothesis of an entelechy the most satisfactory. But the word "entelechy," he adds, only has meaning if it stands for a purposive and psycho-physical factor, which directs organic development in accordance with a plan. Finally, after considering psychological problems, in particular the mind-body relationship and unconscious processes, he supposes there are several subjects in any one individual which unconsciously direct organic and psychical activity. He ends this section by discussing free-will, and maintains that there are cases of undetermined choice.

Professor Wenzl has now reached the point for metaphysical hypothesis. The survey of empirical conclusions has presented a number of puzzles. There are a number of points which have to be fitted together and, above all, we have to ask how physical and psychical factors can interact. For physical things appear in space and time and can be treated mathematically, and psychical beings lack both these properties. How can things so essentially different interact with each other. How can we get insight into the interaction between physical and psychical? Professor Wenzl finally answers this question by a wide extension of the entelechy hypothesis. We are puzzled, he says, by a number of facts such as adaptation, unconscious mental processes, the development of species, the interaction between physical and psychical. They will all be explained if we assume that all reality is psychical, and that psychical beings form a hierarchy in which the lower are directed by the higher. After accepting this hypothesis, Professor Wenzl develops a "metaphysics of expression" according to which physical conditions (mathematical structures which *appear* in space and time) express psychical states and relations.

Umgang mit Dichtung,[1] by Johannes Pfeiffer, contains some very sound views about poetry, and Dr. Pfeiffer includes a great many poems to illustrate his points. He opens the discussion by contrasting two uses of language. On the one hand we may simply speak about a subject, while on the other hand the subject may be transformed into, or as we may also put it, be presented in the words. When this transformation occurs, language is poetic. The words then are all important, and no others could communicate exactly the same content. Thus the ultimate criterion of a poem is that we cannot translate it without loss.

We can understand why this is so by considering what is communicated. Language which simply speaks about a subject asks us to think and know, but poetry asks us to feel and experience. It communicates a mood or attitude (*Stimmung*) as distinct from an idea. Dr. Pfeiffer makes a good comparison between poetic language and expression through voice or gesture. It reveals an attitude in the same kind of way. And this accounts for its being untranslatable. The verbal form is kernel as well as shell.

Dr. Pfeiffer points out that words express a mood both by their sound and meaning (in a wide sense). On the one hand we have rhythm and melody, thus for example syllables of high pitch excite a light and cheerful mood, while those of low pitch express care and sorrow. On the other hand, we have

[1] *Umgang mit Dichtung*, Felix Meiner. Leipzig, 1936. Pp. 76.

imagery. Poetry, in most cases, uses a great many images. This does not mean that it simply paints word pictures, for it uses images of movement. Images, used metaphorically, express a mood by acting as symbols.

We may, however, be tempted to think that a mood is something unimportant. And in that case we may mistakenly think that the solid worth of a poem lies only in its ideas. But a mood is a self-revelation. It illuminates the more secret depths of experience. And thus the "truth" of a poem lies in its success as a revelation.

Dr. Pfeiffer then discusses the criteria of poetry. The first question we have to ask about a poem is whether or no it expresses a mood successfully. We can talk about piety, as Dr. Pfeiffer points out, and thereby show how little pious we are. What then are the ways in which a poem can betray itself? This is the question which he now considers, and about which he makes a number of interesting observations. He classifies his criteria under three pairs of opposites: (1) genuine and not genuine (*echt* and *unecht*), (2) original and derived (*ursprünglich* and *nicht-unsprünglich*, (3) *gestaltet* and *geredet*. Thus, for example, a poem fails to be genuine when there is discord between its theme and its tone, and fails to be original when it simply takes over conventional phrases.

These are aesthetic criteria, and it is these which a poem must satisfy in the first place. But there are also ultra-aesthetic criteria. We must first ask whether a poem is successful in its expression, and then whether it expresses something valuable. Does it reveal a profound or superficial attitude? In the former case it means more to us than in the latter.

HELEN KNIGHT.

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY[1]

This volume, Professor Muirhead tells us in his Foreword, was suggested to him by an Indian friend (his joint editor, we suppose) and welcomed by him "as a continuation of the series on Contemporary British and Contemporary American Philosophy" after having persuaded himself that in India present-day philosophy is not (as many think) mere tradition, but that in that country, "owing partly to the inherent genius of the race, partly to a fructifying contact with Western thought, the tree of philosophical knowledge has recently put forth fresh flowers and fruit."

The book cannot stand a comparison with the twice two volumes it is meant to "continue" and rather confirms the opinion that present-day India, having earned international fame in art, mathematics, and even natural sciences, has not as yet produced a constructive philosopher likely to be enrolled in the international galaxy. To do it justice we must, however, remember that the idea of philosophy as a progressive science has just begun only in India to shake the deep-seated belief in the "ancient wisdom" as unsurpassed and unsurpassable.[2] Only a few decades ago a Brahmin

[1] *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*. By M. K. Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Swāmi Abhedānanda, K. C. Bhattacharyya, G. C. Chatterji, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Bhagavan Das, Surendranath Dasgupta, Hiralal Haldar, M. Hiriyanna, S. Radhakrishnan, R. D. Ranade, V. Subrahmanya Iyer, A. R. Wadia. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan, D.Litt., and J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., F.B.A., Professor Emeritus of the University of Birmingham. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 375. Price 16s. Library of Philosophy, General Editor: Professor J. H. Muirhead.)

[2] Which *in some respects* it very likely *is*. It may, e.g., well be doubted whether the concept of the absolute *can* be carried further than has been done in the Neutral Absolutism reached (from the common Vedāntic Spiritual Absolutism) in the Upanisad mentioned at the end of this review.

philosopher (descendant and namesake of the famous Appayadīkṣita), who had the courage to frame his own Brahmasūtras, was for that believed to have become crazy. "Die Wahrheit war schon längst gefunden" (Goethe) is even now the almost general persuasion in India. All that, according to it, is in this Dark Age left for the philosopher to do is to comment on or, at the best, find a new way to the inheritage of the past. Considering this, the volume before us shows indeed a remarkable progress. The old position is still held by but few of its contributors. Most have successfully conceded to the blood-transfusion from the West, and some will be found to have entirely freed themselves from the shackles of orthodoxy.

The Foreword informs us that the fourteen essays are "all written by philosophers of about forty-five years of age." This is a curious lapsus (fortunately). For, as a matter of fact, nine out of the fourteen contributors are born between 1861 and 1877! It may also be found interesting that "besides philosophers known to be attached to Hinduism, several Moslems were approached, but for different reasons excused themselves," and that there is a single non-Hindu among the contributors, viz. the author of the last essay, who is a Parsee.

The volume opens with a credo of Mr. *Gandhi* covering a single page. Next *Rabindranath Tagore* gives us an idea of "The Religion of an Artist" in a paper full of pithy sayings of which the following may be quoted for characterizing his standpoint: "My religion is essentially a poet's religion"; "Abstract truth may belong to science and metaphysics, but the world of reality belongs to Art"; "The world as an art is the play of the Supreme Person revelling in image-making." The last sentence, as will be noticed, is in keeping with the common Vedāntic view that the meaning of the world-process for an unchanging highest reality can be expressed, if at all, by the word *līlā* (play) only.

Hereafter come the properly philosophic contributions arranged in the alphabetical order of the names of the contributors. Most of the latter give also some information, partly quite interesting, of their philosophical evolution, which latter is with R. D. Ranade the very subject of his paper ("The Evolution of My Own Thought"). It seems convenient to begin our review with the three papers pleading for the Vedānta (Advaita) as the most perfect system of philosophy and then deal with the more independent contributions, of which five are outlines of the system of their respective authors and the rest engaged in some special problem.

Swāmi Abhedānanda (pupil of Rāmakrishna and successor of Vivekānanda), writing on "Hindu Philosophy in India," extols the monistic Vedānta (Advaita) which is, according to him, both more critical and more sublime than Kant: the former "because it shows the phenomenal nature of the Kantian ego, of his forms of intuition and of his categories of thought," and the latter because it proves that the Thing-in-itself of the objective world and that of the subjective world are one. It is the "most complete system" of philosophy and the best also from the religious point of view, considering that "religion is nothing but the practical side of philosophy and philosophy is the theoretical side of religion."

Dr. Bhagavan Das, of Benares (born 1869), Vedāntin like Abhedānanda, summarizes, in his long paper, "Ātma-Vidyā, or the Science of the Self," after a brief "confession of faith," his reasons for the latter as expounded in his several books, such as *The Science of Peace*, *The Science of the Emotions*, *Praṇava-Vāda or the Science of the Sacred Word*, *The Science of Social Organisation*, and *Ancient Versus Modern Scientific Socialism*.

V. Subrahmanya Iyer, of Mysore (born 1869), is another champion of the

idealistic Vedānta. His paper, "Man's Interest in Philosophy: an Indian View," begins with the question "What is Philosophy?" to which he answers that it is for the Indian not opinion (*matam*) but truth (*tattvam*) (which reminds us of the Buddha, for whom *dṛṣṭi*, "view," i.e. speculation, was tantamount to "wrong view"). "Progress in philosophy does not mean in India the attainment of new concepts of ultimate truth, but the starting, as knowledge advances, at higher levels and the finding of less difficult approaches, if possible, to the *same* peak of *Tattvam*" (p. 323; opposition to Fichte). The bulk of the paper is engaged with the theory of the "three states" (*avasthā-traya*, viz. waking, dreaming, deep sleep), which is, according to our author, the back-bone of the idealistic Vedānta. The metaphysical aspect of this trinity, we are told, has not been understood by Western philosophy for which the waking experience is the only standard of reality. It is all-important to distinguish Awareness from the "I" which belongs only to that of which we are aware (mental contents), and Reason from intellect, which latter is "Reason *limited* to the experience of waking and dreaming states." "Reason, which comprehends deep-sleep also, rises above duality." That is to say: "absolute non-difference in thought or knowledge," as "actually realized in deep-sleep" (!), proves "non-duality in existence or being."

Hiralal Haldar (late Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta), whose principal publication is *Neo-Hegelianism* (Heath Cranton, 1927), declines, in his paper "Realistic Idealism," to be described as a Hegelian, though admitting the Hegelian basis of his thought (due mainly to the influence of Green and Caird). His realism is expressed in the emphatic statement that "the *opposition* of mind to its object is the very basis of knowledge," his idealism in disallowing to make this opposition absolute—for the latter means ignoring that "things exist in virtue of the *relations* in which they stand to each other" (cf. Lotze)—and qualifying the unity as "spirit self-distinguished into the knower and the known." Hegel was wrong in believing "that the Logic exhaustively discloses the contents of reality"; for "the categories of human knowledge must be supplemented by others not at present known to us." "Things existing in time and space and excluding each other are limited, but in their ideality, as minds, they are all-pervading and omniscient." The conception of the many omnipresent and eternal selves, as held by the Indian pluralistic systems (Jainism, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika), is, therefore, wrong only in not viewing these as component factors of the one Absolute mind. For "the Absolute cognizes the world in an infinite number of ways from the standpoints of the countless things the minds of which are confluent in it without detriment to their distinctness."

A delightfully plain study (the only one, by the way, which makes no use of Indian philosophy) is *Common-sense Empiricism*, by *G. C. Chatterji* (Professor of Philosophy, Lahore), who, after having, during the War, sat in Cambridge at the feet of McTaggart, Moore, and Russel, has reached the conviction: "I can never return to a faith in a Timeless Absolute . . . barren formalism, which has no bearing whatever on the essential task of Philosophy, which is to reflect upon life and seek to guide and illumine it." He is "neither a subjective nor an objective idealist." Perception itself implies for him "the existence of extra-immediate entities or objects," every feeling or emotion also being "invariably directed towards an object" (and thus there being no evidence for an "Absolute consciousness"), while as to the nature of the object he holds that Idealism has failed to prove "that the world of external reality consists solely of psychical matters of fact." Bradley, according to him, has been inconsistent in urging that Reality must be mental or spiritual; for "in his Philosophy Matter and Mind are really on a par," which means

that it is neither Materialism nor Idealism, but "rather more akin to what Mr. Russel calls Neutral Monism." The exact properties and laws of external nature have to be determined by Physical Science, not by Philosophy. The Body-Mind problem belongs to those difficulties that "are of the philosopher's own making"; "that minds can act upon bodies and vice versa" is the datum of experience from which we should start. As to "value," it "is an objective and not a subjective property," the three phases of objective reality we come in contact with being "external nature, other minds, and values." The author finally espouses the hypothesis of Emergent Evolution (conceiving of nature as a procession of events), without, however, allowing to use it (as did Lloyd Morgan and others who have introduced this conception) as an argument for the existence of a Creator.

"Getting sick of Absolutism" in favour of Emergent Evolution has been also the lot of another Cambridge student, viz. the now well-known historian of Indian Philosophy, *Surendranath Dasgupta* (Principal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta), whose thoughtful paper, "Philosophy of Dependent Emergence," is his début as a constructive philosopher. A philosophy worthy of the name can according to him be only one based on the whole field of experience and such metaphysical concepts as can explain experience. He therefore declines not only Spinoza and Hegel, viz. for their starting from *a priori* notions, but also the Vedānta in that it confines itself to a few special kinds of experience. He does not admit either that experience shows us an unchangeable perceiver or any unchanging entity at all and agrees with the Buddhists in looking at "mind" as a series of processes, but against them holds (with Moore) that awareness and its objects are two different things. As to causality, he declines the two views (common in India) of the identity of the causal entity with the effect (which means denying the process as such) and as the causal process as a making explicit what was implicit (which is deduction and not causation) and regards, with the Nyāya and Buddhist philosophy, the effect as a new emergence. The term "dependent emergence" looks, indeed, like a literal translation of the much-discussed Buddhist term *pratītyasamutpāda*. The complicated elaboration of the theory can be only hinted at in the following. The causal elements or diverse relations involved in a causal process, when leading up to an emergent quality or relation or relational complexes, are called by our author, for the sake of convenience, the "basis" of the emergents. The basis may but need not be a constituent of the emergents, and even, if it is not, may remain as a co-operative factor in a certain sense. The relation between the basis and the emergent qualities is "unique and inscrutable." "Relations exist as ultimate facts," but the qualitative nature of the fact is nothing but the emergence of one or more relations from relational complexes." "Relations are both external and internal; when they contribute to the projection of an emergent they are internal, and when they do not, they are external." It reminds us once more of the Buddhist formula of causation, viz. the *inter*dependence of its two links called "name-and-form" (= mind-and-body) and "consciousness," when we read that, while "the body-complex is the basis of the emergent life," it is "itself also an emergent of the life-process-complex," neither of the two being intelligible as prior to the other, and both of them are "determined" by the mind-complex. In epistemology our author advocates, of course, the psychological attitude (with no consideration of epistemology in the Kantian sense) and, in particular, what he calls the "denotative theory of knowledge" teaching that our knowledge does not correspond with the object, but denotates it only like a word denoting the thing it refers to. The paper concludes with a discussion of "value" and "purpose."

A. R. Wadia (Professor of Philosophy, Mysore) is one more Indian (Parsee) trained in England (Oxford and Cambridge) and left cold by "the Absolute Idealism of Bradley-Bosanquet type," though he "could never be anything but an Idealist." His "Pragmatic Idealism" may be called Vedāntic in so far as, according to it, "God is the personified aspect of the Absolute, the mind in which everything lives and moves"; and it is Indian also in accepting as the one satisfactory solution of the problem of evil the belief in Karma and metempsychosis. It is, however, thoroughly un-Indian in (1) advocating an Absolute that "itself is growing," because "the growth of the parts cannot but affect the whole—the Absolute—if there is a real organic relationship between the whole and its parts"; and (2) strongly rejecting asceticism as a means for overcoming evil and recommending instead the development of a consciousness of the brotherhood of men.

R. D. Ranade (Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad) regrets having no complete system of his own to offer and invites us to guess, from extracts from his writings in chronological order, what it might become like. His evolution, as outlined in his paper, "The Evolution of My Own Thought," begins with a spiritual monadism and reaches in his latest work (reviewed in *Philosophy*, 1934, pp. 111 f.) a monistic Vedānta with emphasis on mystical experience.

K. C. Bhattacharyya (Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta) gives us his *Concept of Philosophy*, by which he holds to go "on the negative side . . . much further than Kant," while on the positive side toning down his agnosticism. He declares philosophy to be threefold, viz. "philosophy of the object," "philosophy of the spirit," and "philosophy of truth," corresponding respectively with the three higher "grades of thought" called by him "pure objective," "spiritual," and "transcendental." Philosophy, then, is not concerned with the lowest grade of thought, viz. "empirical thought" which involves "reference to an object which is perceived or imagined to be perceived." "The contents of these four grades of thought may be provisionally called fact, self-subsistence,[1] reality and truth." The object, philosophically, "is distinguished from the object as 'fact' (i.e. in science) by being intelligible only in reference to the subject." "Spiritual consciousness is not mere consciousness of reality but is reality itself." It is "introspection" = "enjoying understanding," i.e. "a form of the theoretic consciousness that implies an abjuration of the objective attitude." It includes religious experience as a consciousness of the over-personal self. But it differs from "transcendental thought"; for "reality is enjoyed but truth is not." "Transcendental thought is the extra-religious consciousness of a content that is neither objective nor subjective," i.e. of the Absolute, which "is conceived rigorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedānta." This position is claimed by the author to be "practically the reopening of the entire epistemological question of the meaning of thought and knowledge," because it means "on the one hand that the self is unthinkable and on the other that while actually it is not known and is only an object of faith, we have to admit the possibility of knowing it without thinking." For, "metaphysics . . . including logic and epistemology is not . . . literal thought."

M. Hiriyanna (late Professor of Sanskrit, Mysore), critical editor and excellent interpreter of Indian philosophical classics, proposes in his paper, "The Problem of Truth," not to discuss exclusively, as is generally the case in studies on this subject, the nature of ultimate truth only, but rather introduce to the problem by first of all discussing knowledge "distinguished

[1] An awkward compound used, apparently, in the sense of "existence in correlation to a subject." The author seems to have had in his mind some such Sanskrit compound as *ātma-samstha* "based on the self."

as either true or false from the common-sense point of view." He finds a convenient starting-point for this in the two Mīmāṃsā theories of error describing error respectively as incomplete apprehension and misapprehension (briefly set forth already by the author on pp. 313 f. of his book reviewed in *Philosophy*, 1933, pp. 305 f.) and from them proceeds to deal with relative truth, degrees of truth, and absolute truth. Knowledge is made "true" by being found to harmonize with the rest of our experience. But "sensa also, like objects and relations, may be false ("perspectives of the real"). Any truth even may be regarded as relatively false. Still, to avoid universal scepticism, we have to recognize an absolute standard by which knowledge is judged. This brings in the idea of comprehensiveness: the several kinds of truth may be viewed as representing degrees of truth, "a higher degree of it meaning greater completeness in the view it gives of reality."

Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy (of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) contributes a paper "On the Pertinence of Philosophy," consisting of two chapters headed, respectively, "Definition and Status of Philosophy, or Wisdom," and "How Divers Wisdoms have considered Immortality." The paper is abstruse and overloaded with details and footnotes, as unfortunately most of the many writings of the learned author. Chapter 1 is engaged with the kinds of philosophy (including "revealed truth") and the "differentia of religion and metaphysics." "The most urgent *practical* problem to be resolved by the philosopher . . . is to be recognized in a control and revision of the principles of comparative religion, the true end of which . . . should be to demonstrate the common metaphysical basis of all religions." Chapter 2 considers, among other things, "aeviternity" as the state of being, e.g., of the so-called angels (devas) who are eternal as regards the immutability of their nature and understanding, but still partake of time in regard to their awareness of before and after, etc., and their independence of local motion.

Sir S. Radhakrishnan (Vice-Chancellor and Professor of Philosophy, Andhra University, Waltair), writing on "The Spirit of Man," pleads for the necessity of a religious revival and (1) discusses the religious implications of metaphysics. Though in India, according to him, "philosophy is essentially practical, dealing as it does with the fundamental anxieties of human beings," the neglect, by Indians generally, of the "essential duty of service to men" shows that they "have not the slightest idea of the true nature of religion." "Religion may start with the individual, but it must end in fellowship." There is a need for a "religion of the spirit." How can it be met with? By raising the human mind to its "spiritual status," i.e. "the immediate intuition of his unity with the eternal." "We must recapture the intuitive powers that have been allowed to go astray in the stress of life." This does not mean "anti-intellectualism." "Intuition which ignores intellect is useless." Being "the response of the whole man to reality," "it involves the activity of reason also." "It stands to intellect as a whole to a part, as the creative source of thought to the created categories." (2) "Philosophy cannot ignore the testimony of religious experience to the nature of ultimate reality." "For philosophy of religion, the central problem is to reconcile the apparently conflicting views of the supreme as eternally complete and of the supreme as the self-determining principle manifesting in the temporal process," i.e. to define the relation between the Absolute and God. This relation our author wants to be understood in a somewhat different way from both Saṅkara and Bradley. "While the Absolute is the transcendent divine, God is the cosmic divine." "God is the . . . consciousness that informs and sustains the world, . . . its ground, which as a thought or a possibility of the Absolute lies beyond the world in the universal consciousness of the Absolute."

"God can only be a creative personality acting on an environment which, though dependent on God, is not God." "The Absolute is joy; God is love." "The question of immanence and transcendence does not arise with reference to the Absolute." "When the creator and the created coincide, God lapses into the Absolute." (For the description of the Absolute as "joy" compare the Vedāntic Absolute described as *sat-cit-ānanda*, i.e. "being, spirit, joy," and, for the last sentence, the end of the first chapter of Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanīya-Upaniṣad, where the Absolute, called the Fourth, viz. in regard to the "three states" mentioned above, is characterized as "world-extinguishing" and "God-swallowing," *īśvara-grāsa*.)

F. Otto Schrader.

NEW BOOKS

Creative Morality. By Louis Arnaud Reid, D.Litt., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Durham at Armstrong College, Newcastle. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 270. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Professor Reid leaves us in no doubt as to his views on the conduct of an ethical inquiry. In his Introductory Chapter he contrasts two philosophical methods, that of abstraction, appropriate to mathematics and pure logic, which proceeds from special aspects of the world of experience, by logical construction of precisely defined concepts, to a knowledge of their mutual relationships; and the converse method, which works not from part to whole, but from whole to part, clinging resolutely to the concrete experiences from which these abstract concepts were derived, by means of intuitions, clarified indeed on the higher levels by intellectual analysis, but preserving throughout immediate contact with the original object of apprehension; and declares himself to be in favour of the latter. He is fully aware that many, over and above the Logical Analyst, will anathematize him for his choice; but even the metaphysical worm will sometimes turn, and challenge the claims of logical formalism with the claims of life. If—such is Professor Reid's contention—the notions of Right, Duty, Good, which all agree to be fundamental in ethics, are studied in their concrete setting in man's moral practice, they will be found to be "expressive" of a system of meaning that carries us far beyond any abstract definition—indeed, whether they are definable or not is of quite secondary importance—and far beyond the limits of the particular actions to which they are applied. For on the one hand, their meaning is grasped by an intuition that is not merely intellectual, but an activity of a man's entire personality, including his emotions and his will. We are all familiar with Professor Alexander's doctrine that we come to know by acting and with M. Bergson's that the deeper emotions are pregnant with representations, and even beliefs, which have as good a claim as any other to reveal truth. Professor Reid distinguishes the "language of emotion" from the "emotive language" of the Logical Positivists, in that the former is the expression of "the *total* emotional state of mind," which includes cognition and conation, and "always conveys information of significance, and never mere emotion-feeling" (30). Further—and this is the author's main thesis, developed throughout the book—a concrete view of moral action shows it to draw inspiration from the vision, however vague and indeterminate, of an ideal of good, that is at once immanent in and transcendent of the agent's intention. He entitles his work *Creative Morality*, using the term "creation" with full awareness of its ambiguity and limitations (107–9), in that sense of "creaturely creativeness" in which we apply it to the activity of the artist. He means, as he himself tells us (107), much what M. Bergson means by "open" or "dynamic" morality. "Creative morality is embodiment in intentional action of deeply and widely significant good" (147). Morality is exhibited *in concreto* on different levels, illustrating what Professor Collingwood, in his *Philosophical Method*, has called a Scale of Forms; and each step in the ascent is an advance in expressiveness or creativeness. The highest grade in the scale is attained in the *praxis* inspired by religion.

Everything, of course, depends on the way in which this doctrine is verified in detail. We may say at once that the further the argument proceeds, the clearer and more convincing does it prove. Professor Reid takes his start from the issue, very familiar in recent ethical discussions, of the relation between Right and Good. His own view may be summarised as allied to that of Mr. Joseph and Professor Stocks, though with somewhat more liberal concessions to the positions of Professor Prichard and (especially) of Dr. Ross. Rightness, we are told, is intrinsic to moral action, being constitutive and not consequential (152–3); but it stands also in intrinsic relation to goodness, which is a consequential or, in Dr. Ross's phrase, a toti-resultant character (150–1). Of course, this does not imply that rightness means conduciveness to good, or that the relation between them is one of external means to end. Professor Reid devotes much care in the earlier chapters to rebutting this interpretation. But the content of duty is that "of my opinion of the optimific" (57). Professor Reid accepts Professor Prichard's more recent doctrine that the action amenable to moral judgment is the "setting ourselves" to do something rather than the actual production of a result, that it is, in other words, the "intention"; though he argues, in our opinion convincingly, against Prichard and Ross (as Mr. Joseph also has done) that motive is integral to the action thus "intentionally" understood. "Every action," he writes, "is a continuous whole, from its inner side to its outer, the inner side being motive and the outer being intention" (74). If this be not so, then Professor Prichard's view that what ethics is concerned with is the setting of ourselves to do an action, is "less than the needle point of an abstraction" (75). True, ought implies can, and we cannot *always* summon motives at will; but we can sometimes, and when we can it is part of our duty to evoke them. The kernel of Professor Reid's admirable discussion in chapters 3 and 4 is contained in the following sentences (67): "I *ought* (to do what?)—to do my *duty* (what is the content of my duty?)—which is to act according to my opinion of the Right, from the best motive it is now possible for me to summon. *Right* action is the best possible action under the circumstances, best from the point of view of objective effectiveness for good, and best subjectively in that it is the action of the best kind of character moved by the best kind of motive." He never questions that "in ethics the problem of good is always the supreme problem" (99); and in chapter 10 he posits as the "two fundamental judgments of value which seem both to be necessary presuppositions of any moral thinking or acting at all, and to be immediately assented to as true" (157), (i) that there are in the world qualities of better and worse, and (ii) that I *ought* to promote the better (or best). Of this second intuition more presently. The point is that right and duty, being what befits the practical situation in the light of good, do not merely imply "desire for the realization of the maximum of particular good" in the given situation, but express "a dominating ideal sentiment whose depth and significance it may be quite impossible to fathom and impossible to state" (114). This ideal furnishes the content for the formal principle of duty, which on the higher levels of conduct is found to be more and more subservient to content, and in religion is almost wholly transformed into the love of God.

If we offer one or two criticisms, they may serve incidentally to fill certain gaps in this bare outline. Professor Reid has no illusions about the ambiguity of the term "right"; as is clear from the distinction already cited between the objective and subjective measures of optimific value and the restriction of "ought" and "duty" to the latter (56). Ought implies can; and, seeing that the issues of action for good are largely uncontrollable and beyond our ken, how can it be a moral obligation to do what is *really* right (i.e. objectively optimific)?

Right, we are told, is transitive, a bridge between morality and its objects which, though relevant to morality, lie outside it (55–6). But what is meant by the "relevance" of what admittedly lies outside the scope of moral judgment? If I do my duty and the uncontrollable results prove to be not optimific but the reverse, my act is wrong only in a wholly non-moral sense and right in the only sense relevant to morals. Professor Reid seems anxious to secure at all costs the objectivity of right; but this anxiety is surely to be allayed through reflections on the realm of ideal value rather than on the realm of fact. True, we are told that "rightness *is* not itself a value but is the character of a fact possessing value," and that "judgment of rightness is not in *itself* judgment of value, but judgment of fact" (153). But is there such a character as "rightness" at all? To determine it as what is "fitting" in the practical situation is either morally irrelevant or (if *morally* fitting be meant) tautologous; it merely carries us back to the controversies of the eighteenth century and to Fielding's portrait of the Reverend Mr. Square. Is it not high time for the word "right" to be excluded from the discussion, as serving only to darken counsel; and for attention to be fixed on the concrete fact of moral experience, "I ought, or ought not, to do this"? It then becomes clear that obligatoriness (to say nothing of "rightness") is no character of actions, constitutive or consequential, but the recognition by a personal subject of a categorical imperative.

Secondly, as regards the term "good." Professor Reid follows Dr. Ross in holding that goodness is a toti-resultant property of facts in preference to Mr. Joseph's view that it is not a quality of the subject, but its form (149–52). To say, as does Mr. Joseph, that the goodness of the poem is identical with the poem and "that the only definition of its goodness is really the poem itself" is perhaps precarious; but Professor Reid presses his objection too hard when he charges the writer with tautology. Mr. Joseph is not in the habit of making tautological assertions; he leaves that to Dr. Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists. What he means is that the goodness is not one property side by side with others, but that, in Cook Wilson's phrase, it "covers the whole being" of the subject. If this be so, it can hardly be consequential. Whatever we may say about finite goods like a poem, in the case of God goodness is surely constitutive; as Mr. Joseph himself points out, that God is good means not that He *has* but that He *is* goodness. Moreover, on the highest plane of human goodness, the *virtus infusa* of the scolastics, expressly referred to by Professor Reid, love (*caritas*) is declared to be the form which inspires and transfigures the whole character and practice of the Christian believer. And this seems to be just the view developed to such good purpose in the later chapters of this book. The earlier identification of the formal principle in morality with duty, to which goodness supplies the content, calls for revision; love of the good also, and even in a higher degree, gives form to moral and religious conduct. Once more, if rightness be the constituent character "by virtue of which the fact possesses goodness or value" (153), the goodness or value being consequential on the rightness, what is this but a reversal of Professor Reid's central doctrine through the subordination of "good" to "right"? How, if rightness be thus the ground of a thing's goodness, can the "I ought" be "dependent upon good," or the desired escape be found from the Kantian "rigorism of 'duty for duty's sake' "? (163–4).

No; Kant cannot be easily dismissed: *expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.* Our third criticism concerns the relation between right—or rather, let us say, duty—and good. That "the good ought to be done," where the doing, i.e. the setting ourselves to do, lies in our power, and the greater good as against the lesser—this is, for Professor Reid, a self-evident truth. We note in passing

his interesting remarks on the *Seinsollen* (154–6), with critical reference to Hartmann; the phrase "ought-to-be," he holds, is meaningless apart from the "ought-to-do," and though legitimate as a corollary from goodness, is not required to mediate between good and duty. Here the connection is immediate: "it is enough to say directly 'You should do X,' and if a reason is required, the answer is 'Because X is good,' or 'X will be good if you do it'" (155). But is this true? Are not sense of duty and love of ideal good distinct as motives, especially when, following Professor Reid's method of inquiry, we consider them in integration with concrete experience? He admits, indeed, that "the broad distinction remains" between the two types of life (235 *n.*). To vindicate their mutual implication, he is driven to assume—gratuitously, in our opinion—that in all acts prompted by love sense of duty is unconsciously active below the surface. "Without some sense of duty (of the 'due') the morality of love would not be morality at all, but impulse" (*ib*). "We must, I think, deny that the difference between conscientious action or action from a sense of duty, and the other two types"—i.e. action from desire of good and from desire of pleasure—"is really a difference between morally good types of action at all." For if the latter are "desires independent of the thought and influence of duty, they are not morally good actions at all" (129). Yes, if, with Kant, we limit morality to acts done for duty's sake—and there is much to be said for this restriction; though, if we adopt it, we must recognize, as Kant did not, the equal, and possibly superior, value of acts done *sub ratione boni*, without consciousness of obligation. But an act motived by love of a rational good needs no infusion of duty to be redeemed from impulse. As Professor Reid says elsewhere, "in making a judgment 'This is good' . . . we pass . . . to underlying principles" (168). Of course, love of good needs regulation by sense of duty, when in a given case it tends beyond the mark, though where the object is good absolute or God, excess of love is hardly possible; but the sense of duty, when thus provoked, must surely be conscious and explicit. The motive, in the given case, is now not love, but obligation. Nor is desire of pleasure to be confused, as Professor Reid seems to confuse it (e.g. 126, 188), with love of good, though on a lower moral plane; for good, like duty, is a regulative principle, distinct in kind from the natural impulses which serve as material to its informing activity. Desire of pleasure, sense of obligation, the love of God are not different levels of dutiful or moral actions (130). Nor is the man who does his duty without the inspiration of love to be branded as "morally defective," an "unprofitable servant" (131). Love may well be the higher motive—that is another question; but the man who fulfils his obligation simply because he knows he ought displays therein his moral worth. As the author elsewhere admits, "it is absolutely and entirely moral to pay a debt to a tradesman" (136), but normally at least the payment is unattended by any emotion of love. Professor Reid hardly seems to us to realize the full significance of duty. In itself, and not through its dependence upon good (201), it is a self-transcending principle. Further, in willing each particular duty, we therein will duty universal. It is surely error to say: "A duty done is a duty done, but love must go on expressing itself, and without this love dies. Duty might at a stretch be called pluralistic, love monistic" (237). If anything, it is the other way round; the "ought" goes on expressing itself inexhaustibly; while love—not even excepting the love of God—is, as the scolastics taught, always of the absolute good as reflected in finite and defective goods, and is therefore at least *in hoc praesenti statu*, pluralistic. Nor does duty universal need to have recourse to good for its content. True, "real morality is always individual, historical, unique" (133). Duty and good alike are formal; but it is equally true that both alike individualize

themselves of their own power in the presence of particular situations of fact. The dualism of ethical ideals to which these (and other) considerations point, a dualism to be resolved only by religion on lines which the author himself indicates (231), is, we know, anathema to most philosophers. To those who, like Professor Reid, deny its existence, the only appeal is in the well-known words of Cromwell: "My brethren, I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, believe it possible that you may be mistaken."

We have not left ourselves space to do justice to the later chapters, on the proof and validity of judgments of ultimate good (c. 11), and on the relationship between the moral and the religious life (i.e. 12–15). Moral judgments claim truth; the criterion in the case of particular judgments is logical coherence within an ethical system, supplemented by coherence with the "dominating value" of the system in question. But what of the case where systems clash? "Ultimate judgments of value cannot be proved"; "if asked to judge which of two *kinds* of moral life we believe to be *better*, we can only reflect very carefully, and, putting aside prejudice and summoning all sincerity, say: 'I judge this to be better than that' " (171). In the last resort, the appeal is to a rational intuition, which loses nothing of objectivity because it expresses the vision of the mind and character of an individual. The chapters on religion are perhaps the most illuminating and valuable in the whole treatise. It is so easy in these high matters to descend to triviality that we cannot but appreciate the restraint, the insight, and the distinction of thought and expression with which they are here discussed. Professor Reid draws with a firm hand the dividing line between the genuine autonomy of morality and its transmutation, on a higher plane, into the *praxis* informed by religious *theoria*. The informing principle of the religious life is Love in its supreme expression as *Agape* (here and elsewhere Professor Reid fully expounds the difference of *Agape* from *philia* and from *eros*), the God-given virtue that covers the whole field of religious conduct. Primarily, it is man's response to the Divine *Agape*: "Our own love of God is not our own love, but God's Love (*Agape*) in us which we 'enjoy' and 'live through' " (223). Yet, if it were merely God's Love, Professor Reid goes on to say, "it would be God's Love of Himself." Man's response must be as real as the inspiration. It was St. Bernard, in one of his sermons on the *Canticles*, who hazarded the thought that in God's Love *for man* and man's for God the term love could be affirmed, not as in the case of wisdom or goodness, merely by analogy, but, though differing vastly in *degree*, univocally. The activity in both cases is the same *in kind*. The suggestion affords a welcome escape from the difficulties that beset the *via analogica*. Secondarily, from the love of God flows the love of man as man. Professor Reid is at one with M. Bergson (and others) in tracing the ideal of the love and service of humanity to its sole source in religion (238). Secularist humanism has ever masqueraded in borrowed garments. Perhaps this is the reason why, as Professor Reid rightly argues against Dr. Oman, it cannot be characterized as inevitably ego-centric. The author makes no pretension in these pages to treat either the moral evidence for Theism or, save by way of illustration, the specific doctrines of Christianity. He has some excellent remarks on the moral basis of religious belief and unbelief (219 ff, 244, 247), on humility and the sense of sin (c. 13), and on the quandary of the sceptic, who is moved to an admiration of the religious character despite his conviction that it rests on an illusion. He concludes that, on a full realization of the issue, the sceptic will find himself unable to retain his judgment of value in the face of truth (248–50) Our sole ground for cavil in these last chapters is with Professor Reid's perverse (as it seems to us) determination to detect, even on the level of love towards God, an

undercurrent of moral obligation. Assuredly Religion teaches duties towards God; but they have no place, as Aquinas knew, and Dante, beyond the sphere of man's temporal sojourning, and even here they mark the point where, owing to human frailty, the motive of love proves inadequate as a guiding principle of conduct.

The foregoing criticisms must not be understood as qualifying our general appreciation of the importance and value of this most interesting book. Rather they should be taken as an indication of the stimulus it will offer not only to serious students of moral philosophy, but to the wider thinking public.

We have noted a few misprints: P. 64, 3rd line from foot, *for* "the sethings" *read* "these things"; p. 114, l. 10, *for* "roughtly" *read* "roughly"; p. 122, 4th line of 3rd par. *for* "have" *read* "has"; p. 192, note 1, l. 2, *for* αγάπη *read* ἀγάπη ; p. 203, l. 10, *for* "propriation" *read* "propitiation."

W. G. DE BURGH.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi. Fasc. XIV. Liber de Sensu et Sensato: Summa de Sophismatibus et Distinctionibus. Nunc primum edidit ROBERT STEELE. (Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano. MCMXXXVII. Pp. xviii + 221. Price 17s. 6d.)

The hitherto unknown *opuscula* here conjoined by the diligence of Mr. Steele are very different in text and are taken from different MSS. The first from a MS. in the British Museum (Add. 8786) is a regular commentary in the scholastic manner on Aristotle *περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν*. The contents will not, I think, tend to lend much support to the once fashionable notion of Roger as an anticipator of modern physical science born out of due time. It is true that in discussing the various senses and sense-qualities, unusually full attention is given to points on which the medieval 'Arabs' (Alhazen, Avicenna, Averroes) are found trying to improve on Aristotle by taking account of facts which he might have seemed to ignore, and true, again, that Roger naturally gives a good deal of prominence in discussing vision to his own not very clearly conceived or expressed doctrine of the tendency of the 'visible species' to self-multiplication. And it is interesting to observe that he apparently desires to 'hedge' on some issues where Aristotle had taken a side. If I understand him rightly, he is not prepared to dismiss altogether the Platonic view (that of the *Timaeus*) that colours are literally 'flames,' and he seems to hold, as Aristotle did not, that 'light' and 'colour' may be species of a common genus, though, if so, that genus is itself only called 'light' for want of a really appropriate name. But when all is said (even in the case of the Aristotelian doctrine which he clearly finds most difficult of digestion, that of the instantaneous transmission of light), he will never frankly admit to any defect in 'the philosopher.' Whatever looks like one must be got rid of by a logical *distinctio* at all costs; even where the medical writers seem most clearly to have added to our knowledge of the facts, it must be maintained that, not being natural *philosophers*, they are incompetent to say anything about the causes of the facts they record, and Aristotle's account of these causes must be simply accepted. The attitude is that of a 'reactionary' rather than of a genuine 'progressive.' Indeed, it is hard to say what real progress could have been made by one who clung as pertinaciously as Roger to the notion that a *sensum* is at once something corporeal emitted from a body and yet has somehow a more 'spiritual' *esse* than the body which emits it.

To judge by the only evidence available, that of the printed text, the MS. has been much more carefully written than the Amiens MS. from which so many of the *opera inedita* have been taken. There are comparatively few gross palpable errors, and I am not sure that the most striking of these would not prove on re-examination to be due to an editor struggling with a microscopic script rather than to the scribe. Thus, to take the worst instances, in pp. 131–4 the word *leve* (polished, Aristotle's λεῖον) used of sonorous bodies, appears at least five times as *lene* (soft), though I should have thought it immediately obvious that e.g. a ball of wool cannot be used as a gong. So p. 91, 21 where Mr. Steele prints the meaningless *Hec actu(a)li ad presens digrediendo*, what the scribe meant to write, and I should say probably will be found to have written, was not *actuali* but *attuli*, 'So much I advance by way of digression.' And there are not a few places where there seems to be a failure to provide a word (perhaps written contractedly) with the grammatically necessary case-ending, or to correct a verbal slip due to preoccupation on the scribe's part (e.g. 15, 12, *auditus* must surely be an oversight for *visus*, which the sense demands). The one really serious difficulty with which the reader will have to grapple is the eccentricity of the punctuation which often completely perverts the author's sense. It looks as though the MS. had been followed in this matter, without any pains having been taken to ascertain the meaning, as though the producer of an *editio princeps* had done his duty by merely correctly transcribing what is in his MS. and leaving it wholly to the reader to make sense of it. One may excuse a weary palaeographer for taking this view, but the University of Oxford should surely have found a scholar to read the pages before publication attentively enough to prevent the frequent occurrence of full stops in the midst of a sentence, or their omission where the sense absolutely demands them.

The second treatise is from a different MS. (Digby 67 in the Bodleian) and is of a very different character. It is a discussion, in connection with the logical exercises of students in the early years of their university course, of difficulties connected with the use of the word 'all,' and the distribution of subject and predicate in propositions. (Mr. Steele might have illustrated the application of the name *sophismata* to these exercises by reference to the probably still current description of students in arts of the second year as 'Sophisters.') The interest of the discussions, except from a purely historical point of view, seems slight, and the MS. is evidently much inferior to the other. Mr. Steele remarks that it is made difficult by ambiguous *compendia* and that it has *lacunae* (more numerous, I suspect, than those he has actually marked). It is also clear to me that in many places it must either be corrupt or have been wrongly deciphered, since the results as printed make neither grammar nor sense. Thus I would suggest, e.g. that the meaningless *actum* at 138, 1 is the remains of *(predi)catum*, the word really wanted, that the equally meaningless *possit* of 140, 30 really represents *(dis)positio singularis>*, that *universalitate* at 153, 8 should be *universitate*, *naturam* at 160, 24 *materiam*, *pati* at 148, 15 certainly *pati(enti)* I could offer a fair number of other slight corrections which seem to me necessitated by the immediate context, but I prefer to say as little of the work as possible, since, owing to insufficient acquaintance with the subject-matter, I find its meaning in any case often obscure. It is patent, however, that this treatise also would require very thorough repunctuation to be fully intelligible, even where there is no reason to suspect the text. (Thus, to take only one example, what is the sense of 148, 24 *cum singnum non sit opposita dispositio, set magis idem verbum negativum*, etc.? How can the signum "all" be a negative word? But put a comma after *negativum*, and you get the sense "since the sign (of quantity)

. . . is rather the *same* vocable ("men" and "all men" are, in a sense, the same), a negative will not make the term stand for non-entities").

A. E. Taylor.

The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. By Israel Knox. (New York: Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 219. Price 12s. 6d.).

This book serves the double purpose of an exposition and a criticism of the aesthetic theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The bibliography testifies to a scholarly thoroughness in the mastery of their writings, of those of their prominent critics, and of outstanding modern contributions to the subject of aesthetics. Its author develops the central thesis that the sin of these philosophers was to subordinate their aesthetic theory to the demands of a philosophical system or metaphysic, and that all their errors flow from this initial substitution of an imaginary map of the world of knowledge for one they might have drawn after actual exploration of its geographical features. Thus Kant's *Critique of Judgment* bridges, by means of the appreciation of purpose in aesthetic and teleological judgments, the gulf yawning between Nature as apprehended by scientific theory, and Freedom as experienced through the supernatural agency of reason as a moral impulsion; the phenomenal and the noumenal are at last brought face to face through the teleological. In the panlogical idealism of Hegel art manifests the substance of reality—the Idea—in a sensuous and individual form, and exhibits the gradual emancipation of a logical content in its progressive evolution from the symbolical, through the classical, to its apogee in romantic poetry. But both Art and Religion are finally supplanted by the Philosphy of Hegel. According to the arch-pessimist Schopenhauer, Art is the first stage on the journey towards salvation through ascetism; it reveals the Platonic Ideas that objectify the ubiquitous Will for those who can detach themselves from their private interests and become immersed in the pure, selfless contemplation of reality.

The exposition is in itself an admirably concise and clear historical summary; though to do full justice to these doctrines three volumes would have been more adequate than one. It would, besides, be generally agreed nowadays among writers on aesthetics that what Fechner called "the Method from Above," beloved of nineteenth-century metaphysicians, was completely obsolete. Now the real weakness of Mr. Knox as a critic is that he lacks a definite, consistent, and carefully thought-out viewpoint of his own. He has assimilated a vast quantity of material, but it is not as yet thoroughly digested by the process of personal reflection. It would be only natural for the author to develop his own views on the firm basis of his wide historical learning; and then he may find that metaphysics, though no longer, as heretofore, the starting-point, has become the common terminus of aesthetics and all other studies of value in so far as their originators can lay any justifiable claim to a philosophical handling of their subject.

Listowel.

Roger Fry and Other Essays. By Howard Hannay. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 208. Price 6s.).

This Collection of Essays on aesthetical topics is distinguished by a limpid clarity of style and a solid commonsensical quality of judgment that should

recommend it to laymen as well as to philosophers. The most profitable chapters are those that deal with modern theories and schools of painting. Mr. Hannay is adamant to the plea that painting is at its best a kind of geometry in line and colour, and rightly relegates abstract patterns to their legitimate pre-eminence among the minor arts. The thesis that the classical schools of painting have never exhibited a sharp divorce between form and content, between an intellectual or emotional theme and the contours or volumes through which it can be represented by pigments, is one that stands the test of actual observation and would rescue genuine originality from the byways of eccentricity and fruitless experiment were it taken seriously to heart by the fraternity of painters. His exposition of Roger Fry's theory of painting does less than justice to the broad-minded eclecticism of that rare critic. In accusing him of lapsing into a lopsided formalism, he seems to forget the delightful appreciation of caricature in the pages of *Transformations*, and the frank admission there that "psychological volumes" are not alien intruders upon a finished canvas. I am inclined to think that Mr. Hannay's anxiety to prove that what is best in modern art conforms to the canons of the classics—in itself an impeccable contention—leads him to read into certain pictures more than their authors intended. He is surely exaggerating the representative element in Cézanne, the last of the giant impressionists, when he speaks of "the tragic intensity" of some of his portraits.

The stimulating discussion of creative imagination in science, history, and art suffers from one crippling defect; it tackles this immensely difficult problem from a logical rather than a psychological angle. Dr. L. Rusu's little read *Essai sur l'Imagination Créatrice* is a contribution to its solution that no modern student should neglect, and its attitude reveals by contrast the fatal methodological error of neglecting the psychological approach to the functioning of human imagination. The qualified subjectivism of the following chapter shows in an interesting way how epistemological idealism can be freed from dependence on metaphysical idealism, and that this view sheds more light than realism on the spontaneous fusion between what is actually perceived and what is added from the mind in the aesthetic perception of an object.

The concluding essay on *Standards of Taste* comes as a sad anti-climax. Those who deny the existence of any rules or standards for assessing the merits of a work of art are denying simultaneously the very possibility of aesthetics. For the work of description and explanation peculiar to science furnishes *ipso facto* laws for the identification and production of its object. The aesthetician's job is to distinguish his norms from the precepts of medicine, the laws of engineering, the recipes of cookery, etc., not to wave aside a necessary consequence of exact knowledge. It is true that Mr. Hannay does his best to fill the gap by substituting good taste for abstract canons as the touchstone of aesthetic value. But a cursory glance at the history of criticism surely displays the amazing vagaries and aberrations of so-called taste. May I remind the author that the bulk of his own book is an effort to establish a critical standard and to apply it to the art of painting?

LISTOWEL.

The Philosophy of Relativity. By A. P. USHENKO, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 208. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This book, which is intended primarily for philosophers, may be described as an attempt to review the nature of physical reality in the light of the

theory of relativity. To the physicist it is recommended as a possibly new interpretation of his equations. A summary of the theory is given, and the problems discussed include those of the basic categories of nature, the representative and presentative theories of perception, the nature of change and of measurement, and the physical reality and general philosophical status of space-time. There are five appendices, in which certain relevant points, such as the identification of matter with curvature, Zeno's paradoxes, and the logical positivists' analysis of propositions, receive comment.

The writing, though lacking distinction, is clear; the account of relativity is, in the main, accurate, in spite of a few statements such as "Relativity explains that time and motion are merely two different ways of looking at the same thing"; and there are some acute remarks on certain of the subjects dealt with. Those who share the author's standpoint will find much in the book to give them pleasure and profit. As a non-scientific treatise, written by a philosopher for philosophers, on questions that derive what importance they possess from other than empirical sources, it is undoubtedly worth reading.

From the point of view of the scientist, however, or that of the reader who is interested in problems to which both science and philosophy can make significant contributions, the book appears in a different light. The trouble is not so much that it is inaccurate or illogical as that it is inhomogeneous. It drags relativity, so to speak, into an atmosphere in which it cannot breathe, with the result that we have two unconformable sets of ideas forced into an unnatural union. Relativity is a scientific theory, generated and developed in the traditional, orthodox manner proper to scientific theories, and as such it is quite unfitted to give evidence concerning any philosophical questions which, like those here discussed, are essentially independent of scientific discoveries.

One or two examples must suffice. A prominent question throughout the book is whether space-time is real or not. The fact that science is not interested in this question does not, of course, necessarily preclude a philosopher from discussing it, but what it should tell him is that if he does so he cannot legitimately claim that the meaning of space-time for the physicist has any bearing on his problem. Conceptually, space-time has for the physicist precisely the same meaning as Newton's laws of motion; each provides a language in which the facts of physics may be expressed. If the relativity language is used, the facts are expressed as curvatures or world-lines, and if the Newtonian language is used, the facts are expressed as forces. The physicist almost invariably uses the latter language, but for the most general problems he finds the former more convenient. Now appears the philosopher in search of reality. If he means by reality the conceptions which the physicist finds most generally applicable in a restricted field of research at the present stage of development, then he must conclude that space-time is real, just as twenty-five years ago he would have had to conclude that the force of gravitation was real. But Professor Ushenko does not mean that: he means by reality "the traditional definition, viz. reality is independent of the mind." Except that mind must be unreal, this tells us nothing, and certainly relativity throws no light at all on the question, "Is space-time real?" when reality is defined in this way.

Closely connected with this point is the question of solipsism. Professor Ushenko seems to imply that relativity is incompatible with solipsism, whereas one of its cardinal features is its conformity therewith. Relativity identifies "another observer" with "myself using a different co-ordinate system." If there is another observer whose experience of mechanical events I cannot myself describe simply by changing my co-ordinates, relativity leaves him

entirely out of account, however "real" or "independent of the mind" he may be. Thus an observer moving faster than the critical velocity is ignored in relativity because his view could not be mine.

Again, in discussing motion, Professor Ushenko has in mind something quite distinct from motion as conceived both in relativity and in classical physics. He is concerned with the merging together of perceptions at different instants, but in science there may be no such merging together, and in fact only a single perception. Thus, the proper motion of a star, which is shown by comparison of isolated observations taken perhaps fifty years apart; the radial velocity of a star, which is shown by a single observation of the position or colour of a spectrum line; and the flash of a meteor, which is perceptually a continuous change of position with time, are all indistinguishably grouped together as "motion." The motion with which Professor Ushenko is concerned is therefore something quite different from motion as it is understood in relativity, and in dragging relativity into his book he is simply confusing his treatment of what is essentially a non-scientific problem. Whether his problem is of importance or whether, as the logical positivists might say, it is merely nonsense, need not concern us. The point here is simply that it is quite independent of relativity.

The fact is that there is no philosophy of relativity any more than there is a philosophy of the electromagnetic theory of light or of the mutation theory of the origin of species. The relation of any scientific theory to philosophy is simply the relation of science in general to philosophy, and that is not at all affected by the advent of relativity. It may, of course, be clarified by scientific progress and shown better by means of one scientific theory than by means of another, but that is quite a different matter. In discussing the concepts peculiar to relativity as though they had a special meaning for the philosophical theory of perception or the problem of the ultimate nature of reality, Professor Ushenko is, in our opinion, mistaking their significance. For this reason we cannot regard his book as a valuable contribution to its professed subject, in spite of certain incidental merits.

HERBERT DINGLE.

The Philosophy of James Ward. By A. H. MURRAY. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1937. Pp. xii + 196. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The best years in Ward's long and strenuous life were spent in the attempt to find a philosophy that should include the religion of a thinking man (at the top), but never lost the scientist's savour of the nature of things. To this he devoted his great intellectual powers with an intellectual candour that has seldom been matched, and he had the experimentalist's temper and training as well as a very wide knowledge of the biological and other experimental sciences. It would be a calamity if his views were allowed to pass into the twilight of merely antiquarian interest. Many of them, for instance his insistence that the macroscopic should be regarded as a statistical aggregate of microscopic constituents, were even prophetic of a very modern attitude. His great *Psychology*, although too philosophical for current tastes and too closely argued to reward a merely desultory study, is a model of a type of inquiry the neglect of which is a great loss to the present age. And certain theological scientists like Dr. Tennant or the Bishop of Birmingham take Ward's philosophy very seriously indeed.

Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that a philosophy so full of human interest, dealing with such a variety of perennial problems in a form that is not untopical, should have elicited comparatively little in the way of

detailed commentary. The reason may be in part that Ward wrote in a style which, although it was pointed, clear, terse, and sometimes even vivid was too condensed and too obviously burdened with too great a load of relevant material to be easy to read or even to quote. Another part of the reason may be that theological writers in this country in the recent past have been more eager to accept all that the scientists say, and to proclaim (without argument) that science and philosophy are blood brothers than, like Ward, to try to struggle towards solid ground by vigilant criticism of science, philosophy, and religion too. Certain modern physicists, it is true, have been generous in this matter, giving an unconsidered blessing to crude philosophies and vague religious hypotheses. But no one who likes that kind of thing could have much interest in Ward.

I think, then, that the present book is most welcome, and I should like to think that it is timely. The author has made a most careful study of Ward's work, of its contemporary connections, of its aims, development, and internal affiliations. He has documented his book very well. His narrative is lucidly arranged. His exposition is vigorous and likely to catch and to keep the reader's attention. Indeed, there is only one major criticism that I am disposed to make. It seems to me to be unfortunate that the author is one of those people who know so very well what genuine philosophy is, and consequently can afford to treat Ward's struggles with the subject so very much *de haut en bas*.

Quite probably Ward's philosophy was "not always as profound as it might have been," and some of Mr. Murray's reasons for dissatisfaction may be very good reasons. Ward may have put too much individual psychology in the wrong place, he may have been over-concerned with the philosophical importance of a common-sense interpretation of "experience." His idealism in various ways may have been rather too timid and rather too sticky. But Mr. Murray seems to be hinting all the time, and he tells us explicitly at the end that Ward's pluralism, Kantianism, occasional "psychologism," etc., are due to the fact that he never understood what (universal) "mind" was, although he knew quite a lot about his own mind and about other people's minds. "Mind," according to Mr. Murray, "in some way, one does not know how, seems to be able to grasp universals and relations which transcend the immediacy of the given fact. It is this characteristic of mind, known to all thinkers through all the ages, which is important for philosophy."

Mr. Murray can scarcely mean that there is *no* transcendence of the immediacy of the given fact in Ward's psychology and philosophy. He means that there isn't enough of it. In short, he means that philosophy, in the strict sense, is exclusively concerned with universal "mind" and that all thinkers through all the ages have admitted the fact (even, I suppose, when they were anti-Averroists). It follows rather easily that Ward wasn't a "thinker" although something like thought occasionally overflowed his naturalism and his scientific bent.

JOHN LAIRD.

A Creed for Sceptics. By C. A. STRONG, LL.D. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. viii + 98. Price 6s. net.)

Professor Strong is already known as an exponent of Critical Realism; but he feels that he has so far failed to impress his contemporaries—a curious but not infrequent phenomenon in the philosophical world. Claiming that his doctrine has now probably reached its final form and that it "differs

in a number of respects from any other" with which he is acquainted, he essays once more in the present volume, the slimness of which is no indication of its value, to state his philosophical position regarding such topics as sense-data and perception, being and becoming (in French, presumably because the chapter appeared originally in a French publication?), and Free-Will (in a chapter which consists of an extract from Voltaire on this subject). Affinity with Bergson and James, who are expressly mentioned, and to some extent with Schopenhauer is apparent.

The lack of response by his contemporaries, to which Professor Strong refers, is, it must be confessed, understandable. The exposition is extremely difficult to follow, not merely because of the theory set forth and the concentrated nature of the argument but also because of the terminology used. Apart from his own use of the term *feeling* which involves a departure from the traditional meaning, the latter being suggested by himself to be an obstacle to the acceptance of his view, but which he is quite entitled to adopt if he believes it to conform more accurately to the facts, the occurrence of such terms throughout the discussion as data, feelings, sensory impression, sensation, the meanings of which are not correlated, tends to produce confusion. Nor is it easy to grasp his distinction between the *characters of real things* and their *nature*, even when one does grasp that he intends to find in *feeling*, as he interprets it, the clue to their *nature*. In view of his plain statement as to his purpose, it is unfortunate that such a degree of obscurity marks his exposition that it is difficult to assess his actual achievement.

His express objective is to defend knowledge from the challenge of scepticism. His fundamental position as a Critical Realist is that datum and object are distinct. This non-identity is used by the sceptic to cast doubt upon the existence of the object. (If this is so, could Hume, to whom he refers as a sceptic, be really a sceptic, seeing that he very clearly asserted that philosophy could have no grounds for accepting such a distinction?) To meet this doubt we are given a somewhat intricate theory. The doctrine of representative perception is rejected, if it means that the real thing is *inferred* from the datum. The latter is said to be purely mental (p. 50); it is made of feelings which in their turn are "internal, subjective, and real"; it is yet "external, objective, and merely apparent" (p. 25); it is largely produced by reactions on the part of the self and has only a *fictitious* externality, for we react "as if a feeling which bears the impress of an external thing *were* the thing"; it is a picture "which is taken as identical with the real thing" but which is not the real thing because it is the knowledge of it; as a picture it depicts objects, and we know the latter only through the picture. In spite of the supposed evidence for the distinction between datum and object—evidence which suggests a time-lag between datum and the state of the real thing—a datum is yet said to depict "a real thing as it is at that moment and as it appears from that point of view."

In the face of so much *fiction* and *as ifs* it is not easy to see how scepticism has been met. The conception of *intent* is made to bridge the gap between datum and object; it is doubtful, however, whether it is a bridge at all but only a magic wand. Reactions on the part of the self do not provide any clear explanation, for to what are the reactions made? In the end Professor Strong is merely laying stress upon practical requirements and the instinctive belief that objects exist, and to this a sceptic would be in no way opposed. In fact the author is not sufficiently critical. It seems that his theory, like so much theory about and on the basis of sense-data since the time of Locke, starts from data that are defined in terms of *known* things, *known* relations and distinctions between things, instead of adhering strictly to the task

of showing how such knowledge can be explained on the basis of the data. A psychologist is probably more apt than any one to err in this respect. Psychological experiments may provide evidence for and render intelligible the notion of *intent*; but, as the psychologist is working within the framework of a datum and a *known* object and a *known* distinction between datum and object, can his psychological notion of intent be admitted to provide a solution to the prior epistemological issue?

B. M. Laing.

John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century. By Kenneth Maclean. (Newhaven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1936. 11s. 6d. Pp. viii × 176. Price 2 dollars 50; 11s. 6d.)

The main theme of this entertaining work is set forward in its opening sentence: "The book that had most influence in the eighteenth century, the Bible excepted, was Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*." The author sets out to demonstrate this thesis by apt and frequent quotation from eighteenth-century writers, and by referring these passages back to their source in the *Essay*. He does not claim to be a philosopher, and we are not to expect any philosophical exposition of the *Essay* itself in these pages. He contents himself with the barest statement of Locke's doctrines, quoting frequently. On the whole this statement is free from error, but superficial and inadequate. In particular the account given of Book IV seems to be weak. It is to be feared that the student of literature will not get a very clear idea of Locke's theory of knowledge from this section. Elsewhere also one or two points need to be questioned. I cannot follow the argument that "the denial of innate ideas . . . definitely questions God's benevolence and kindness" (p. 19–20). Again, is it not an over-statement to say that Book III of the *Essay* "presents in brief space a complete philosophy of language" (p. 103)? Book III is certainly more important than some writers have been ready to admit, but Dr. Maclean surely makes too great a claim for it.

However, it is not the author's primary purpose to expound Locke, but rather to trace his influence on the chief literary works of the eighteenth century and this Dr. Maclean does with considerable skill. He is obviously very familiar with the period and is able to bring forward considerable evidence in support of his thesis. There can be no doubt that writers like Pope, Addison, Swift, and Sterne were deeply indebted to Locke's *Essay*. In particular Dr. Maclean is interested in the relations between Locke and Laurence Sterne. His explanation of the use which Sterne made of Locke's theory of time is admirable. Interesting also are his discussions of such matters as the comparison between brutes and men, the association of ideas, and the relation between wit and judgment in eighteenth-century literature. Students of Locke will be grateful to Dr. Maclean for this careful piece of research.

R. I. Aaron.

The Silver World: An Essay on the Ultimate Problems of Philosophy. By Aegidius Jahn, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 392. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This book is described as the English edition of a work written in 1930–31, recast and expanded in the next year. Its author, according to the flap of the jacket, is a native of Pilsen, who since 1920 has been inspector of Czech

public instruction in Austria and has written actively upon epistemological and other such subjects. In his preface Dr. Jahn tells us that he has been profoundly influenced by Anglo-American philosophy, particularly as regards its favourite (objective) starting-point, although he himself is a mid-European who finds German philosophy "intellectually more accessible," despite its predilection for idealism. Of recent writers Mauthner, Vaihinger, Reininger, Reichenbach, Einstein, and Müller-Freinfels have impressed him the most.

The book itself is of a type rather unfamiliar in contemporary English philosophy. If I dared to run the risk of misconstruction, I should describe it as a piece of high-grade philosophical journalism. By this I do not mean that it is amateurish, for it is serious and knowledgeable and technically adequate. Nevertheless, as cricketers would say, it uses the long handle. It is definitely propagandist. It chooses its terms and its metaphors to startle and to perturb. It is ferociously atheistic, savagely "anti-hominist ic," uncompromising in its repudiation of the ultimate (and especially the absolute) in metaphysics and in epistemology.

Its broadest outline is somewhat as follows: We have O-philosophies (i.e. professedly objective ones) and S-philosophies (i.e. mentalistic ones). The first type is strictly impossible because we can never be "ego-free" in our knowing. Nevertheless, we can scarcely doubt that there was and will be something before our birth and after our death. S-philosophy, on the other hand, inevitably founders on the rocks of solipsism. It is responsible for all false anthropomorphisms (including "substance," all nouns, and even "being"). Yet since we cannot avoid every particle of S-philosophy in epistemology, that study is doomed, and metaphysics with it. Metaphysical questions either lead nowhere or are lost in impenetrable mist or are swallowed up by a "black absolute." Their message, if they could have one, would just be death, and that, too, would be the message of an O-philosophy if we could reach it. The universe is mostly void, too empty even to be dead. Where it is not void it is seldom alive. Where it is alive, life is short and sad.

Nevertheless, Mr. Jahn believes that it is possible to walk with some security in what (forgetting metaphysics) we might call the valley of empirical being. He also believes that although "absolute good" is as much of an absurdity as "wooden iron," a relative ethics for man and his companions among the higher animals is not absurd and is even practicable. Suffering unites them and should enable them to alleviate their lot before they are carried feet-foremost to their graves. If there be progress within the next ten million years or so during which man may perhaps survive, the world should become "silver" although at present (with its wars, follies, and cruelties) its metal is very much baser.

This thesis is presented with vigour and gravity and makes use of much learning, mostly modern and scientific although also older and quite frequently Eastern.

While I find it difficult to believe that the difficulties inherent in this agnosticism-cum-realism are adequately met (i.e. to believe that the author does not profess to know too much to make metaphysics quite inaccessible, or alternatively does not profess to know too little to warrant his confidence in a silver or about-to-be-silvery world of the plains) I should like to call attention to the range of his arguments and to their frequent acuteness and solidity. For proof of this the reader must go to the book itself. A short review would be unfairly eclectic.

JOHN LAIRD.

Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics. The Philosophy of a Physician. By WILLIAM BROWN, D.M.(Oxon), D.Sc.(Lond.), F.R.C.P. (London; Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. viii + 294. 7s. 6d. net.)

This is a collection of essays dealing in a popular fashion with a number of important questions relating to medical, moral, religious, and, to a lesser extent, metaphysical problems, from the point of view of a psychologist who is also a philosopher and a practising physician. Nowhere in *Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics* does Dr. Brown explicitly set forth his philosophical creed; he implies it rather as a background against which he develops the various topics of which he treats. But, just as he strikes the clarion note of faith on the first page of his book in the chapter headed "Psychology and Medicine," so he ends the volume on the same note when discussing "The Survival of Personality" in the last chapter. Despite all their failings and diseases, Dr. Brown is an optimist, or at least a meliorist, in his outlook upon human individuals and humanity as a whole; but his philosophy, so far as it may have a practical outcome, is to be attained only by way of an autognosis more far-reaching than that of Socrates, for it must extend beyond the confines of the conscious mind to reveal the very depths of the unconscious itself. Such knowledge "brings self-control," and this in every direction and circumstance of life, in sickness as well as in health, in inner moral strife against instinctual revolts as well as in social adjustments and international relations. It is this thread running through the book that makes it possible to include chapters on such diverse topics as psycho-analysis and the physical treatment of disease, sex control, free-will, confession, peace and war, and the Group movement, without leaving them, as it were, a mass of fragments and loose ends. There are two Appendices, one on the development of psychology and the inauguration of the new psychological institute at Oxford, and the other containing reprints of three letters from the Author to *The Times* newspaper on the psychology of peace and war.

F. AVELING.

Growth of the Mind in Relation to Culture. By C. LAMBEK. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard. 1936. Pp. 143. Price Kr. 6.50.)

This is an interesting and able essay. Its thesis is that "For cultural development the same laws hold good as for individual growth and decline . . . at the present stage of culture the whole question of progress hangs upon the mental factors" (pp. 108 and 98). Mental activity (the source of which the author traces wholly to depressive influences) and mental coherence are the two desiderata of culture, the latter being the more important. The significance of association in mental life he takes to be grossly exaggerated in consequence of "the utter lack of results shown by psychology in the study of all forms of volitional phenomena" (p. 63). "To-day," he adds, "most of us have more associations than are good for us. Brains that are full up with many things are apt to produce only superficial thoughts. What we need to-day is not more varied contents in the stream of thoughts, but its control and regulation" (p. 64).

Of the social order he is (justifiably) pessimistic. "The idea of obtaining stability in the outer world must now be regarded as obsolete, our only hope is to obtain harmony in the inner world, in the form of a coherent self, and thus attain an existence more worthy of mankind" (p. 82). Yet of man's nature he is (to my mind excessively) optimistic. In consequence he appears

to overstress the subjective side of mental life. It is a truism that no one can sense my sensations or think my thoughts; but is it equally true that, "Nature has made each individual organism into an instrument upon which others can play only to a slight extent" (p. 78)? Is it not the case that the majority of us are not in the least opaque either to the sight or the suggestions of others; that we are in reality all too easily moulded into the shape our propagandists desire? Certainly the more substantial the personality the less transparent and pliable, and certainly the ideal is that all men be substantial personalities; yet the reality falls sadly short. Men can be (and are being) played upon to an almost unlimited extent. Nevertheless Mr. Lambek's contention that it is only through independence that culture can flourish is no doubt right. In sociological subjects it is less than ordinarily possible to keep ideals and facts from mixing, and Mr. Lambek errs, if he errs at all, in this respect alone, in a manner which is entirely creditable, and which in no degree diminishes the value of his vigorous and lucid little book. The translation, presumably made for the manuscript, is generally clear. I have noted the following slips: p. 22, l.10, insert *h*; p. 36, l.31; for *c* read *s*; p. 50, l.15, insert *o*; p. 72, l.31, insert *e*.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy. By INGEMAR HEDENIUS. (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells Boktryckeri-A.B.; Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. 1936. Pp. 238. Price 10s.)

Under this somewhat strange title Dr. Hedenius has written a really interesting critical account of the development of Berkeley's philosophy. It is a particular pleasure to welcome this book by a Swedish scholar, for though Berkeley has stimulated much fruitful study in Germany, Italy, and France, he has heretofore formed the subject of but little first-hand research in Sweden.

The essential task which Dr. Hedenius sets himself in this inaugural dissertation is to examine the connection between the doctrine of spirits ("theology") and its epistemological basis ("sensationalism"). He considers that though the obvious contradiction between sansationalism and theological metaphysics in Berkeleianism would seem to split this system into two incompatible parts, yet it seems evident that Berkeley himself saw some logical connection between the doctrine of spirits and its epistemological basis, the doctrine of ideas. After submitting to a searching critical analysis Berkeley's own works as well as the views expressed by various thinkers upon them, Dr. Hedenius reaches the conclusion that Berkeley's system, to a much greater extent than has generally been assumed, forms a consistent whole in which the various theories, epistemological as well as metaphysical, are found to have an intimate logical relation to each other. Considered from this standpoint, Berkeley's philosophy lends itself naturally enough to treatment under four heads entitled by Dr. Hedenius Immaterialism and Empiricism, Sensationalism as a Metaphysical Doctrine, Berkeley's Theological Metaphysics, and Immaterialism as a Basis for Morality.

Perhaps the most valuable part of Dr. Hedenius's book is the last, in which he expounds and criticizes Berkeley's ethics. Students of Berkeley usually pass over his ethical theories rather cursorily. Berkeley wrote more on ethics than is generally realized. The *Commonplace Book* teems with suggestive remarks which probably give some idea of the argument of the lost Part II of the *Principles*, *Passive Obedience* is, in the main, an ethical

treatise, two of the essays in the *Guardian* and three of the dialogues in *Alciphron* are chiefly concerned with morals, and there are a few hints in the *Principles* and *Siris*. Dr. Hedenius deserves gratitude for his very careful examination of this aspect of Berkeley's thought. I could have wished, however, to see a fuller treatment of the question of the relation of mathematics to ethics. Morality, for Berkeley, may be demonstrated as "mixt" or applied mathematics. It was fresh in his mind that Newton had applied mathematics, with wonderful success, to the solar system; and it required no great stretch of imagination to hope for significant results from the application of mathematical methods to the study of human conduct.

The author's general conclusion is that the metaphysics of immaterialism forms a philosophical basis for all the essential points of Berkeley's ethical system. In an entirely natural way Berkeley's theological metaphysics, which are based on sensationalistic epistemology, result in a theological theory of morality. And the wish to strengthen this ethical system was one of the most important motives behind Berkeley's philosophical speculation.

G. A. JOHNSTON.

Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle. LEON CHESTOV. Traduit du Russe par T. Rageot et B. de Schloezer. (Paris: Libraire philosophique J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 384. Price 25 fr.)

Chestov, a Russian philosopher in exile, known principally in this country for his book on Dostoievski (*In Job's Balances*), here writes on Dostoievski's contemporary, and in many ways kindred spirit, the Danish poet-philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. Those interested in contemporary philosophical and theological movements on the Continent will have been aware of the importance of Kierkegaard as the primary inspirer of the "existential" dialectic of Heidegger and Jaspers, and in a rather different way, of the Barthian "Theology of Crisis." We may be glad that we can now have access to his writings in more possible languages (besides Chestov's book and the German translation, *Gesammelte Werke*, published at Jena, a series of English translations by D. F. Swenson has begun to appear from the Oxford Press). Kierkegaard is a riddler and a prophet. He rebels against "speculative philosophy," which he thinks aims at the objective theoretical attitude of a detached spectator, in the name of an "existential" philosophy of faith, which (like that of Dostoievski's characters) is distilled out of the *extreme* subjective experience of the man who lives it. We may feel that his attacks on speculative philosophy, and particularly on Hegel, amount at times to an almost pathological hatred; that "the wisdom of the world is foolishness before God" can most rightly be felt by those who have a loving appreciation of that wisdom. Whether when its destructive attacks have shot their bolt, the Existential Philosophy has in it the germ of a new kind of constructive metaphysic it is perhaps too soon to say. But just as, even in its negations, the "Theology of Crisis" is proving itself a fighting faith for the Confessional Opposition of the German Protestant Church, so I have no doubt that in contemporary philosophy Kierkegaard and the philosophy of *Existenz* are forces to be reckoned with.

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

A History of English Philosophy. By W. R. SORLEY. (Cambridge: University Press. 1937. Pp. xvi + 380. Price 8s. 6d.)

This book is simply a cheaper reprint of a work published in 1920 and therefore does not require as extended a notice as it would on its original

appearance. Had the author been spared a few years longer he would, I suppose, have taken the opportunity of a new edition to make changes, but, as it is, the work seems to have been reprinted without alteration. However, the book is so admirable as it stands that I cannot imagine there would have been much scope for serious amendment, unless indeed he had enlarged his account of some of the philosophers. The number of authors treated is from the nature of the case too great to admit of a thorough or detailed discussion of their views, but, within the limits set by its large field, its function is fulfilled completely, and as a general introductory survey putting together the different English thinkers or as a book of reference for summing up briefly the views of minor thinkers whom the student has not had time to read, it should remain a standard work. An additional recommendation is its fine literary style which makes the book far more readable than one usually expects a history of philosophy to be, without in the least detracting from its philosophic merit.

The history extends from A.D. 800 to A.D. 1900, but the mediæval period is compressed into thirteen pages. The relative space given to the different philosophers is about what we should expect except that the most recent, e.g. Bradley, are treated much more briefly than others, and I was surprised to find Richard Price dismissed with only one page. With the leading philosophers a good deal of space is given to biographical details. The book is based upon a series of chapters contributed to the Cambridge History of English Literature, and no doubt, as this suggests, it would be useful for students in the English as well as in the Philosophy departments of our universities. The author completely resists the temptation, to which historians of philosophy sometimes succumb, of treating the history of philosophy as a dialectical process leading towards the vindication of their own philosophical theories and presents the views of the different thinkers in a thoroughly objective manner though not refraining from brief criticisms.

A. C. EWING.

Philosophy and Revelation in the Work of Contemporary Jewish Thinkers. By Dr. A. LICHTIGFELD. (London: M. L. Cailingeld. 1937. Pp. xii + 163. Price 7s. 6d.)

The title of this book in two respects disappoints expectation. One is justified in expecting a discussion of the relation of philosophy to revelation, but the two subjects are for the most part juxtaposed, and an illustration of the Jewish standpoint on the subjects, but the only common bond of the writers referred to seems to be their common Jewish descent. It is only in Section V, "Theological Thinking," that these expectations find in any measure fulfilment. Of these writers Martin Buber seemed to be the most interesting, and for that reason to deserve fuller treatment. There is nothing distinctively Jewish about Henri Bergson and Samuel Alexander; and the only reason for their inclusion seems irrelevant to the purpose of the volume. The philosophy of both is so familiar that they might have been omitted, and the space might have been devoted to the less known writers, the reference to some of whom is tantalizingly brief. One would have been grateful for a volume which showed how 'orthodox' Judaism vindicated its adherence to the Torah in view of modern Biblical scholarship, and offered a philosophical exposition of its ethical monotheism in terms of modern thinking. Failing that, the writer would have been well advised, as already indicated, in omitting the philosophers who show no distinctive Jewish traits, dealing more

adequately with those who do. His treatment is often very scrappy, and the author's own comments are casual. The book lacks organic unity, although he arranges his material under the headings Philosophy of Reason, Philosophy of Life, Phenomenology and Theological Thinking. I find the relegating of a mass of notes to the end of each section irritating and the inclusion of some of them distracting. He has brought together a great deal of valuable material for a book, and one is grateful for his diligence, but he has not made a book of it, of continuous interest or dominant purpose, and that failure one regrets, because one would be glad of the opportunity now of expressing sincere appreciation of the contribution of Jewish thought to the world's truth and wisdom.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Principles and Laws of Sociology. By Professor H. A. PHELPS. (London: Chapman & Hall; New York: J. Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1936. Pp. xii + 544. Price 20s.)

In its very excellence, this comprehensive and scholarly volume does not make for easy reading. Its piling of generality on generality is not always a contribution to lucidity. It is more patient than pungent. A fair example of its style would be the following: "For this reason, in the whole pattern of human population, population itself may be regarded as the principle. From this point of view, the fact of population or of populating is simply reinterpreted to mean growth, decline, or maintenance upon a stationary level. This substitution is admissible because it is highly possible that the main fact of growth (whether it is ultimately a biological, social, or bio-social process) may never be submitted to precise inductive determination. In this sense, population itself is a principle, somewhat resembling the principle of evolution or relativity, since it is a fusion of knowns and unknowns."

"Social and societal patterns" constitute the "sociological omnibus." "Patterns are classifications of related phenomena in a closed or limited framework," and "The pattern approach remains a sociological omnibus because there is no one precise order or arrangement of relationships and interactions that can prove of equal use to every phase of sociological interests." Part III (pp. 191–408) reviews the patterns of population, ruralization, urbanization, industrialization, mobility, social organization, social class and status, social disorganization, and cyclical fluctuations. It is claimed for each pattern that it "is subject to tentative explanation by its own characteristic combination of factorial and component items and by a representative principle."

Perhaps it is the value of suggested sociological principles that is especially baffling. We are offered a select alphabetical list, containing such terms as Accumulation, Adaptation, Association, Coercion, Culture, Cycles, Diffusion, Transmission, Variability. "This list could be extended to include almost any noun that means process, or in their methodological references to words indicating a technique of induction." One major principle or explanation may be employed to define the main feature of interaction in each of the patterns, as for example, in population, a principle of growth; in rurality, a principle of bio-social adjustment; in mobility, a principle of movement and continuity. There is a suspicion that reality may be but confounded by the multiplication of terms.

More cogent is the emphasis on the possibility and value of sociological law. A pattern having been "factored" into its elements, these may be dis-

covered to be related in a manner that admits of prediction and control. Sociological laws are of three kinds. Quantitative laws may be precise—like Dalton's formula of maladjusted population, Hart's regression equation, Pearl's curve of population growth, Engel's laws of standard of living, and the verbal formulae of Douglas concerning suburbanization and of Cooley concerning transportation. Examples of indeterminate quantitative laws would be Fairchild's law of the standard of living, McKenzie's law of fluidity, Young's formula of rural-urban migration, Huntington's law of the selectivity of migratory movements of population, Sorokin's law of the comparative life-span of the social institutions, the Malthusian law of population. Qualitative laws may be illustrated by Sims's law of rural standards of living, Reeve's law of social convulsions, Whelpton's law of birth rates, and Durkheim's law of suicide. There are, thirdly, laws of functional dependence, such as Bogardus's law of tension and conflict, the Le Play sequence, Durkheim's law of family contraction, and Mill's law of business cycles. The book ends with two conclusions. "The first of these conclusions is that there is an infinite number of social laws in the phenomena of sociology. The second conclusion is that these social laws are sociological to the extent that they are logically conceived."

The final chapters—on Symbolic Sociology, and The Changing Scope of Sociology—may be recommended as of greatest philosophical interest. But why a treatise on Sociology should be more deserving of notice in a philosophical journal than, say, a treatise on Botany—this question as to the philosophical status of Sociology is perhaps more fitted for an article than for a review.

The book is well documented and indexed. The author offers it as "a summary of the sociological literature available to me up to March 1935, with the exception of a few bibliographical references to more recent literature."

M. KAYE.

The Social Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development. By J. W. GOUGH. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. viii + 234. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

What this book offers is an outline of the history of the social contract theory from the earliest times to the present day. Since so many thinkers require to be considered, none of them can be considered at any length; and there is naturally little space for the critical discussion which we are promised in the sub-title. Indeed, not one of the fifteen chapters is exclusively devoted to a single thinker; and it is only in the introduction and conclusion that any attempt is made, except by way of incidental comment, to estimate the general significance of the idea of contract. Nor has it been found possible to say much about the relations of the theory to the historical circumstances which influenced, or were influenced by, its various formulations. Mr. Gough has, however, been able to bring together all the important thinkers who have advocated or criticized it; and the chief interest of his book lies in the success with which he has exhibited the interrelations of their ideas and made possible a synoptic view of the whole development of the theory. Especially interesting are his expositions of numerous lesser thinkers who, though not widely known except to students of history, are important both in themselves and as having anticipated some of the principal contentions of their better known brethren. It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the historical purpose of the book that it should have no general thesis and little continuity of argument beyond what is provided by the succession of names. But even

philosophers cannot be indifferent to a theory which, for several centuries of European history, has provided the framework for all serious thinking on politics; and they should find much to interest them in an exposition which enables them to view its development as a whole and to see that the great thinkers whose names they usually associate with it are only the most eminent examples of a tendency of thought that expressed itself in numerous predecessors and successors.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. By KARL MANNHEIM. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1936. Pp. xxxi + 318. Price 15s.)

This is a book distinguished both in matter and in manner. The breadth of its erudition is displayed not merely throughout the text, but in a classified bibliography covering twenty-three pages. The translators are to be congratulated for conveying a style of lucid compactness.

The thesis of the book is generally familiar. Its German forerunners are fully acknowledged by the author himself, and in a useful preface Professor Louis Wirth traces similar views among English and American sociologists and philosophers. But here the thesis receives a most pertinacious and luminous elaboration, and an abundance of subtle and challenging illustration.

Sociology of knowledge is the outcome of ideology, and is itself subject to that social conditioning of thought which is the main object of its revelation. The "particular conception of ideology" exposes the opponent's social, economic, religious, and philosophical views in their conscious and unconscious psychological determination. The "total conception of ideology" adds to these psychological conditions the discoverable relevant complex of social and historical factors. It is thus that the Marxist brands the opposition as ideological. But in "sociology of knowledge" the thinker confesses to an awareness of his own subjection to manifold determination. Everyone without exception is confined to a thought which is "relational." The same term means different things for people of different times, of different classes, of different groups. "Liberty" had a different significance for those who fought for European Liberalism from what is allowed it by modern Marxists and proletarians. It is similarly difficult to be "objective" with respect to the relation between theory and practice in politics. One's conclusions will be determined according as one is a liberal, a conservative, a communist, a fascist.

Yet Professor Mannheim does not reject objectivity. But the degree in which this may be attained has to depend on the possible synthesis of particular view-points. If, then, there is to be political objectivity, there are required academies aiming at political synthesis, thereby being distinguished from the schools of political parties concerned with the propaganda of fanaticism or predatory opportunism. The existence of the politically detached intellectual indicates that such academies may already be staffed. Scholars are no more the monopoly of the ecclesiastical and governing classes; and springing from all classes, and stimulated by physical, economical, and intellectual mobility, at least a certain number of them may join forces for the pursuit of political objectivity; for certainly their career has revealed to them the prevalence of partiality. Yet when (p. 144) Professor Mannheim declares that "To-day more than ever it is expected of such a dynamic middle group that it will strive to create a forum outside the party schools in which the perspective of and the interest in the whole is safeguarded," we cannot help wondering as to who

expects this. Is it possible that the author has forgotten for a moment the advancing bands of Communism and Fascism?

In contrast with ideologies which in their impracticability are exploited by the ascendant class with a view to maintaining the prevailing social order, there is the Utopian mentality whereby through its seeming impracticability the submerged but aspiring class seeks to modify or shatter the prevailing order. In so far as Christianity is distributed as opium for the people so as the better to enslave them, it is ideological; but with those who would realize its gospel of universal fraternity here and now, it is a Utopia. But the Utopian mentality also is historically and socially conditioned. The Chiliastic impatience of the Anabaptists, the optimistic "progress to reason" of the Liberals, the "objective Reason and Perfection" of the Conservatives, the perfection to be achieved by violence at the moment of capitalist collapse as envisaged by modern communism—all these are brilliantly reviewed. But what Utopia is left for the modern intellectual emancipated from all delusion concerning the possibility of individual origination? Indeed, the exposure of the complex conditioning of all knowledge and aspiration is itself required for the possibility of efficacious freedom. "We could change the whole of society to-morrow if everybody could agree. The real obstacle is that every individual is bound into a system of established relationships which to a large extent hamper his will. But these 'established relationships' in the last analysis rest again upon uncontrolled decisions of individuals. The task, therefore, is to remove that source of difficulty by unveiling the hidden motives behind the individual's decisions, thus putting him in a position really to choose. Then, and only then, would his decisions *really* lie with him. All that we have said so far in this book is meant to help the individual to disclose these hidden motives and to reveal the implications of his choice" (pp. 234–5). Even so, the disappearance of Utopia is glanced at as a possibility. "We would be faced then with the greatest paradox imaginable, namely that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses" (p. 236).

That this book does not yield any abiding pacification of the quest for reality and objectivity, still leaves vivid its wealth of philosophical suggestion.

M. KAYE.

The Concept of Time. By LOUISE ROBINSON HEATH. (U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1936, Pp. xiv + 235. Price in Great Britain, 13s. 6d. net.)

This book has a refreshing quality, partly because it is simple, straightforward, and untechnical, partly because the author's unflagging zest sustains the reader's attention throughout. For its first five-sixths (or so) the book is the story of temporal theory from Greek philosophy and science to modern science and philosophy. The story, in view of its ramifications, is told with commendable brevity, and the author's emphasis upon the continuity of her tale is, on the whole, not exaggerated. The rest of the book discusses the (metaphysical) "reality" of time and the analysis of its meaning in two short chapters, of which the second is the more important. In it the value of a pragmatic-operational view is suggested, especially if time have *several* meanings in use. The treatment is tentative but not diffident.

The author is careful, but makes odd little slips. Thus she consistently spells Northrop's name "Northrup," gives Lotze an unnecessary diaeresis, and prints "*aeorum*" for "*aevum*." She also gives R. B. Haldane an "H" that was not conferred at baptism.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Development of Religious Toleration in England, from the Accession of James I to the Convention of the Long Parliament (1603–1640). By W. K. JORDAN, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 542. Price 21s.)

This volume is a successor to the author's previous work upon the same subject, during the period from the beginning of the English Reformation to the death of Elizabeth. A third volume is projected to complete the task. Those who are familiar with the earlier work will expect that the high standard exhibited there should be maintained here, and they will not be disappointed. Dr. Jordan moves amidst the tangled undergrowth of this intricate subject with the easy mastery of a man who knows all the paths. He begins with the dominant groups, Anglican and governmental, and the beginnings of "Anglo-Catholicism," although one regrets that a term with a recognized modern connotation is employed in quite a different sense, as will be shown by mentioning that the alternative title is "Arminianism." The problem of toleration was twofold, embracing both Dissenters and Romanists. Dr. Jordan passes to the minority groups, Puritan, Separatist, Congregational, and Baptist. Then he reviews the lay attitude, that of the Latitudinarians, Moderates, Sceptics, and Erastians. Finally, he discusses Romanist thought, its claim to toleration, and the politico-religious issues thus involved. In any historical journal a lengthy review would be demanded. As the philosophical interest of the book, though by no means absent, is indirect, it is enough to say that it represents a very high order of research, and one that forms an illuminating background to the study of Hobbes and the reactions which his unwelcome candour provoked. E. S. WATERHOUSE.

God and Man. Four Essays in the Nature of Personality. By EMIL BRUNNER (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1936. Pp. 180. Price 5s.)

Dr. Brunner writes as a theologian, not a philosopher, so that interest in this book for the readers of PHILOSOPHY is indirect. Yet a philosopher can be no more unconcerned with developments in theology than can a British politician be unconcerned with the domestic situation in Germany, or the "Swaraj" movement in India. The chief interest of this book is its help in clearing up the relation between Brunner and Barth. Brunner contests Barth's position on four main points. These are the declaration that sin has effaced the divine image in man; that there is no general revelation of God in history, nature, or conscience; that man's fallen nature has no point of contact with God's redemptive work; and that the new creation is not the perfecting but the destruction of the old fallen nature. Barth's reply is simply that he refuses to discuss natural theology as it is no part of true theology. Barth is a reactionary, but we must view him against the background of contemporary Germany to understand the inwardness of his reaction. Brunner, as a Swiss, has not faced the same situation. That Barth's theology should become general in the Christian Church is surely impossible, but as a reaction it is significant and of value. Dr. Cairns, the translator of the book, contributes an excellent introduction. E. S. WATERHOUSE.

An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1936. Pp. 256. Price 6s.)

This is a book of interest and importance. Its interest lies in the frank and even aggressive manner in which it states the question with which it is primarily

concerned. Its importance is in its incisive criticism. Dr. Niebuhr knows how to pull down the walls of Jericho, even if he does not promise equal success as a builder of the walls of new Jerusalem. With nicely-balanced impartiality he chastises orthodoxy and Liberalism alike. He has all the Hebrew prophet's sense of the sinfulness of the world. Orthodoxy—the Augustinian tradition seems to be what the author has in mind almost exclusively here—has a place for sin but a poor sense of sins. It inclines to regard the *tabus* of the morality of the day as the chief index of sin. Certainly in the Victorian age swearing was to many a worse sin than sweating, and financial charity compensated for lack of Christian charity. Liberalism, on the other hand, has been so busy proving its acceptableness to the "modern mind" that it finds when the task is accomplished the "modern mind" has changed, and is forced to begin anew. It confuses social idealism with the Gospel, sin with the slum, and righteousness with the reasonable. The heart of the book is the chapter on "The Relevance of an Impossible Ideal," a striking and provocative title. This shows what the author believes to be the right way, that of the Prophetic Religion of Jesus. The standard is impossible, but indispensable. It sets the Infinite before the Finite. Because man is finite, the infinite is impossible, but because he is always led beyond the finite, it is a necessary conception. Dr. Niebuhr has no place for morality without religion. However passionately the moralists claim their independence of religious considerations, history shows that morality without religion is ineffective for good. "What men are able to will depends not upon the strength of their willing but upon the strength which enters their will and over which their will has little control." Many books on Christian Ethics are colourless and unimpeachable. Whatever may be thought of this, and however much disagreement it provokes, it represents a challenge no moralist should ignore.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Surprise and the Psycho-Analyst: A Study of the Conjecture and Comprehension of Unconscious Processes. By THEODOR REIK. Translated from the German by MARGARET M. GREEN. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1936. Pp. vii + 294. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Reik is a psycho-analyst of mature experience, and his book is intended mainly for psycho-analysts. The publishers claim that it can be easily understood by the lay-reader, but of this I am doubtful. Even philosophers whose work lies in other fields may have difficulty in "comprehending" it according to the author's standard of comprehension.

Nevertheless, it is of the first importance to philosophy, since it treats of the unconscious mind, the uncomprehended hinterland of which our conscious thought and life is but the fringe, and in which all our real discoveries are made. The book is a study of the conjecture and comprehension of unconscious processes, an attempt to describe the psychological process of cognition from *within*. It is essentially a record of an *experience*, the experience of making analytical discoveries, and describes the discipline and the suffering which the analyst must accept as a condition necessary to the discovering of anything new to himself in this field. Dr. Reik emphasizes the fact that discovery is no mere objective or technical problem, and that our comprehension and even our technique are a precipitate of a previous unconscious experience shared by the analyst and the analysand. The analyst's ability to comprehend the unconscious processes of others is limited by his own character, even when his ego is not to the fore. It would seem that one of

the most important factors is the individually varying relationship of the conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious systems in the individual. This makes it clearly necessary to truth that every philosophy should be regarded as a "whole," and be considered from two main points of view, firstly as a projection of the philosopher's own unconscious processes, and secondly as a formulated and comprehended precipitate of his experience. The relationship between the two should be the relationship between the philosopher's pursuit of ultimate truth and his *sense of the finite*, as stressed by Professor Hallett in his lecture "On Being a Philosopher" (reproduced in PHILOSOPHY in January, 1937).

In Dr. Reik's opinion the quality most important for an analyst (and presumably for any philosopher) is that he should excel in moral courage or inner truthfulness, rather than in technical ability alone. The root problem of neurosis is not fear, but shock; the memory trace of the prime shocks of the hnman creature is at work in fear. Apart from special trauma in later life, most of the prime shocks are those associated with and immediately following upon birth, the *first experiences* of the human being. There is an analytical correspondence between these early biological experiences and the later processes of cognition, and our cognition is limited by the fears which still safeguard us against comprehending the experience of these prime shocks. The deepest knowledge is not to be had if one shrinks from purchasing it with personal suffering. "Suffering, consciously experienced and mastered, teaches us wisdom."

Dr. Reik's presentation of his theme might have been less diffuse, it if were intended purely for the *experienced* analyst. His method of repeating and elaborating his theme in various guises, however, is not out of place in a book which is attempting the difficult task of bringing into the conscious mind of the reader some comprehension, and not merely conjecture, of the depth and extent of the unconscious. One wishes that he had devoted more of the book than a very brief chapter xx to his underlying theme of "The Shock of Thought," and described in some detail the reactions of the newborn human and the significance for character formation of his first experiences. This chapter needs linking up with the work of Otto Rank on "The Trauma of Birth." Interesting discoveries are now being made on this level by a number of English workers, led by Dr. Jane Suttie.

Dr. Reik's reference to the importance for the unconscious of sense-perceptions that are now consciously disregarded and obsolete invites a correlation with Professor Jung's concept of archetypes, and suggests a biological foundation for much that has been observed empirically and used for purposes of therapy in an anagogic way, especially through the interpretation of dreams. In this field, too, one would have been glad if Dr. Reik had gone into more detail.

The author has shown great moral courage in presenting a theme that is almost beyond the reach of description and in striving to describe processes which are, in part, incapable of expression in words. He shows that analysis involves "an emergence of secret things that were not only unspoken but never spoke," and leaves us wondering with him whether we do not need a whole long life in which to reach some degree of psychical mastery of what we experience as children. One important key to real mastery he leaves with us: "the deeper planes of the ego can be reached only by a roundabout way, through an object. . . . In beginning to comprehend another, we discover a clue to ourselves."

Such a book as this cannot be lightly criticized; it needs to be experienced, in life as well as in the reading of it; and criticism should wait upon experience.

My own experience, within its own much narrower limits, bears witness to the truth of most of what Dr. Reik affirms.

B. D. Hendy.

Sense and Thought: A Study in Mysticism. By Greta Hort, M.A., Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 262. Price 8s. 6d.)

This is not an easy book to read or to review, but it is one of real originality and makes a distinct contribution to the study of the problems, metaphysical and psychological, presented by mysticism. The difficulty of the book arises from the two-fold, or even three-fold, nature of its subject-matter. It is primarily a study and an interpretation of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, and, though it does not attempt to solve detailed questions of text or of authorship, it does involve an understanding of its meaning, both in itself (not always an easy matter) and in its relation to mystics of other types, such as St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross. Side by side with this there is a detailed attempt to expound the mystical experience of this unknown medieval writer in terms of modern psychological theory, mainly of the type of which Professor Bartlett is an exponent. It is indeed upon Professor Bartlett's work that the writer, herself a Cambridge scholar, depends, at one point very explicitly. With these two main interests there is also a strain of a more purely philosophical kind, and it is not always very easy to tell when the philosopher is intruding upon the dominant psychological interest of the writer. Those readers who are not philologists will find themselves faced with a further problem if they endeavour to understand Verner's law, but fortunately such understanding is not necessary. The point of the illustration can be taken even by those who cannot follow the relation between spirants and accents and consonant-change.

The most valuable element in the book is the psychological. A constructive analysis of the mind of this curiously abstract medieval writer is carried through with great persistence, and with real probability. The genesis of his conception of the 'Cloud' is found in earlier sources which he knew, especially in the Victorines, and not in any pictorial imagery of his own, for, it is argued, he was a writer of the type whose images are rather kinaesthetic than visual, so that the effective element which dominates his approach to God does not bring with it any body of conceptual thought. 'Unknowing' exactly expresses the 'Cloud' which is his way to God.

It is admitted in the course of the argument that parts of the book were written before Professor Bartlett's striking conception of "Schemata" in behaviour was taken into account. Whether the use here made of the process described as "turning round on a schema" is not rather too enthusiastic, later writers on mysticism must decide. It is made to serve as giving an account, and even an explanation, of the "subtleness" and "ghostliness" which in *The Cloud of Unknowing* are the condition of union with God. Because the schemata are parts of the organism which constitutes man, and yet are constituted in full relation to that which lies beyond, we can see, in the case of the mystic, that to be "oned in him that is all" is a fundamental expression alike of the being of God and of the being of the mystic. The application of this principle to the cryptic sentence "for as nothing may be without him, so may he not be without himself" is too long to set down here, but it is one of the most original and most successful pieces of interpretation in the book.

It is a pity that this conception of the schema is not introduced in the earlier chapters. It would have rendered unnecessary what is at least difficult, and perhaps really confused, in the attempted analysis of the action of what

are called, not very happily, "conative conceptions," a phrase which introduces the elements of conation and cognition in a form which makes the thread of clear thinking about them very hard to hold.

Despite the clever piece of analysis in the last chapter, it is not very easy to say with what metaphysical conception of God the writer is herself operating. She claims her unknown author for a Platonist, for one who at least in part of his thinking about God is "operating with the conception of the Absolute" on lines which foreshadow the thought of Bradley and Bosanquet. But this part of her task is barely more than suggested. The main interest throughout is psychology, and psychology cannot deal with ontological problems. She has carried through the psychological analysis in a manner which is original and fruitful. When that is done we are still left with the greater question unanswered. What is the ultimate character of that Reality to which the mystical experience points?

But it is always a little ungracious in a reviewer to complain that a book does not answer questions that are not really within its scope. The main purpose of this book is certainly fulfilled and future writers on mysticism must needs take it into account.

L. W. GRENSTED.

Personal Realism. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1937. Pp. x + 387. Price in England, 15s. net.)

Mr. Pratt, as was shown in this *Journal* (No. 46, p. 155), belongs to the Right Wing of the contributors to Critical Realism, and he is a tried and favourite author to a wide public in questions of philosophy and of theology. In the present book he surveys man's philosophical beliefs from the Far East (of the past) to Massachusetts of the present, not forgetting Europe, but reminding that continent of the "typically European fashion" (192 n.) in which Wenzl and von Hügel ignored prior American rights to the term "critical realism."

In rough outline, the plan of this book is firstly to secure its charter by examining the categories of terms, relations, substance, etc.; secondly, to establish a metropolis of dualistic realism; thirdly, to occupy the neighbouring metaphysical territory, and to explore the more remote regions in a tentative way. As one would expect, the book is written with vigour, candour, and a certain charm. It makes small parade of learning, but is written by a competent scholar for an audience assumed to be pretty knowledgeable. On the other hand, it is sparing of technicalities and could be read with pleasure and with profit by those who are intelligent enough to remember that they are amateurs.

On the whole, the early chapters on the categories (selected) seem to me to be rather less successful than the others. They are not, of course, "very dull," as the author fears in his preface, but they are at least semi-detached from one another, and instead of moving smoothly tend to clank like the coaches of a train that isn't fully under way. The central chapters of the book are quite different in this respect. The interest is sustained and close in the author's entire argument from his eleventh chapter, "How Explain Our Experience?" to his fifteenth (inclusive), "The Alternative to Realism." The general tenor of this central argument is that human experience, private or inter-subjective, is inexplicable without conditions outside it, that the balance of probability is in favour of the existence of a world of non-experiences understood in the natural way of spatio-temporal things and causes, that dualistic realism is much more defensible than the first realistic

movement in England in the present century, than the monistic New Realism that succeeded it in America and than the present fashionable theory of Objective Relativism. Indeed, Mr. Pratt is very confident indeed regarding his ability to dislodge these other realisms.

He is also, however, a *personal* realist. In him the Right Wing is *very* right. It relies on the *Cogito* with a self that is transcendentally and also empirically real. Indeed, he seems to be more fully convinced of the truth of personalism than of realism for he holds that the serious choice in metaphysics is between (personal and dualistic) realism, Absolute or Personal Idealism, and "possibly" Panpsychism. "My mature opinion is that the solution of the world riddle narrows down to a choice between Realism and Absolute or Personal Idealism, and that neither of them will ever be proved false and, therefore, neither of them will ever be proved unquestionably true. The question between them is one of relative probability; and so many factors are involved in the judgment of probability that I doubt whether this question will ever be settled with objective certainty" (p. 217).

In this belief the author leaves epistemology for Metaphysics. Examining the mind-body problem he concludes that the ego is an active participant in the matters that concern it. Knowledge, psychology, and the phenomena of volition prove a self that is more than a stream of consciousness or a succession of passing thoughts, and the last of these demands some kind of freedom. It may even demand a self that is (at least naturalistically) unbegotten. In the final chapter Mr. Pratt defends certain "over-beliefs" (which are more than mere conjectures) of a theistic type, and appears to suggest that the realism of his central argument is unlikely to be a continuing city, since it all but compels us to seek a better. It is a tribute to his candour that he remains precisely where he is.

JOHN LAIRD.

Problems in Chinese Education. By VICTOR PURCELL. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1936. Pp. viii + 261. Price 10s. 6d.)

The growing literature on Chinese education is a sign that its problems are not only numerous but also unsolved. Mr. Purcell has called attention to several of the most significant issues with the detachment which is often denied to the Chinese and the learning which so rarely encumbers the foreigner. It is some years now since a League of Nations' Mission of Educational Experts completed their admirable report, in which, while not excluding the question of language and its relation to education, they refrained, with commendable restraint, from the discussion of an issue which they felt to be one for the Chinese alone to decide. Mr. Purcell, equipped with a knowledge of Chinese, both written and spoken, has concentrated his main research work on the problem of language. Can the Chinese language be used as a medium for the transmission of Western ideas, in particular of Western science? A great deal of evidence is produced to show that the resistance of the language is formidable, but the conclusions which he draws are inconclusive. The strong militarist and nationalist tendencies in modern China make urgent a study of the purposes of education and in this connection the author deals extensively with the *San Min Chu I*, a book which he considers to be the Bible of modern China and the foundation of the educational system. It is necessary to respect the analysis of Sun Yat-Sen's works while disagreeing with the assumption that they are of such importance. Perhaps the most significant question dealt with is that of the relation between the spirit of Western and of Chinese civilization. Must the one be sacrificed to the other?

Is it to be fusion or diarchy? And how will the fusion, if such it is to be, be reflected in the curriculum?

Mr. Purcell has attempted to put these questions in their proper perspective. His first chapter covers the Old System, the examination curriculum, the respect for authority, the spirit and purpose which informed the whole structure. The second covers contact with the West and traces first the growing realization among governments and individuals of the need for reform and secondly the shape which this took at different periods. The author then draws up the problem as he sees it. And he sees it, not as study of educational programmes, methods, curricula, and pedagogics, but as a more subtle matter of the form which Western ideas assumed when they were received into the Chinese language, the adaptation of the language itself to foreign conceptions, the attempts to simplify the language in the interest of mass education and cultural revolution, the resistance of the old system to the onslaught of the West and the sort of ideas which have in particular been selected as conveyors of the foundation of Western strength. This leads on to a consideration of the Language Problem. By taking general and sociological terms and first defining them in English, the author shows that Chinese translations do not convey in any adequate measure the same meaning. And this is due, he argues, partly to the fact that the Chinese language does not admit of logical modes of thought, partly to the specific associations of the ideographs chosen for purposes of translation. In many cases, of course, the Chinese have nothing in their life or institutions remotely corresponding to the terms they have to translate. The difficulties are therefore serious. But the author's conclusion, that for the purpose of teaching Western ideas, especially science, the best course would be to adopt English as a medium, is hardly worthy of his discussion, for he is forced to admit that Orientals cannot acquire English in addition to their native tongue. To suggest, without discussion or research, that Basic English is the way out, is unconvincing, and seems indeed to be an afterthought, for it is not mentioned again. In fact, at this point his whole argument breaks down, for it is impossible to know where the author stands.

It is disconcerting, to say the least, when the author suggests Basic English as the medium for the transmission of Western ideas yet includes in the closing paragraph of the same chapter the following quotation from Karlgren. "The day that the Chinese discard their written script they will surrender the very foundations of their culture." Does he or does he not agree with this? If he does then surely he must make out a stronger case against the Chinese language than he has done, for he admits that it is developing and expanding rapidly. And what is the point of a long historical introduction to the problem if all these other considerations, political, social, and economic are not focused on the heart of the book? If he does not agree with Karlgren, it is difficult to explain the concluding chapter in which he suggests that students should study the traditional literature, with special emphasis on calligraphy, for five hours a week and a modern practical system for the remaining twenty-odd hours. The traditional study is to be subjective and the modern objective. Transition is to be made easy by changing costume when passing from the one to the other. It is as if we were asked to attend school in Hebrew dress for the morning Scripture and change to modern dress for chemistry and physics. And the further advice that no system can be made effective until the Chinese feel dismay at the non-realization of any programme that they have undertaken, in fact, that they should practice the most valuable of the Confucian virtues, "sincerity," might bring a warm and familiar glow to the heart of Doihara or Araki, but is in no sense justified

by the facts or discussion in this book. The gap between programmes and practice is due to the specific distribution of political power, not to race characteristics. Legislative bodies in China may be compared with Royal Commissions in England; the groups that actually control the government are perfectly capable of putting their programmes into practice.

Mr. Purcell's inability to come to any conclusion worthy of his knowledge and hard work is due to lack of method. He lacks scientific historical training. His picture is formal and conventional, not dynamic. No historian can agree that Chinese political unity was due mainly to the common written language; language was a common factor during periods of unity and disunity. The Empire was made possible by the completion of the Grand Canal and the Examination system. Again, it is not criticism to say that Chinese education has not succeeded in producing enough public spirit to maintain in good repair a highway of any length, the capacity to deal effectively with flood, famine, or afforestation, or enough official integrity to secure any appreciable portion of the revenue for national purposes. A society produces only the institutions that it requires and they are not the same for an Oriental agrarian society and a modern industrial State. Nor is it possible to accept the statement that the final cause of missionary failure under Ch'ing was the jealousy between the Jesuits and the Dominicans. The final cause was that Christianity challenged the very basis of Chinese society, a fact clearly shown in the Imperial edicts of the period. That Mr. Purcell has not carefully examined the old society is shown most clearly in his analysis of dynastic renewals. It is one of natural causes. Famine creates distress, which, owing to bad organization, is not relieved, and desperation leads to disorder. Under a strong government the centres of trouble are isolated, under a weak one they spread, and in extreme cases, when the dynasty is effete, it is overthrown. If foreign invasion occurred at the same time, the "interbreeding of conqueror and conquered resulted in a vital impulse and a renewed culture." Manchus and Chinese, to take one example, did not interbreed to any extent (it was expressly forbidden) till the end of the dynasty, and what "vital impulse" the Manchus added to Chinese culture, apart perhaps from the pigtail, is best left to the imagination. And what causes famines? It is difficult to control those due to drought, but those due to floods are more often than not aggravated by neglected dykes. So the inefficiency of government and the extent of "natural disasters" are directly connected. The vital question to answer is why the government is weak at one time and not at another. The clue to this can be found in the growth of population, the development of a landed bureaucracy which becomes increasingly torn between its duties as tax-collector and its interests as landlord, the social consequences of the development of internal trade, changes in land tenure, and so on, not in the theory that dynasties become effete. The Ch'ing began with a minor and ended with a very capable Empress Dowager. It was Ch'ien Lung, usually considered one of the greatest of the Ch'ing Emperors, who, as a result of his reckless expeditions and suppression of minorities, to say nothing of his starvation of intellectual life through a rigorous censorship, left to his by no means incapable successor a country internally exhausted and externally surrounded by enemies. The famine-effete theory does not fit the facts.

Examples of *a priori* thinking, of which the author accuses the Chinese, could be multiplied indefinitely. Sometimes it is mere lack of knowledge that leads him astray. He says that Japan has answered in the negative the question as to whether or not one can adopt the motor-car or the wireless without at the same time adopting representative government or trade unionism. Yet it is common knowledge that the whole purpose of Japanese education is to

teach Western technique without exposing students to the spirit behind it and that her representative institutions are mockery. Countries that come late to capitalism do not go through the classic stages of those in which it originated.

The Chinese language presents obvious difficulties to the translator. The author has shown these difficulties very clearly, but he is on safer grounds when dealing with scientific than with general terms. Considering the impossibility of China ever giving up her ideographs, however, the suggestion that English should be used is academic. Attention can be more profitably directed to the problem of making translation effective. At the moment development is sporadic and uneven; the need for a strong centralizing body to direct and classify the new trends has already been realized and partly satisfied. Mr. Purcell is quite right in pointing out that Wen Li does not encourage the growth of the logical faculty, but there are, even at that, all kinds of Wen Li, and he has chosen the poetic rather than the documentary style. But he does admit that it does not follow that Chinese is incapable of logical arrangements. This, to my mind, destroys his conclusion that English must replace Chinese in the teaching of Western ideas. The new Chinese language, the language used in scientific, literary, and historical work, to take only a few examples, is in no way constricted by the artificialities of style. On the contrary, it is crude, ugly, and the sentence formation loose to a degree. Sometimes the language will settle down to a more standard form, but the changes which have already come about are sufficient evidence that the ideographic script will never be discarded; the Chinese can and do express everything they wish. The old bureaucratic Empire did not need an exact language; the bureaucrat had a vested interest in ambiguity just as lawyers have in legal jargon or doctors in their Latin prescriptions. The coming of Western forms of organization and technique have undermined the mandarinate; the new State must be based on literacy, propaganda, and modern technique. Economic and social forces are therefore on the side of growth and the surest sign that the Chinese language is adequate to meet all the demands made upon it is the existence of a society for the preservation of the old literary style.

So much for the language. The long chapter on the San Min Chu I seems hardly worth the effort, for this book is certainly not the basis of Chinese education; instruction in the Three Principles is as formal as their observance. The critical work that the author has done on this adds little, therefore, to the discussion. It is unfortunately true that Chinese education is being moulded by forces other than those which the author has taken into account, and although, of all people, the Chinese are the most willing to listen to the philosopher, he who would seek to give guidance would do well to acquaint himself with the share that we have taken in driving this great people along the paths of nationalism and militarism. Order in the East waits on order in the West. Consideration of such factors would not have led the author to the amazing conclusion that "So long as Chinese parents send their children to school in this unseemly dress (the semi-military uniform with a peak cap) there can be no serious improvement in Chinese education."

G. E. Taylor.

Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie: vol. 36. February, 1934. *Hommage à Monsieur le Professeur Maurice de Wulf.* (Louvain: L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. Pp. 546. Price 70 frs.)

The revival of interest in medieval philosophy, which has been a notable feature of present-day thought, is due in large measure to the excellent

historical studies of the great Schoolmen which have appeared during the last forty years. The name of Professor de Wulf is undoubtedly one of the best known of those who have opened to us the treasure-house of medieval thought

This special number of the *Revue Néoscolastique* is a fitting tribute to the work of Professor de Wulf on the occasion of his fortieth year of teaching. The lasting influence and fecundity of these years may be judged by the first contribution to this *Festschrift*, "L'œuvre de Monsieur de Wulf," by his close collaborator and colleague, Professor L. Noël of Louvain, and by the second contribution, "La carrière scientifique," which contains a bibliography of 26 pages. The standard of the articles which form the remainder of this large volume is very high, but it is quite impossible to discuss any of them in the limits of a review. It is even impossible to enumerate them all. Perhaps a choice may be made which, without revealing all the rich and varied subjects connected with the history of medieval philosophy to be found in this volume, may give some idea of the interest of this collection of essays. The names of the authors are themselves a warranty of scholarship. We find, for instance, Edward K. Rand: "The supposed Commentary of John the Scot on the Opuscula sacra of Boethius"; Martin Grabmann: "Eine für Examinazwecke abgefasste Quaestionensammlung der Pariser Artistenfakultät aus der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts"; Pierre Mandonnet: "Saint Albert le Grand et la 'Philosophia Pauperum' "; E. Gilson: "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne"; D. E. Sharp: "Thomas of Sutton, O.P., his place in scholasticism and an account of his psychology"; E. Longpré: "Le ms. 139 de la cathédrale de Valencia. Etude sur les réportations de Duns Scotus," etc. In fact, an act of homage worthy of the illustrious historian of philosophy to whom it is dedicated.

M. C. D'Arcy.

Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays, and Reviews. By George Santayana. Edited by Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz. (London: Constable. 1936. Pp. ix + 238. Price 10s. net.)

In this volume the editors have selected sixteen pieces of Mr. Santayana's, and have appended a complete bibliography of his published writings. Mr. Santayana himself contributes a brief but memorable preface.

The sixteen pieces include his celebrated Herbert Spencer Lecture of 1923, and also an address read at the tercentenary celebration of Spinoza's birth. Of the others, six were originally published in technical American philosophical journals and the rest, with one exception, in periodicals like *The Dial* and *Life and Letters*. The dates for the whole collection extend from 1902 to 1932.

The volume will be indispensable to anyone who desires to compose a monograph (or a treatise) on Mr. Santayana's philosophy, not for its bibliography only but also for the evidence it gives of the growth of its author's characteristic conceptions—essence, substance, intuition, animal faith, the place of phenomenalism, representationism, and a sort of sub-metaphysical "naturalism." Much unity in his life's aim also becomes apparent. In his own words (although with some alteration of their intention) he has striven long and nobly in the cause of "sacred material conditions" and endeavoured to show how the spirit may be "at home in this world and not merely a captive or a fugitive."

To those whose interest in Mr. Santayana is less professional I should suggest that the book will be savoured best if it is tasted intermittently at propitious moments. Otherwise feelings of strain may accompany the reader's

revolving attention to a rapid diversity of themes. And even a desultory perusal would catch the pure brightness of verbal jewels. "Look long and be brief"; "The suasion of the symbol"; "Death for the pragmatist simply *is* burial." But Mr. Santayana himself has some pleasant things to say about jewels, and why ladies succumb to their spell, and why they dazzle us but hide themselves. The magic of these pebbles, delectable though it be, is only a tiny gracious embellishment of the subtler, consuming charm of a philosophy whose dominating characteristic is *gravitas*.

JOHN LAIRD.

Life Here and Now: Conclusions Derived from an Examination of the Sense of Duration. By ARTHUR PONSONBY (LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE). (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 289. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book falls roughly into two parts, the first being a discussion of time and of our sense of duration, with particular reference to the variety and instability of our temporal experience. The material assembled under these heads, and the author's comments thereupon, are highly interesting. Apart from useful practical suggestions on the use and "making" of time, the conclusion reached is, in effect, the somewhat disappointing one that, "Whether it depends on physical, mental, or emotional factors, or on psychological, moral, and spiritual factors the Sense of Duration is perhaps the most important part of our make-up."

The second part digresses among themes of a social and political kind, in which Lord Ponsonby is always stimulating: their derivation, nevertheless, from "an examination of the Sense of Duration," is scanty. There is a long chapter on Immortality, and the question runs through the whole book. Here and elsewhere the author discloses the strange (but not peculiar) assumption that "the more serious and thoughtful sections of the community" are with him. This tone links ill-assorted opinions—those, for example, of Lord Ponsonby and of the *Morning Post*!

As analyst of time we might have expected Lord Ponsonby to be critical of Lord Ponsonby as reformer. This is not the case. He recurs to the misleading analogy of "clearing the ground" of "outworn creeds," otiose institutions, and the like. But what "clearing of the ground," one can only ask, short of the impending race-suicide, is possible for actual, time-conditioned man?

Notwithstanding its dual nature, this is a readable and interesting book. It is offered as an alternative to the author's reminiscences, which, otherwise, he might have written. In view of Lord Ponsonby's unrivalled opportunities and exceptional gifts in the reminiscent art, may we not hope that he will now, after all, write those reminiscences?

RALPH E. STEDMAN

Philosophy of Our Uncertainties. By GUSTAV E. MUELLER. (Norman, U.S.A.: University of Oklahoma Press. 1936. Pp. xii + 236. Price $3.00.)

This is a book of very considerable significance. Its author, now a member of the University of Oklahoma, is a philosopher of manifest power and penetration, and a writer of force and pungency. The style, staccato and epigrammatic, is of one substance with the argument. This is a far-ranging offensive defence of a philosophical idealism in the direct Hegelian line—Hegelian notwithstanding the author's denunciation of "absolute" idealism. As such it is quite the most persuasive, and in parts the most convincing, essay I have read. The theme is developed in a spirited, even an original, fashion, and it

is as manifestly erudite as it is free from the burden of erudition. It is briefly and generally expressed in the author's own closing paragraph:

> "The symbol of philosophy is the circle, the circle of circles. A dialectical universe is manifesting itself through many situations, in each of which its problematic and dialectical character is experienced in a different perspective, in a different modification. But the circling movement of philosophy is also an ascent. Reality as object led to life as mind, ethical life rose to the blessed innocence of beauty, freedom of the world met its limitation in the absolute Being experienced in religious symbol-language, and ontology thinks the dialectical logic of the whole."

Dr. Mueller's negative or destructive arguments (e.g. against the "Four Fallacies of Scientism") are, in my judgment, more cogent than his constructive ones (which hinge chiefly upon the ontological argument in its most general—or Hegelian—form); while the almost infinite variety of instruction and suggestion one can gather on the way is of greater value than either his *mappa mundi* or his journey's end. Space will not permit a criticism of his detailed discussion; nor, in some important connections, can it be fairly attempted on the basis of the inevitably brief sketch of special problems provided in this ambitious essay. In general, however, this brevity does not preclude an adequate, if cleverly condensed, account of the several branches of experience from the standpoint of the author's principles, or from what he calls "the standpoint of philosophy."

I venture the judgment that too much weight bears upon the term "dialectical" in this argument. It is not that one tires of the mere word, but that one wonders just what it means when used of "the whole." The author renounces the kind of idealism which reduces the hard differences and distinctions of the world to "harmonious mush"; and he insists that the whole contemplated by philosophy is "a dialectical tension of irreconcilable and irreducible opposites." Yet, we are told, it is also a "unity and a reconciliation." This unification and reconciliation of irreconcilables and irreducibles, by the merit of "dialectic" seems to me little advance upon what Dr. Mueller describes as "mush." I have no hesitation, however, in commending this book to readers of PHILOSOPHY: it is quite the most powerful essay in idealism (the author prefers the title cosmological vitalism) that has appeared for some time.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Head, Heart and Hands in Human Evolution. By R. R. MARETT, D.Sc., LL.D. (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1935. Pp. 303. Price 10s. 6d.)

In this book, Dr. Marett, Rector of Exeter College and Reader in Social Anthropology at Oxford, has collected a number of his addresses, lectures, and papers. They are arranged in three main parts. Part I deals with the leading ideas in the study of sociology. It contains three chapters on the antitheses: (1) Evolution and Progress, subordinating evolution as a category of ordinary biology, to progress which is a distinctly human attribute proved by history to be real; (2) Fact and Value, allotting to the sociologist the task, not of framing judgments, but of presenting the facts in such a way that they can be used for the criticism of values; (3) Race and Society, expounding shortly the biological basis of race and then advising the sociologist to concentrate on society rather than on race. Part II treats religious feeling, thinking, and acting, and illustrates these by chapters on particular examples, e.g. on totems, charms, etc. Part III gives an account of the rôle which the human

hand, i.e. the progress of technology, has played in the development of mankind. The fundamental idea underlying and fusing into a unity all these miscellaneous contents is the belief in the progressive triumph of spirit over matter and in the creative mission of mankind to guide evolution towards the aim of an organized life scheme centred on a supreme good, comprising truth, beauty, and righteousness. Since, however, the progress of mankind does not advance along one straight line, but rather along many tentative tracks, studies of this kind should produce in us a spirit of tolerance of variety in human affairs, especially when dealing with the task of educating the uncivilized.

F. A. E. Crew.

John Stuart Mackenzie. Edited by his Wife. (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 176. Price 5s.)

Contemporary philosophy owes much to J. S. Mackenzie. Reflection was the principal business of his long and strenuous life. He was learned, he had wide sympathies, he had a strong concern with politics not only as a subject of academic study, but as a sphere of practical social action; he was accessible to new ideas, and he was throughout constructive in aim and temperament. This little books adds nothing to the statement of his philosophy. But it reports the main events and circumstances of his life—some of which, as e.g. his early voyaging to South America, are probably unknown to many of his colleagues and friends. A considerable part of the book is by his own hand—notes which he made in preparation for a "biographia philosophica." These have been skilfully edited and augmented by Mrs. Mackenzie. Professor Muirhead has contributed a characteristically illuminating "foreword"; and Dr. W. Tudor Jones an interesting chapter on Mackenzie's professorial work at Cardiff.

H. J. W. Hetherington.

The Social Sciences: Their Relations in Theory and in Teaching. (London: The Le Play House Press. 1936. Pp. 222. Price 5s. net.)

This book is the report of a conference held in London in September 1935 under the joint auspices of the Institute of Sociology and the International Student Service (British Committee). The subject of the conference is sufficiently indicated in the title; and the main body of the book consists of symposia, by recognized experts in the respective subjects, of the relations to the social sciences of history, political theory, economics, and sociology. It also contains a foreword by Professor Ernest Barker, an address on "Sociology to-day" by Mr. J. A. Hobson, a report by Mr. T. H. Marshall on the teaching of the social sciences in British Universities, and a summary, also by Mr. Marshall, of the discussion of that report which took place at the conference. As might be expected, there is considerable disagreement between the contributors to the volume; nor does any definite conclusion emerge from it. But most of the contributions are interesting in themselves; and the whole volume is welcome evidence of the vitality of the social sciences and of the interest taken by those who teach them in the important problems which concern their nature, purpose, and interrelations. A further volume on the same subject is, no doubt, to be expected as a result of the second conference which was held in September 1936.

O. de Selincourt.

Of Human Freedom. By F. W. J. Schelling. Translated with an Introduction by James Gutmann, Ph.D. (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1936. Pp. lii + 128. Price $1.50.)

The translator remarks that no other modern philosopher of Schelling's importance has been as little accessible to students unable to read the original. Dr. Gutmann has selected the "Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom and matters connected therewith" as a suitable introduction to Schelling's metaphysics, and he succeeds in translating it in a manner that reproduces the meaning and also illustrates the temperament of the writer and the atmosphere of his times.

The translator's Introduction gives a brief account of Schelling's life and qualities, and emphasizes his importance as something more than an intermediate stage between Fichte and Hegel.

There are passages dealing with the nature of the copula that raise problems fundamental to modern logic but the present-day student, for whom this translation is intended, will probably find Schelling more interesting as exemplifying the philosophical accompaniments of the Romantic Movement than as contributing to the solution of philosophical problems.

W. A. Sinclair.

The Self in Psychology. By A. H. B. Allen. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. 282. Price 10s. 6d.)

The author declares himself at the outset to be in favour of a "self-psychology," and says, "The main object of this work will be to see whether some positive content cannot be ascribed to selfhood, whether it does not have effects in actual experience, which can be described." It does not appear that he is more successful in the former task than other writers have been who start from the subject-object relation in cognition. Though he makes out a strong case for the necessity of the conception of a self as subject, and claims that it is an immediately experienced fact, he can say little more about its intrinsic qualities than that it is capable of enhanced or diminished intensity of consciousness. His very careful discussion rather reveals the abstract nature of this conception. He is more successful on the functional side, arguing in detail that the self actively maintains its conscious level by differentiating the objective field, and entering into relations with other selves. To this extent it shapes experience. All purposive action proceeds from the self.

Holding that the self is present in all mental activities, Mr. Allen is led to extend his treatment over a wide range, and there is really more said about cognition than about the self. These discussions are always germane to the central theme, but if there were more variety of emphasis in statement the structure of the book would be clearer. None of the material is very novel, but it is useful to have so much brought together in a single volume for thoughtful and unbiased review.

A. W. Wolters.

The Social Thought of the Ancient Civilizations. By Joyce O. Hertzler, Professor of Sociology, University of Nebraska. (London: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 1936. Pp. xv + 409. Price 24s.)

Here we have a spaciousness of declamation rather than of argument, an induction for philosophy rather than philosophy itself. We see the wise men of antiquity taking the essential good for granted; their mission is to secure

that it be respected in its scattered detail, as this seems evident to them in their station and prejudice, in their passion and aspiration.

Professor Hertzler's book is rich in skilfully selected and arranged quotation, and the concluding chapter usefully summarizes the main characteristics of the thought reviewed. This new volume may be read with profit alongside Professor L. T. Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*. Its aim is to reveal the indebtedness of our present civilization to the colourful procession of social thought which contributed so much to the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations themselves. "The importance of the phenomena of culture diffusion has not been sufficiently taken into consideration in the history of thought, especially social thought." The practical wisdom of the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hittites, Persians, Hebrews, Indians, and Chinese is not the less arresting and provocative for its ignorance of the methods of science and philosophy, and we have accepted it for our working heritage notwithstanding the shyness of our acknowledgment. "Though this pre-Greek thought is ancient, immature, fragmentary, and non-scientific, it contains the germs of practically everything that is valid in social science thinking. The ancients *have* stolen most of our good ideas."

Yet these good ideas were after all ineffective for the purpose of mass transformation. Large human groupings have had their distinctiveness and have had their day. The sociologist observes as a defect of ancient social thought that it is more concerned with the salvation of the individual in society than with the nature and possibilities of society itself. Though what is required for good government is by no means neglected, the main appeal is to the individual to do what is right if he would have health, wealth, honour, tranquillity, and length of days. But that society and the state may in some sense be valuable in themselves is a possibility which does little to dispute that the individual should still seek for good even though the social order seems doomed to decay. Those prophets and thinkers of the past who seem to have limited their hopes to a chosen "remnant" may perhaps be appraised as revealing a perception of realities not less profound than their social despair. Professor Hertzler is clearly a Westerner still retaining faith in progress. Yet Lao-Tse is not the least of the ancient sages.

M. Kaye.

The Scientist in Action. By William H. George, MSc., Ph.D. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 355. Price, 10s. 6d. net.)

This book is the result of the author's efforts to solve for himself many of the problems in the philosophy of science, and especially those concerned with the connection between mathematics and physics. He favours what he calls the theory of patterning, similar to views advocated by Mach, Kirchhoff, Karl Pearson, and Hobson. "On the patterning theory of science, classifications, laws, and theories are regarded as ways of arranging facts. They are biological products of scientists, each of whom has his own unique internal (biological) and external environment" (p. 191).

While science is, of course, an activity of a group of the higher apes—and many learned writers on the philosophy of science seem to forget this—the reader will be disappointed if he expects an analysis of the effect of the internal or external environment on scientific theories and why the patterning is done in a certain way in one epoch and differently in another. The author does not clearly distinguish between mathematical, physical, and functional theories of nature, and this renders obscure a large portion of his treatment, e.g. that on the difference between wave-mechanics and classical mechanics.

Again, he does not bring out the profound difference between deductive science and the mixture of induction and deduction which is the foundation of scientific method, as Bacon so clearly demonstrated, and which Northrop has so brilliantly developed in his *Science and First Principles*. In fact, induction and deduction do not appear in the index.

Dr. George obviously has a wide knowledge of scientific literature, and there are many varied, and sometimes amusing, quotations, and he is not afraid to expose some of the nonsense which masquerades as science in recent publications. He does not stress, however, the value of careful definition in science, and he is himself confused by a problem which depends upon lack of it, viz. whether a whole is more than the sum of its parts. The book follows the best scientific procedure in having precise references and useful summaries, and includes a very interesting chapter on the future of experimental research.

G. Burniston Brown.

The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected. A Study of the Arahan. By I. B. Horner, M.A. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1936. Pp. 328. Price 12s. 6d.)

This is a technical study in a limited field, yet as a further attempt to dig up the roots of primitive Buddhism, it is of more importance than might seem. Mrs. Rhys Davids's challenge to the ordinary interpretation of Buddhism has stirred others, among them Miss Horner, and in the main her work goes to support the contentions of Mrs. Rhys Davids that Buddhist doctrine, as we now have it, is as far removed from the teachings of Gotama as, shall we say, the doctrines of the Council of Trent were from those of the Synoptic tradition? The concept of the arahan, the saint, of Buddhism, is shown by Miss Horner's investigation to have been of somewhat slow growth. In Mahayana Buddhism interest in the concept of arahan died away, in view of the ideal of becoming a Buddha. Hinayana Buddhism taught that arahanhood could be attained on earth, but by so doing was obliged to restrict the conception according to the circumstances of earthly existence. How this came to be is traced by Miss Horner with much patient detail. Those who are interested in early Buddhism will find in this careful study more than the mere title indicates, for, incidentally, it gives a picture of much of the general development of that faith as well. It is, moreover, a model of research method in its subject.

E. S. Waterhouse.

Books received also:—

Yoga Vasishtha. The Story of Queen Chudala and Sermons of Holy Vasishtha. Translated by H. P. Shastri. London: Favil Press Ltd. 1937. Pp. 170. 3s.

The Siddhāntalesasangraha of Appayya Dīksita. Vol. II: Roman and Sanskrit Texts. Edited by S. S. S. Sastri. University of Madras. 1937. Pp. 117+lxi. Rs. 3.

M. Bishop. *Pascal. The Life of Genius.* London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. 1937. Pp. x + 398. 12s. 6d.

T. Haecker. *Soren Kierkegaard.* (Translated, with a Biographical Note, by A. Dru.) Oxford University Press: London: Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. 67. 2s. 6d.

S. Kierkegaard. *Philosophical Fragments.* By Johannes Climacus. (Translated with Introduction and Notes by D. F. Swenson.) Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation. 1936. Pp. xxx + 105. 7s. 6d.

G. Wells. *Appeal to Common Sense.* London: Methuen & Co. 1937. Pp. viii + 262. 7s. 6d.

M. J. Adler. *Art and Prudence. A Study in Practical Philosophy.* New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Pp. xv + 686. 5 dollars.

R. St. Clair. *Towards a Religion of the Moral Law.* Cheltenham: R. S. Watson. 1937. Pp. 53. 2s.

W. J. Beale. *Divine Causation. A Critical Study concerning "Intermediaries."* London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xv + 335. 7s. 6d.

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N. Berdyaev. *The Destiny of Man.* London: G. Bles. 1937. Pp. vi + 377. 16s.

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F. C. Sharp and P. G. Fox. *Business Ethics.* New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co. 1937. Pp. xi + 316. 8s. 6d. 2 dollars 25.

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W. E. Hocking. *The Lasting Elements of Individualism.* New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. xiv + 187. 2 dollars. 9s.

L. R. Wolberg. *The Psychology of Eating.* London: G. Harrap & Co. 1937. Pp. xii + 321. 8s. 6d.

E. F. Carritt. *An Ambiguity of the word "Good"* (Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, 1937). London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. 32. 1s. 6d.

R. H. S. Crossman. *Plato To-day.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 302. 7s. 6d.

A Textbook of Marxist Philosophy (Prepared by the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy under the Direction of M. Shirokov). Tr. by A. C. Moseley. London: V. Gollancz, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 399. 5s.

Origins of Clerk Maxwell's Electric Ideas: As described in familiar letters to William Thomson. Edited by Sir J. Larmor. London: Cambridge University Press. 1937. Pp. 56. 3s. 6d.

M. H. Bulley. *Art and Understanding.* London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xix + 292. 15s.

F. J. E. Woodbridge. *Nature and Mind.* Selected Essays. New York: Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. x + 509. 18s. 6d.

W. Hauer, K. Heim and K. Adam. *Germany's New Religion. The German Faith Movement.* (Tr. by T. S. K. Scott-Craig and R. E. Davies.) London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 168. 5s.

J. Feibleman. *Christianity, Communism and the Ideal Society. A Philosophical Approach to Modern Politics.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 419. 12s. 6d.

A. Peel and J. A. R. Marriott. *Robert Forman Horton.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 381. 10s. 6d.

O. Bagnall. *The Origin and Properties of the Human Aura.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1937. Pp. vii + 197. 7s. 6d.

R. H. Thouless. *General and Social Psychology. The Psychological Basis of Social Life.* (Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged.) London: University Tutorial Press, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xii + 522. 8s. 6d.

M. Roberts. *The Modern Mind.* London: Faber & Faber. 1937. Pp. 284. 8s. 6d.

N. Fialko. *The New City. A Story of the Future.* (Translated from the Russian and revised by the author.) New York: Margent Press. 1937. Pp. 153. 2 dollars.

C. Maund. *Hume's Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Examination.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xxi + 310. 12s. 6d.

G. Dawes Hicks. *The Philosophical Bases of Theism.* (Hibbert Lectures.) London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 272. 8s. 6d.

E. W. Strong. *Procedures and Metaphysics. A Study in the Philosophy of Mathematical-Physical Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.* Berkeley: University of California Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1937. Pp. vi + 301. 11s. 6d.

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W. Diltheys Schriften XII. Zur Preussischen geschichte. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1936. Pp. x + 212. Geheftet RM. 5.25; gebunden RM. 6.75.

Der junge Dilthen. Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern 1852–1870. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1933. Pp. v + 317. Geheftet RM. 4.20; gebunden RM. 5.10.

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E. Cassirer. *Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik. Historische und Systematische studien zum Kausalproblem.* Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers Verlag. 1937. Pp. xi + 265. Kr. 8.

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U. Spirito. *La Vita come Ricerca.* Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1937. Pp. 236. Lire quindici.

F. Lombardi. *Kierkegaard.* Con una Scelta di Passi nuovamante tradotti, una Bibliografia, e due tavole fuori testo. Firenze: "La Nuova Italia" Editrice. 1936. Pp. 328. Lire 14.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

THE Syllabus of Lectures and Evening Meetings for the Session 1937–38 is now in course of preparation, and will be sent to members in the early autumn.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.
These lectures are free to members.
(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.
(6) There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies, at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1.

[*Suggested*]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

The Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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